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Abstract 
Traditionally, solid axle railway wheelsets are stabilised by using passive suspensions on a 
conventional rail vehicle, but such additional stiffness affects the pure rolling action of the 
wheelset around the curve. It has been theoretically proven that this design conflict between 
stability and curving performance can be solved by applying active control instead of 
conventional passive components, resulting in the reduction of the wear of the wheels and 
track by minimising the track shifting forces. In the active approach, the use of actuators, 
sensors and data processors to replace the traditional passive suspension raises the issue of 
the system safety in the event of a failure of the active control, which could result in the loss 
of stability and in more severe cases, derailment. Further on, in active control systems for 
railway vehicles the actuators tend to be significantly more expensive and require more 
additional space than sensors, and an electronic control unit. Therefore, developing an 
analytical redundancy-based fault tolerance technique for an actively controlled wheelset that 
minimises the number of actuators will clearly be more beneficial. Thus the emphasis of this 
research is to develop a fault-tolerant system of active control for a railway vehicle in the 
event of actuator malfunction in order to guarantee stability and good curving performance 
without using additional actuators. The key achievements of this research can be summarised 
as follows:  
 The research considers three of the most common types of actuator failure for the 
electro-mechanical actuators: fail-hard (FH), short circuit (SC) and open circuit (OC). 
The fail-hard is a failure condition when the motor shaft of the actuator becomes 
immovable, whereas the short circuit and open circuit are failures that occur in the 
electrical parts of the actuator which correspond to zero voltage and zero current in 
the motor respectively. 
 xxvi 
 
 The research investigates and develops a thorough understanding of the effect of 
actuator faults and failure modes on the vehicle behaviour that provides the necessary 
foundation for the development of the proposed fault-tolerant strategy. 
 An effective fault detection and isolation methods for actuator faults through two 
different approaches is developed; the vehicle model-based approach and the actuator 
model-based approach.  Additionally, the research takes into account the reliability 
and robustness of the FDI schemes in the presence of sensor failures and parameter 
uncertainties in the system.  
 The research develops the control re-configuration in order to cope with the identified 
failure mode of the actuator in order to maintain the vehicle stability and desired 
curving performance. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW  
A conventional railway vehicle is stabilised through the use of the passive suspensions, but 
such additional stiffness has an adverse impact on the curving performance (Polach, 2004); 
resulting  in the severe wear of the wheel and rail during curving and fatigue due to the high 
stress related with rolling contact during curve negotiation.   On the other hand, there is a 
limitation to the design of an optimum passive suspension that limits the extent to which 
contact forces can be minimised in wheel-rail contact patches in order to solve this conflict 
for the railway vehicle.   
More recent studies have suggested that the active control for the railway wheelset in the 
primary suspensions can be used to overcome this design conflict by stabilising the wheelsets 
without compromising the vehicle performance on curved track  (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & 
Himmelstein, 2004); by affecting/ minimising the dynamic forces between wheel and rail. 
In this new method, the use of actuators and sensors to replace the traditional passive 
suspensions raises the concern of system safety in the event of a malfunction of the active 
control, which could result in the loss of stability and in more severe cases derailment 
(Mirzapour & Mei, 2014).Therefore, the active controls for safety-critical applications have 
to achieve a high level of integrity through appropriate fault tolerance solutions that 
guarantee the basic functionality and safety of the overall system whilst permitting 
component fault(s) (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014).  
This chapter presents a brief background of the actively controlled wheelset with different 
vehicle configuration and control methodologies. Meanwhile, a full description of the 
proposed fault-tolerant strategy will be provided as it represents an important issue in 
maintaining the safety and reliability of the active suspension for the railway vehicle. Finally, 
the research objective of this study as well as thesis structure will be given.    
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1.1 Background and Overview of Active Control  
A conventional railway wheelset is composed of two coned (or profiled) wheels rigidly 
connected to a common axle to rotate at the same angular velocity, as shown in Figure 1.1 
(Wickens, 1998). When an unconstrained wheelset travels through a curved track, it is 
displaced laterally and the rolling radii of the two wheels are therefore different because of 
the profiles of the wheelsets. Consequently, different forward speeds are obtained for each 
wheelset due to the difference in rolling radii that provide a natural centring/curving action. 
However, this arrangement has the disadvantage of presenting a problem of kinematic 
instability, known as “Kinematic Oscillation” or wheelset “hunting”, as illustrated in Figure 
1.2 (Brickle, 1986).   
 
Figure 1-1: Conventional wheelset for railway vehicles 
 
Figure 1-2: “Kinematic Oscillation” or wheelset “hunting” 
The dynamic performance of conventional railway vehicles is determined by the basic 
geometry and mechanical parameters such as mass, springs, dampers and contact mechanics, 
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etc., the values of which are constrained in all manner of ways (Goodall & Kortum, 2002; 
Iwnicki, 2003). The instability problem is solved on conventional railway vehicles by using 
passive springs connected between the wheelset and the body/bogie frame of the vehicle, but 
the added stiffness also interferes with the movement of the wheelset on curves (Anon, 1997; 
Mei & Goodall, 1999a)  and is known to be a main cause of severe wheel and rail wear (Mei 
& Goodall, 2001). There is therefore a difficult trade-off to be made between the vehicle’s 
stability and curving performance in the design of railway vehicles/suspensions (Pearson, 
Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004). 
A detailed study shows that there are limitations to designing such optimum basic geometry 
and mechanical parameters to overcome the perceived conflict for the railway vehicle 
(Wickens, Stability of High Speed trains, 1973). A number of more recent investigations have 
concluded that this design conflict can be solved by applying active control within the 
primary suspensions to stabilise the wheelset and control laws can be formulated not to 
interfere with the natural curving actions of the wheelset; leading to a significant reduction in 
the wear of the wheelset and track, and minimised track-shifting forces (Mei & Goodall, 
2000a). Therefore, there has been increasing interest in the use of active control in the 
railway industry as opposed to its passive counterparts (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 
2007). 
With active suspensions, actuators can be used to deliver the desired forces or torques that are 
reliant upon measurements from a combination of sensors and a controller, as given in Figure 
1.3 (Goodall, 1997). The use of active control leads to higher levels of dynamic performance 
that may be completely impractical with passive approaches (Goodall & Kortum, 2002). In 
the passive suspensions, the relationship between inputs and outputs only determined by the 
value of masses, springs, dampers and the geometrical arrangement (Goodall & Mei, 2006a, 
p. 328) whereas, in the active approach, the dynamic performance becomes dependent upon 
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the number and positioning of the actuators, the number and type of sensors, and the software 
that implements the control algorithms to provide a link between the controller and 
physical/vehicle system to be controlled (Goodall & Mei, 2006b). 
 
                         
 
Figure 1-3: Active control strategy 
Recently, a number of different wheelset configurations and active control methodologies 
have been developed to maintain stability without compromising the steering performance of 
the vehicle, which offers greater scope of possible approaches for the active primary 
suspensions (Goodall, Bruni, & Mei, 2006; Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 2007). 
These proposed technologies can significantly improve the future efficiency of rail vehicles 
in terms of cost, energy consumption, maintenance, weight and reduced complexity in 
vehicle configurations (Kortüm, Goodall, & Hedrick, 1998). This section reviews various 
options for the actively controlled wheelset. Different actuation configurations for the active 
control of railway wheels, and different control approaches and control design methods are 
provided in subsections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, respectively. 
1.1.1 Vehicle configuration and actuation scheme 
A number of different vehicle (mechanical) configuration schemes for controlling the wheels 
and the wheelset have been proposed recently. These options are illustrated diagrammatically 
in figures 1.4 to 1.9.  
Vehicle Sensors Actuators 
Controller 
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Figure 1-4: Actuated solid-axle wheelset (ASW) via yaw torque 
 
Figure 1-5: Actuated solid-axle wheelset (ASW) via lateral force 
       
Figure 1-6: Actuated independently rotating wheels (AIRW) 
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Figure 1-7: Driven independently rotating wheels (DIRW) 
                                             
 
Figure 1-8: Directly steered wheels (DSW) 
                                          
 
Figure 1-9: Secondary yaw control (SYC) 
                                           
 Actuated solid-axle wheelset (ASW):  The first concept was investigated through the 
use of controlled traction rods to provide a yaw relation of coned wheelsets in order to 
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improve curving performance without compromising stability (Shen & Goodall, 
1997). In the ASW configuration, the actuator provides a controllable force or torque 
to a conventional wheelset to maintain the stability and curving performance of the 
railway vehicle. The actuated solid-axle wheelset via yaw torque and lateral force 
schemes are shown in figures 1.4 and 1.5, respectively. It has been suggested by Mei 
and Goodall (1999a) that yaw actuation is preferable to lateral actuation, with the 
former requiring a lower control force to achieve the same level of stability and 
provide better ride comfort experienced by the passengers. In recent years, several 
studies have focused on the advantages of applying the ASW concept to conventional 
bogie-based architectures for high speed service compared to the passive vehicle. For 
example, a study in (Perez, Busturia, & Goodall, 2002) investigated the problem of 
sensors’ requirements and required state estimation for the implementation of the 
active control strategies with the main emphasis on improved curving performances. 
A comprehensive study (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004) studied both 
stability and curving performance, and requirements for actuators and sensors, as well 
as the required state estimation for practical implementation. The demonstrated 
concept has also been tested on a full size vehicle (Pearson, et al., 2003).  
 Actuated independently rotating wheelset (AIRW): The use of independently 
rotating wheelsets (IRW) allows the two wheels on the same axle to rotate 
independently from each other. This configuration eliminates the cause of hunting due 
to the decoupling of the yaw motion and lateral displacement (Dukkipati, 
Narayanaswamy, & Osman, 1992), as shown in Figure 1.6, but the removed 
constraint between the two wheels also lead to the loss of guidance and natural 
curving of the solid-axle wheelset (Goodall & Li, 2000) Therefore, some form of 
steering control becomes necessary but this tends to require a lower control torque 
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(actuation effort) when compared to a conventional solid wheelset (Mei & Goodall, 
2001).  
 Driven independently rotating wheelset (DIRW): For the independently-rotating 
wheelset, there is a possibility of controlling the wheelset via an active torsional 
coupling, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.7, where independently driven, 
independently rotating wheelsets provide drive and guidance via motor control 
(Gretzschel & Bose, 1999). The other study in (Mei, Li, Goodall, & Wickens, 2002) 
investigates the implementation of the DIRW on two-axle vehicle (without bogie) on 
a low speed vehicle through the use of permanent magnet electric motors embedded 
inside the wheels.  
 Directly steered wheels (DSW): The concept was initially treated by (Aknin, 
Ayasse, & Devallez, 1991). In this configuration, the axles of the independently-
rotating wheelset are mounted onto a wheel frame, as shown in Figure 1.8. This 
configuration offers the possibility of applying a lateral force between the frame and 
the wheels to steer the angle directly via a track rod. Study in (Wickens, 1994) 
considered a vehicle configuration with a carbody and two bogies, and each bogie 
equipped with DSW which is guided by feedback on the lateral wheel/rail 
displacement, with the main emphasis on the vehicle stability and curving 
performance, where very good curving performance can be obtained compared to a 
conventional passive vehicle. A recent application of the DSW concept is proposed by 
(Suda, Wang, Nishina, Lin, & Michitsuji, 2012), where independently rotating wheels 
with inverse tread conicity have been considered in order to improve steering ability 
without any complex bogie structure, and the effectiveness of the concept has been 
demonstrated using a vehicle with two single-axle bogies in a 1/10 scale model 
experiment. 
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 Secondary yaw control (SYC): This concept is based on applying a yaw torque on 
the bogie, to improve stability and/or curving performance, as shown in Figure 1.9. 
The actuator may be designed to replace the traditional passive yaw dampers, and 
therefore active control of the running gear can be introduced without fundamental 
redesign of the bogie (Diana, Bruni, Cheli, & Resta, 2002), but this approach is less 
beneficial in tackling the trade-off between the stability and curving performance than 
what is possible when the control is applied directly to wheelsets. 
 
1.1.2 Control strategies 
The different vehicle configurations reviewed in subsection 1.1.1 present several practical 
challenges that have to be considered in order to develop the controller (Goodall & Mei, 
2006b). One of the most important challenges relates to providing essential feedback signals 
for the controller as that some of the feedback variables are very difficult and expensive to 
measure, such as the relative movement between the wheels and rail-track and the wheelset 
angle of attack (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 2007; Li H. , 2001). Therefore, it is 
necessary to find cost-effective solutions with the use of practical sensors (Mei, Li, & 
Goodall , 2001). Furthermore, railway vehicles are subject to parameter variations when the 
vehicle is running along a track, especially at the wheel-rail interface. Another issue is 
related to the order of the dynamic models of railway vehicle, which is usually high, which 
may lead to a complex controller (Zolotas & Goodall, 2007, p. 4). For the configuration of 
yaw actuation, which is also considered in this study, control strategies that have been 
proposed include intuitively formulated control methods and model-based control 
approaches. 
 
 10 
 
 Active yaw damping:  where the vehicle stabilisation can be achieved by applying a 
yaw torque to each axle proportional to its lateral velocity (Mei & Li, 2007).   
 Sky-hook spring: where the control torque of each actuator is set to be proportional 
to the yaw angle of the corresponding wheelset (Mei & Goodall, 2007). 
 Model base full state feedback control: where the controllers for the two actuators 
are designed with full-state-feedback, where the feedback states may be provided 
through the use of an estimator (Mei & Goodall, 2003a). 
Although the control requirements as well as control possibilities are mostly reliant on the 
vehicle and wheelset configurations as outlined above, an important challenge relates to the 
strategies for the safety and reliability of the active control (Goodall & Mei, 2006b; Goodall, 
2010). 
In the active approach, the use of actuators, sensors and data processors to replace the 
traditional passive suspensions raises the issue of system safety in the event of a failure of the 
active control, which could result in the loss of stability (i.e., wheelset hunting) and, in more 
severe cases, derailment. The practical implementation for such technology can only be made 
possible if the safety and reliability requirements can be addressed satisfactorily. Therefore, 
actively controlled wheelsets for such a safety-critical application have to attain a high level 
of integrity through fault tolerance approaches that ensure the basic functionality of the entire 
system, whilst being capable of tolerating potential faults (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 
2014). 
1.2 Fault-Tolerant Control 
More recently, fault-tolerant control has drawn significant attention due to the growing 
demand for safety, reliability, and productivity in many engineering applications (Jiang, 
2005). In recent years, an increasing number of survey papers on fault-tolerant control 
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systems have appeared (Blanke, Izadi Zamanabadi, Bogh, & Lunau, 1997; Steinberg, 2005; 
Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 2002; Zhang & Jiang, 2008; Patton, 1997) and text books on 
this subject have been published (Benıtez, Hector, García, & Fabián, 2005; Isermann, 2011; 
Ding, 2014; Patton, Frank, & Clark, 2000; Patton, Clark, & Frank, 1989; Gertler, 1998). 
Literature reviews indicated that the research on fault-tolerant control systems was first 
motivated by aircraft flight control system designs (Steinberg, 2005; Lombaerts, Saili, & 
Breeman, 2010, pp. 2-3), where the objective was to provide “self-repairing” capability in 
order to ensure that a safe landing in the incident of severe faults in aircraft can be achieved 
(Zhang & Jiang, 2008; Chandler, 1984). Historically, the notion of a fault-tolerant control 
system has been inspired by reported commercial aircraft accidents in the late 1970s 
(McMahan, 2005; Montoya, et al., 1982). In one accident, Delta Flight 1080 (April 12, 1977) 
(McMahan, 2005), the captain experienced a serious control problem in the pitch axis 
immediately after take-off. The malfunction was later determined to be the left elevator 
jammed in the up position (at 19
°
), but the pilot had been given no indication of this 
malfunction. However, based on his experience and knowledge about actuation redundancy 
in the L-1011 airplane, the pilot was able to reconfigure the remaining control elements to 
land safely. In another accident, American Airlines Flight 191 (May 25, 1979) (Montoya, et 
al., 1982) crashed, and subsequent investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board 
reported (1979) that the crash could have been avoided if the engine failure had been 
separated/isolated, a mechanism that the DC-10 did not have. More recently, fault-tolerant 
control has begun to draw more widespread attention in a variety of industrial applications, as 
can be seen from a number of existing publications such as in the aerospace (Briere, Favre, & 
Traverse, 2001; Goupile, 2011; Tarnowski, 2008), automotive (Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 
2002), railway vehicles (Goodall & Kortum, 2002; Goodall & Mei, 2006b; Goodall, 2010), 
manufacturing and other process industries (Bruccoleri, Amico, & Perrone, 2003; Mehrabi, 
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Ulsoy, Koren, & Heytler, 2002). In fact, the concept of a fault-tolerant system is a vital part 
of a control design and complex system in order to make feasible the implementation of the 
new innovation (Muenchhof, Beck, & Isermann, 2009), whereas without developing the 
fault-tolerant control the production of such a new innovation cannot be justified in terms of 
the reliability and cost for the high volume of production. Such an example can be seen for 
clutch-by-wire (eClutch) in the automotive industry (Gallagher, Paciotti, Ribichini, & Struve, 
2012). The objective of the eClutch is to provide sufficient damping through controlling the 
slip between the engine and driveline in order to minimise the excited driveline oscillation 
which occurs during synchronisation of the engine and drivetrain (Albers, Meid, & Ott, 
2010). Although the concept has been implemented successfully, it requires substantial 
consideration to develop fault-tolerant control in the incident of the components’ failures to 
ensure that the actuator and sensors are functioning in order to engage/disengage the clutch 
by driver request.  
In general, redundancy is fundamental to achieve fault tolerance which can be classified on 
the basis of redundancy in hardware and analytical redundancy (Nelson, 1990; Patton, 1991). 
1.2.1 Hardware redundancy 
In hardware redundancy at least two modules are required in order to re-configuration take 
place. One module is usually in operation with the other module used as the standby or 
backup unit. If the operation module fails, the backup unit takes over. This requires a fault 
detection and isolation (FDI) scheme to identify if an operational component has become 
faulty, in order for the reconfiguration to switch to the standby component. The fault 
detection scheme is usually performed by the use of an output signal for consistency 
checking, cross testing or voting system through the use of information in computers 
(Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 2002) . Another way is to use self-validating sensors or 
actuators to perform fault detection technique (Henry & Clarke, 1993; Clarke, 1995), where 
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sensor/ actuator has an in-built microprocessor and therefore the self-diagnosis take place 
within sensor/ actuator (Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 2002).  
Hardware redundancy can be performed with “cold-standby” or “hot-standby” methods 
(Furman, Chutani, & Nussbaumer, 1995; Isermann, 2011, p. 22). In the “cold-standby” the 
back-up component comes to operation when the fault appears, as shown in Figure 1.10. 
Although this method saves the lifetime of the component, it does not guarantee that the 
backup module is functioning at the time when it is required to be in the operation. The other 
disadvantage with this re-configuration is that a transition time is required to switch from the 
faulty component to the intake module (Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 1-10: Hardware redundancy with “cold-standby” 
In the cease of “hot-standby”, the standby unit is continuously running as shown in Figure 
1.11. In contrast to the “cold-standby” method, the continuous operation of the backup 
module ensures that the intake unit is available for operation at the expected time, and this 
strategy also minimises the transition time to start-up procedure ( Isermann, 2008).   
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Figure 1-11: Hardware redundancy with “hot-standby” 
An example of hardware redundancy can be given in military aircraft applications and the 
new generation of civilian aircrafts such as the Boeing 777 and Airbus A320/330/340/380 
(Briere, Favre, & Traverse, 2001), where the control surfaces are controlled by multiple 
actuators and motion sensors in the yaw, roll and pitch directions to maintain the required 
level of safety. The decision is made by a “voting plan” which determines the available 
components to control the system (Goupile, 2011). However, this type of redundancy 
requires multiple components to be used, and also an additional space is needed to 
accommodate the redundant components within the limited space of the system; therefore the 
cost, complexity, power consumption, weight and maintenance scheduling of the overall 
system could significantly increase (Crepin & Kress, 2000).  Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that sometimes the use of hardware redundancy is unavoidable in order to be able to develop 
a fault-tolerant strategy.  A practical example can be given in a brake-by-wire system, which 
presents the concept of hardware redundancy for safety-critical applications, where a fault-
tolerant strategy with hardware redundancies with hot-standby for the real-time 
communication system and power system were employed (Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 
2002; Schwarz, Isermann, Böhm, Nell, & Rieth, 1998). A prototype concept of an electro-
mechanical brake was developed by Continental Teves, Germany, and the system consists of 
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four electro-mechanical wheel brake modules with local microcontrollers, an 
electromechanical brake pedal module, a duplex communication bus system and a central 
brake management computer (Isermann, Schwarz, & Stolzl, 2002).  
1.2.2 Analytical redundancy 
In contrast to hardware redundancy, the analytical redundancy method can help to 
considerably reduce the use of hardware redundancies (number of components) in order to 
keep the overall cost down in terms of design and development (Frank, 1990). In an 
analytical redundancy, the re-configuration is achieved through software without adding extra 
components in the incident of fault(s) (Patton, 1991; Patton, 1997) in order to maintain 
stability and the current dynamic performance of the system close to the desired performance 
(Guenab, Weber, Theilliol, & Zhang, 2011). However, in order to allow a reconfiguration to 
take place, FDI methods must be performed to diagnose the faulty components. FDI may be 
classified depending on the dynamical availability of the model associated with the 
applications into the model-based approach, direct-signal approach and intelligent 
(knowledge) -based approach (Isermann, 2011, p. 24).  
1.2.2.1 Direct computation 
Many measured signals of processes show oscillations that are either of harmonic or 
stochastic nature, or both. If changes in these signals are related to faults in the actuators, the 
process and sensors, then signal based fault detection methods can be applied in order to 
detect an abnormal change in time or frequency domain. Therefore, in this approach FDI is 
based merely on the analysis of the output signal (measured signal) (Isermann, 2005). This 
method is well suited for detecting abnormal changes in the stator current and magnetic fields 
inside the motor of an actuator due to its periodic behaviour, but it might not be able to 
provide reliable fault detection for the bearings due to noise, gear teeth and temperature 
 16 
 
changes, etc. (Muenchhof, Beck, & Isermann, 2009).  Studies in (El Hachemi Benbouzid, 
2000; Zhongming , 2000) survey the detection of abnormal changes in the electrical (rotor, 
stator) and mechanical (bearing) parts of an induction motor through the use of the signal-
based approach in both the time and frequency domains.  
1.2.2.2  Model-based approaches 
If a physical system is sufficiently understood and a set of dynamic equations that capture its 
essential responses can be developed, a model-based approach can be appropriate (Patton, 
Uppal , & Lopez-Toribio, 2000). This approach captures human knowledge explicitly within 
the model, and a mathematical model enables powerful parameter-estimation techniques to be 
developed using concepts of parameter estimation or state-estimation techniques such as least 
square or parity equation for parameter estimation(s), or the Kalman Filter (KF) for linear 
systems, or the Extended Kalman Filter in the case of non-linearity for the state estimation 
(Isermann, 1997). In general, in the model-based approach, fault detection can be determined 
by fixed threshold(s) on residuals―the difference between real measurements and their 
estimation obtained from a mathematical model. The analysis of each residual which exceeds 
the threshold can then be used to help with fault isolation (Simani, 2006, p. 28). Figure 1.12 
shows the general structure of a model-based approach for FDI. It illustrates that the model-
based approach in FDI solves the problem at two levels: first, residuals generation are used to 
generate symptoms, and then the fault isolation is achieved through residual evaluation. This 
structure was first proposed by Chow and Willsky (1980).  
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Figure 1-12: Fault detection and isolation structure 
 This approach presented in Figure 1.12 is widely applied in many industrial applications. For 
example, the fault detection of automotive vehicle suspensions and hydraulic brakes was 
examined in (Borner, Straky, Weispfenning, & Isermann, 2002) by using the parameter 
estimation technique through parity equations and least square method. An example of the 
model-based approach for a non-linear system is given in (Zhang, et al., 2013), where FDI for 
the sensor failure is achieved through the use of the Extended Kalman Filter to ensure that the 
system reliability can be guaranteed in the event of sensor failure.  
1.2.2.3  Knowledge-based approaches 
Knowledge based approaches can be very efficient when a dynamical model of the system or 
process is unknown or very complex if the majority of real industrial applications/ processes 
are non-linear and cannot readily be modelled by applying a model-based approach (Chen, 
1995, pp. 67-70; Sobhani & Khorasani, 2009, p. 39)  . This knowledge based methods 
attempt to evaluate system knowledge to develop rule-based decision making, which is also 
known as heuristic knowledge (Isermann, 2011, pp. 22-23). A number of different 
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knowledge-based methods are possible to diagnose fault(s) depending on the available 
analytical and heuristic information of the model (Simani, 2006, pp. 57-60):  
 Fuzzy logic: if the dynamic model or parameters are not known, diagnosis is mainly 
based on heuristic information, and fuzzy system theory seems to be a natural tool to 
handle these uncertain conditions (Simani, Fantuzzi, & Patton, 2003, p. 52; 
Mendonça, Sousa, & Costa, 2006, p. 82). Instead of using a complex non-linear 
model through modelling techniques, a plant can be described by a collection of local 
affine fuzzy and non-fuzzy models (Leontaritis & Billings, 1985; Simani, Fantuzzi, & 
Patton, 2003, p. 52), where parameters are determined through identification 
techniques (Simani, 2006, p. 58). In order to extract the features for FDI, a logic 
decision process can be developed to transform residual information (quantitative 
knowledge) into qualitative statements (e.g. fault or normal conditions) (Simani, 
2006, p. 58). Research studies in (Ulieru & Isermann, 1993; Meneganti, Saviello, & 
Tagliaferri, 1998) investigated the residual evaluation primarily in the decision 
making for releasing the final yes–no decision. Further studies in (Rich & 
Venkatasubramanian, 1987; Chen & Patton, 1999, p. 68)  exploited the rule-based 
method to diagnose fault(s), where being rule-based required a database of rules and 
the accuracy of FDI depended on the inferred rules. However, in order to develop FDI 
through the fuzzy logic approach both rule-based and decision making should be 
developed at two levels in order to generate the symptoms and fault detections 
(Dexter & Benouarets, 1997). An example of using fuzzy logic for FDI in turbine 
engines can be given in (Gayme, Menon, Ball, & Mukavetz, 2003), where the fuzzy 
logic rule-based method incorporates both sensed engine parameters that represent 
engine normal operation, and fault conditions related to engine performance such as 
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high pressure turbine, high pressure compressor and fault condition related to engine 
performance such as high pressure.   
 Neural Networks:  In pattern recognition, the neural network is considered primarily 
for fault classification (Sobhani & Khorasani, 2009, p. 40), and this approach was 
suggested by (Himmelblau, 1979) (Pau, 1981). Studies (Li, Chow, Tipsuwan, & 
Hung, 2000), that considered the bearing vibration in both time and frequency 
domains are applied to build an automatic motor bearing fault diagnosis machine, and 
other studies  (Hoskins & Himmelblau, 1988) (Venkatasubramanian & Chan, 1989), 
considered the neural network-based methodology in order to provide a potential 
solution to the preceding problems in the area of process fault diagnosis.  These 
studies demonstrated the use of neural-networks’ pattern recognition for FDI. In these 
applications, the neural networks’ pattern recognition is only trained to examine the 
possibility of a fault or abnormal features in system measurements and give a fault 
classification system signal to determine the normal condition (no fault) of the system 
(Sobhani & Khorasani, 2009, p. 40). It demonstrated that the performance of the FDI 
is significantly affected by the dynamic behaviour of the systems. Therefore, the use 
of neural networks through pattern recognition for the purpose of the fault diagnosis, 
especially for the non-linear systems, may produce incorrect fault information since 
the inputs’ signals to the systems are subject to change (Simani, 2006, p. 52) (Sobhani 
& Khorasani, 2009, p. 40). This drawback can be resolved by using a neural network-
based residual generation decision-making scheme (Sobhani & Khorasani, 2009, p. 
40) or using the combination of neural network and fuzzy logic in order to minimise 
the perceived problem (Simani, 2006, pp. 52-53). The former approach was initially 
suggested by Patton et al (Patton, Chen, & Nielsen, 1995). In this method, the fault 
diagnosis system uses both analytical and heuristic knowledge of the monitored 
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system and the knowledge can be determined in terms of residual (analytical 
knowledge) and feature extraction (heuristic knowledge)  (Simani, 2006, p. 52). 
Furthermore, a fuzzy-neuron has the same structure as the artificial neuron, except 
that some or all of its parameters may de described by fuzzy logic (Simani, Fantuzzi, 
& Patton, 2003, pp. 53-54). Different structures for neuro-fuzzy networks can be 
considered (Nelles, 2001) in order to combine the advantages of both fuzzy-logic and 
neural networks (Simani, 2006, p. 53).  
An example of knowledge-based approaches in rail applications can be found in 
(Lehrasab, Roberts, & Goodman, 2002), where the health of the control system of 
train doors is determined by extracting features from the trajectory profiles of the train 
doors. Detailed diagnostics can then be carried out once a fault has been detected 
through a neural network. Another study in (Balaban, Bansal, Stoelting, & Saxena, 
2009) performed condition monitoring tasks to identify and categorise the fault mode 
for an electromechanical actuator in the aerospace industry. A subset of the faults, i.e., 
actuator jam, sensor bias, sensor drift and sensor scaling were selected for detailed 
study, with the features for fault detection determined through a neural network. 
Table 1-1 summarised the fault-tolerant control to a different range of engineering 
applications. Further on, a comprehensive research survey in (Zhang & Jiang, 2006; Blanke, 
Izadi Zamanabadi, Bogh, & Lunau, 1997; Zhang & Jiang, 2008) shows that most research on 
fault tolerant control have treated the concepts of the fault detection and isolation and re-
configuration control as two distinct issues due to the complexity of the problem. From a 
practical point of view, the integration of a fault detection and isolation scheme and an 
appropriate re-configurable control technique should be designed in an integrated manner in 
order to analyse systematically the interaction between fault detection and isolation and re-
configuration control. On the other hand, the majority of the publications have primarily 
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considered the analytical redundancy approaches for the sensors’ failure whilst comparatively 
little attention has been paid to the actuators’ failure (Zhang & Jiang, 2008; Blanke, Izadi 
Zamanabadi, Bogh, & Lunau, 1997; Frank, 1990; Patton, Uppal , & Lopez-Toribio, 2000; 
Isermann, 2011). Therefore, this research study aims to fill the following gap in the research 
field: 
 The analytical redundancy for the actuator failure. 
 Designing fault detection and isolation and re-configuration control in an integrated 
manner. 
Table 1-1: Summarised list of published studies in different applications, Fault-tolerant strategy (FTS), 
Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) 
Application  Type of 
redundancy  
Objective Failures Design approach References 
Aircraft Analytical/ 
Model-based 
approach   
R-configure the 
controller 
Sensor failures, 
wind 
components 
Reconfiguring control is 
implemented by making use 
of adaptive nonlinear 
dynamic inversion for 
autopilot control. 
(Lombaerts, 
Looye, Chu, 
& Mulder, 
2012) 
Aircraft  Analytical 
redundancy/ 
Knowledge-
based  
FDI Actuator and 
sensor failures  
The fault-tolerant flight 
control system through a 
neural network to identify 
sensor and actuator failures. 
(Napolitano, 
An, & 
Seanor, 
2000) 
 
Railway  Analytical 
redundancy/ 
Model-based  
FDI Vehicle 
suspensions 
The developed Rao–
Blackwellized Particle Filter 
(RBPF) based method is used 
for parameter estimation to 
provide an early warning of a 
fault or performance 
degradation. 
(Li P. , et al., 
2007) 
Railway  Analytical 
redundancy  
FDI Track circuit 
failures 
The proposed method uses a 
hybrid 
quantitative/qualitative 
technique known as the 
neuro-fuzzy system to detect 
and diagnose the failure of 
the track circuits for railway. 
(Chen, 
Roberts, & 
Weston, 
Fault 
detection 
and 
diagnosis for 
railway track 
circuits 
using neuro-
fuzzy 
systems, 
2008) 
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Railway Direct signal 
approach 
 
 
FDI Motor failure 
of wheel- 
motor 
A measurement from torque 
transducer considered in 
order to implement range of 
winding failures 
(Ifedi, et al., 
2011) 
 
Articulated 
vehicles 
Hardware 
redundancy  
Fault-tolerant 
strategy 
Electronic 
control unit 
failure 
The electro-hydraulic (EH) 
power circuit is controlled by 
two embedded electronic 
control modules (ECM): the 
primary ECM and backup 
ECM. The two ECMs 
monitor each other’s 
condition. If one detects fault 
in the other, it takes over the 
control functions. The finite 
state machine (FSM) concept 
is used to design the fault 
handling algorithms for both 
the component level and the 
system level failure. 
(Haggag, 
Rosa, 
Huang, & 
Cetinkunt, 
2007) 
Motor and 
drive 
Analytical 
redundancy/ 
Model-based 
approach  
Fault-tolerant 
strategy 
Stator failure A fault-tolerant control 
design based on a sliding 
mode observer for induction 
motors has been developed. 
The proposed sliding mode 
observer detects and 
reconstructs the faults, and 
also estimates the flux.  
 
 
(Djeghali, 
Ghanes, 
Djennoune, 
& Barbot, 
2010) 
Air 
conditioning  
Analytical 
redundancy/ 
Knowledge-
based approach  
Fault-tolerant 
strategy  
Terminal boxes 
and controller 
unit  
The fault-tolerant control 
scheme has been established 
through a knowledge-based 
approach. The fuzzy models 
relate the performance of the 
terminal boxes, the air-
handling unit and the chiller 
to fuzzy descriptions of the 
cooling load, the supply air 
and chilled water temperature 
set-points, and the amount of 
air-side and water-side 
fouling. 
(Liu & 
Dexter, 
2001) 
Gas turbine  Hardware 
redundancy/ 
Hot stand-by  
Re-configuration 
control 
Controller unit Classical methods for fault 
tolerance, such as error 
checking and n-module 
redundancy have been used 
to implement a fault-tolerant 
controller module. 
(Thompson 
& Fleming, 
1990) 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
In active control systems for railway vehicles, the actuators tend to be significantly more 
expensive and require more additional space than sensors and an electronic control unit. 
Therefore, developing an analytical redundancy-based fault tolerance technique for actively 
controlled wheelset that minimise the number of actuators will clearly be more beneficial. 
The emphasis of this research is therefore to develop a fault-tolerant system of active control 
for a railway vehicle in the event of actuator malfunction in order to guarantee stability and 
good curving performance without using additional actuators. Figure 1.13 shows the basic 
components for an actively controlled railway system (without fault-tolerant measures). Each 
solid-axle wheelset is equipped with an electro-mechanical actuator to deliver the desired 
torque demand to the wheelset. A selected number of sensors are mounted on the bogie frame 
to minimise the need to install sensors on the wheelset axles where the working environment 
is known to be extremely harsh.  
    
 
Figure 1-13: Overall control strategy 
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A control strategy based on the optimal control approach is used in this study and an 
observed model-based observer is developed to provide the necessary full state feedback, 
although other control strategies may also be used.  
However, the scheme in Figure 1.13 does not guarantee the vehicle stability and desired 
performance if one of the actuators fails to deliver the desired torque to the wheelset. In the 
development of a fault-tolerant scheme for actively controlled wheelsets, two key issues are 
investigated in this study. The first issue is to develop an accurate FDI scheme that monitors 
the actuators’ status in the system and raises a flag (or alarm) if a fault is identified. The 
second key issue is to develop Re-configuration Control (RC) methods to deal with different 
fault conditions and preserve stability conditions and maintain the vehicle performance, in the 
presence of a fault, close to that desired, or at least not worse than the passive system in the 
normal condition. This study considers the three most common types of actuator failure: Fail-
Hard (FH), Short Circuit (SC) and Open Circuit (OC). The fail-hard is a failure condition 
where the motor shaft of the actuator becomes immovable, which could be caused by a 
mechanical jam possibly due to the lack of lubrication. The short circuit and open circuit are 
failures that occur in the electrical parts of the driving motor of the actuator, which 
correspond to zero voltage (e.g. short circuit in the motor windings) and zero current (e.g. 
failures in the power supply/amplifier) in the motor, respectively; resulting in re-generative 
braking or the absence of motor torque from the actuator. Furthermore, one of the critical 
design aspects is that the features of FDI depend on the reliability and availability of the 
information that is provide by the sensors. Therefore, this study also considers the sensor 
fault(s), although the scope of the study is limited to the failure mode of zero output for the 
sensors concerned. In this study, two different approaches are investigated in the 
development of condition monitoring tasks: the vehicle model-based approach and the 
actuator model-based approach. 
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 The vehicle model-based approach (Approach 1) as illustrated in Figure 1.14 is 
considered to monitor the actuators and sensors’ status as the modelling technique and 
specified models for the railway vehicle system dynamics are well developed. In this 
approach, a Kalman Filter (KF) developed to provide state estimation feedback for the 
active controller will also be used for the purpose of fault diagnosis and condition 
monitoring tasks, where the FDI scheme for the actuators and sensors will be 
developed.        
 The actuator model-based approach (Approach 2) as shown in Figure 1.15 through the 
use of a Local Kalman Filter (LKF) is considered to detect abnormal changes in the 
actuators, while the generated residuals between the estimated data and measured data 
will be used to provide the information for the FDI scheme. 
 
Figure 1-14: Fault-tolerant strategy through Approach 1 
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Figure 1-15: Fault-tolerant strategy through Approach 2 
In either approach, if an abnormal change is detected based on the information provided by 
the FDI filters, the active wheelset controller will be re-configured in order to adjust the 
structure and the control gains in respect to the type of the actuator failure in order to 
maintain stability and the desired performance. It should be noted that some level of 
degradation in the event of actuator failure is inevitable as the actuator’s availability is 
reduced, but the development of the control re-configuration must ensure a performance at 
least not worse than that of the vehicle with passive suspensions. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the development of the mathematical 
models that represent the vehicle dynamics and a control strategy for the implementation of 
the actively controlled wheelset.  The dynamical model of an electromechanical actuator will 
be presented. 
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Chapter 3 presents the development of the approach 1 for the FDI, where a condition 
monitoring task is performed by the use of Kalman Filters that are also used to provide the 
full state feedback for the controller. One of the critical design aspects for the features of FDI 
is related to the reliability of the sensors; therefore, the given FDI for the actuator will be 
used to detect the sensors’ failure in order to show the effectiveness of the approach. 
Furthermore, the FDI will be assessed on both random and deterministic track inputs.   
Chapter 4 presents the development of the approach 2 for the FDI, where the condition 
monitoring task is performed based on the use of a local Kalman filter for the individual 
actuators. The proposed approach also attempts to address the key issue for the sensor’s 
failure. The performance assessment will be provided to show the robustness of the scheme. 
Chapter 5 provides a full description for the development of control re-configuration in the 
event of actuator failure in order to preserve stability and curving performance to a level at 
least not worse than a vehicle with passive components. Also the integration of the proposed 
control reconfiguration strategies with the fault detection and isolation schemes as developed 
in the previous chapters will be presented in order to demonstrate how the two parts of the 
entire fault tolerant strategy work together in a simulated ‘real situation’ environment. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research. The major contribution and novelty aspects of the work 
will also be highlighted, together with recommendations and suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 VEHICLE DYNAMICS AND CONTROL STRATEGY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the development of the modelling and the basic active control strategy 
for a conventional railway vehicle that provides a research platform for the study of the fault 
tolerant control for the active primary suspensions. The characteristic of railway track is first 
discussed in section 2.2. The wheel–rail contact and mathematical model for the dynamics of 
a half vehicle is then provided in section 2.3.  The basic control strategy and design 
performance for the active primary suspensions in the normal condition (i.e. no faults) is 
presented in section 2.4. The model of the actuator dynamics is provided in section 2.5. 
Section 2.6 details the design of a model-based estimator to provide the controller with the 
required full state feedback variables. Finally, summary of the work will be provided.  
2.2 Characteristic of Railway Track 
The wheelsets of the railway vehicle respond to the track excitations and therefore the track 
geometry has a direct impact on the wheelset’s behaviour and the performance of the railway 
vehicle as assessed through track input (Mei, Li, & Goodall , 2001). In the railway industry, 
two distinct input characteristics of the railway track are considered: random and 
deterministic track inputs (Mei & Goodall, 2003b). Deterministic track inputs are intended 
features that represent the design alignment associated with the curves (R), cant angle (θ) and 
transition time that a train takes to connect the straight track to a curved/gradient track. These 
characteristics are defined in order to satisfy the requirements for passenger comfort.  Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 show a curved track with a radius of 1250 (m) and a cant angle of 6
°
, respectively, 
at the vehicle speed of 50 (m/s) and transition time of 2 (s).  
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    Figure 2-1: Curve track (R =1250 m) 
 
                          
Figure 2-2: Cant angle (theta = 6°) 
Random inputs are the track irregularities that represent the unintended deviations from the 
intended alignment in both lateral and vertical directions (Mei & Goodall, 2003b). In this 
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study only the lateral irregularities are of prime interest due to the fact that this study focuses 
on the stability and steering control of the primary suspensions, i.e. the plan-view dynamics. 
The lateral track irregularities used in this study to represent the roughness of typical track 
are generated from filtered white-noise in order to provide a broad frequency spectrum with a 
relatively high level of irregularities (Zheng Jiang , Z. Matamoros-Sanch, Goodall, & Smith, 
2012). The lateral track irregularities can be approximated as the zero mean white Gaussian 
noise with variance, as described in Equation (2.1). 
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Eq. 2-1 
 
where Ar is the track roughness factor, Vs is the vehicle forward velocity and f  is the temporal 
frequency. This equation can be used to generate time domain random sequences as the input 
excitation to the vehicle dynamic models in the computer simulations (Li P. , et al., 2007). 
Figure 2.3 shows the generated random lateral track irregularities at the vehicle speed of 50 
(m/s). 
 
Figure 2-3: Random track irregularities 
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Although it is possible to use the measured real track data, one of the main drawbacks is that 
their frequency content is limited and is normally less representative (Mei & Goodall, 2001). 
Therefore, the use of the generated random track data would ensure full coverage of the 
relevant frequency range (Mei, Li, & Goodall , 2001).                                                                                                             
2.3 Wheel–Rail Contact and Modelling of Vehicle Dynamics  
2.3.1 Wheel–rail contact 
The dynamic behaviour of railway vehicles is significantly affected by the contact forces at 
the wheel–rail interfaces (Wickens, 2006). These forces have an impact on the adhesion 
(Polach, 2005), creep and wear characteristics (Mei & Goodall, 2003a), and also provide the 
fundamental forces for wheel guidance (Wickens, 2003, p. 1). These contact forces are due to 
micro-slippage or creepage in the contact region, which can be expressed as the ratio of 
sliding velocity to forward velocity due to rolling (Note, sliding velocity is the difference 
between the circumferential velocity of a driven wheel and the translational velocity of the 
wheel) (Iwnicki, 2003). In a railway wheel, the creepage can occur in three directions (Garg 
& Dukkipati, 1984, p. 104): longitudinal (γ1), lateral (γ2) and spin (ω3), as defined in 
Equations (2.2), (2.4) and (2.4), respectively, where Vx
w
, Vy
w 
and Ωz
w
 represent the 
longitudinal, lateral and rotational velocities of the wheel; Vx
t
, Vy
t 
and Ωz
t
 represent the 
longitudinal, lateral and rotational velocities of the track; and Vs represents the forward 
velocity of the wheel. 
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In order to calculate the creepage, the velocity for each wheel (i.e. the left and right side of 
the wheels) can be derived in terms of the lateral displacement and the yaw motion of the 
wheelset in respect to the track centreline as given in Equations (2.5) and (2.6), ― the 
concept of the creepage has been extensively explained in a number of publications (Garg & 
Dukkipati, 1984, pp. 103-132; Wickens, 2003, pp. 19-43; Iwnicki, 2003) and the full details 
of the calculation can be found in Appendix A.  
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where wy is the lateral velocity of the wheelset; w  the yaw velocity of the wheelset; Lg 
represents the half-gauge of the wheelset; R represents the curve radius; ω the angular 
velocity of the wheelset (=Vs/r0); and rL and rR represent the contact radii (i.e. the distance 
between the wheel-central axis and wheel–rail contact) on the left and right wheels, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2-4: Lateral and vertical direction of a wheelset 
The contact radii for the left and right wheels vary as the wheelset displaces laterally. When 
the wheelset is in the centre position to the track centreline, the contact radii for the left and 
right wheels are equal to the constant value of r0. In practice, the contact profile of the wheel 
rim and rail head is nonlinear, but linear approximations using conicity λL, λR are often used 
in the study of wheelset dynamics to provide a linear relationship between the differences in 
rolling radii and the lateral displacement of the wheels, as given in Equation (2.7), in which 
(y-yt) is the relative lateral movement between the wheel and rail (Ayasse & Chollet, 2006). 
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Eq. 2-7 
Equations (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) are used to compute the creepage for the two wheels, as given 
in Equations (2.8), (2.9) and (2.10), respectively. 
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The creep forces at the contact patches are generated due to the creepages (Garg & Dukkipati, 
1984, p. 105; Iwnicki, 2003), which exist in both longitudinal and lateral directions as 
illustrated in Figure 2.5. At small values of creepage the relationship can be considered to be 
linear. However, at larger values of creepage, the relationship becomes highly nonlinear and 
the creep force approaches a limiting value determined by the normal force and coefficient of 
friction in the contact area (Ayasse & Chollet, 2006). When working in the nonlinear regions, 
it would be necessary to use different modelling methods. However, this study uses the 
linearised models of the wheel–rail contact mechanics exclusively for control law design, 
principally because nonlinearities are relatively small unless there is flange contact, a 
condition which the actively controlled wheelset avoids (Li & Goodall, 1998). The contact 
forces are determined as given in Equations (2-11)-(2-14):                                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Contact forces 
LL fF 1111 .              Eq. 2-11 
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Eq. 2-12 
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Eq. 2-13 
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RRR ffF 3232222 ..    
Eq. 2-14 
where LF1 , RF1  correspond to the longitudinal contact forces for the left and right wheelset, 
respectively; and LF2 , RF2  represent the lateral forces for the left and right wheelset, 
correspondingly; and f11 , f22 and f23 represent the longitudinal, lateral and spin creep 
coefficient, respectively.  
2.3.2 Vehicle dynamics 
In this study, a half vehicle model (consisting of a two-axle bogie and a half-body frame) is 
used as the focus is on the primary suspensions (i.e. between the wheelsets and the bogie 
frame). Also, as the investigation of the primary suspensions of the vehicle only affects the 
lateral and yaw motions, only the plan view dynamics of the half vehicle require 
consideration. Figure 2.6 gives a simplified plan view diagram, where the modelled scheme 
mainly consists of two solid-axle wheelsets, a bogie and a half body of the vehicle. The 
wheelsets are connected to the bogie frame through springs (Ks) and dampers (Cs) in the 
lateral direction, while the bogie is also connected to the body frame via secondary springs 
(Ksc) and dampers (Csc) in the lateral direction (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 
2004). Although in practice some form of longitudinal connection is needed to transmit the 
traction and braking forces to the vehicle, this is not included in the model as it is not the 
concern of the current study (Mei & Goodall, 2001).  
                     
Figure 2-6: Plan view diagram of half vehicle 
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The stabilisation of the wheelset can be obtained through the use of the yaw connection 
between the bogie frame and each wheelset in the longitudinal direction on either side that 
effectively produce a torque (
21
, ww  ) opposing the yaw motion of the wheelset. This could 
be a yaw stiffness in the case of passive suspensions and actuator torque in the active case. 
The lateral forces between wheelsets and the bogie frame 
wgf
F and 
wgr
F for the leading and 
trailing wheelsets are those of the springs and dampers connected the wheelset to the bogie, 
as given in Equations (2.15) and (2.16). Note, all variables in the equations are related to 
local track references. Four sets of Cartesian coordinate system are shown in Figure 2.7 with 
respect to their four different local frames of references, where the frame references by Owf xwf 
ywf , Owr xwr ywr , Og xg yg, Ov xv yv  move synchronously with the front wheelset, the rear 
wheelset, the bogie and the vehicle body respectively. Those coordinate systems have their 
origins (Owf, Owr, Og, Ov) at the track centre line and move at a constant forward velocity with 
respect to (Owf xwf, Owr xwr, Og xg, Ov xv), and axis of (Owf ywf, Owrywr, Ogyg, Ov yv) pointing to 
right-hand sides.  
              
Figure 2-7: Axes systems 
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).Lyy.(C).Lyy.(KF gvgwsgvgwsfwg    11                                               
Eq. 2-15 
).Lyy.(C).Lyy.(KF gvgwsgvgwsrwg    12                                               
Eq. 2-16 
In addition, the lateral force between the bogie frame and half-body vehicle is due to the 
springs and dampers which connect those rigid bodies, and can be written as Equation (2.17).  
gvF  )yy.(C)yy.(K vgscvgsc                                                                           
Eq. 2-17 
According to Newton’s second law, the dynamics of the two wheelsets, bogie and the body 
frame can be derived in Equations (2.18)-(2.24).   
For the front wheelsets: 
1111 wgfgfww
L.FL.F.I
RL
                                                                                      Eq. 2-18 
wgRL ffmfcffww
FFFFFym 
221
.                                                                           Eq. 2-19 
For the rear wheelsets: 
2112 wgrgrww
L.FL.F.I
RL
                                                                                         Eq. 2-20 
wgRL rrmrcrrww
FFFFFy.m 
222
                                                                             Eq. 2-21 
For the bogie frame: 
)(L.FL.F.I wwvrvfgg wgwg 21                                                                          
Eq. 2-22 
gmgcgvrfgg FFFFFy.m wgwg                                                                           
Eq. 2-23 
For a half-body: 
mcrgvvv FFFym .                                                                                                
Eq. 2-24 
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By substituting the forces associated with creep, dampers and springs in the above equations, 
the dynamic equations of the vehicle can be obtained as presented in Equations (2.25)-(2.31), 
where all the variables are related to local track references. There are a total of seven degrees 
of freedom (14
th
 order), i.e., the lateral and yaw motions for each wheelset, and for the bogie 
and lateral displacement for the vehicle body (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004).   
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Eq. 2-31 
 
There are two different types of track inputs at the wheelsets: random inputs (yt1,yt2)  that 
represent lateral track irregularities along the route track at the leading and trailing wheelsets 
and deterministic inputs that represent the track curvature (R1,R2) and cant angle of the track 
(θc1,θc2) for the two wheelsets.  
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The control torques for the two wheelsets (
21
, ww  ) are given in Equations (2.32) and (2.33), 
where k represents the effective yaw stiffness from the passive springs and the third term in 
the equations represents the additional relative yaw displacement between the wheelsets and 
the bogie frame due to track curvature. 
)
R
L
.(k vgww
1
11
                                                                                           
Eq. 2-32 
)
R
L
.(k vgww
2
21
                                                                                            
Eq. 2-33 
However, after setting up a set of mathematical equations that represents the vehicle 
dynamics, it is necessary to analyse and validate those equations of motion in order to ensure 
that there is no mistake. In this study two methods are considered to analysis the vehicle 
model. The fist method is an eigenvalue analysis that indicates the natural frequencies of the 
various modes of motion.  In the second method, a comparison of curving performance 
against published work has been considered. Both methods are briefly examined in sections 
2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2 respectively in order to avoid repeating what is required to be described 
for the active approach. 
2.4 Active Control Strategy and Design Performance  
2.4.1 Active approach 
The active wheelset control can be used to stabilise the wheelsets without compromising 
performance during curve negotiation, with much reduced contact forces in comparison to 
passive suspensions (Mei & Goodall, 2003a). In active control, the yaw torque for each 
wheelset will be determined by the specific control algorithms from a selected set of sensor 
measurements to maintain stability and curving performance (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & 
Tsunashima, 2007). As shown in Figure 2.6, two actuators are placed between the wheelsets 
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and the bogie frame in the yaw direction for the implementation of the active controls ― 
these are illustrated as rotational torque-producing actuators, although in practice they might 
be a pair of linear actuators. A number of control strategies are possible, but in this study the 
optimal control approach with full state feedback is used to design the active control (Mei & 
Goodall, 1999b; Mei & Goodall, 2003a). The design of the optimal controller is fairly 
standard, and for the wheelset control it has been found that the minimisation of the lateral 
displacements and the angle of attack of the wheelsets result in a controller that provides the 
desired degree of stability and performance (Mei & Goodall, 2000b). A general diagram of 
the control structure is shown in Figure 2.8.   
 
Figure 2-8: A general diagram of the control structure 
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Equations (2.34) and (2.35) define a state–space representation of the vehicle model suitable 
for the optimal control design, where x is a vector of state variables, u is the control input 
vector, w is a vector of track inputs, and y is a vector of outputs or measurements. In the state 
space model represented in Equation (2.34), the lateral deflection of the wheelset, bogie and 
vehicle body to the lateral track irregularities are part of the state in order to control the 
vehicle to follow the track (Mei, Li, & Goodall , 2001). For designing the optimal controller, 
it is not necessary to minimise all the states. It has been found that minimisation of the lateral 
displacements or the yaw motion of the wheelsets results in a controller that provides the 
desired performance and stability. 
The cost function is given in Equation (2.36), where the first term reflects the expected 
performance of the controller and the second term reflects the control effort requirement.  
By tuning the weighting matrices Q and R the performance of the optimal control can be 
studied thoroughly. In this study the weighting matrices Q and R tuned manually although 
some studies of intuitively formulated control with GA (Genetic Algorithm) optimisation are 
w,μuBxAx                                                                               Eq. 2-34 
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Eq. 2-36  
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also carried out and reported elsewhere. The weighting factors R and Q can be tuned to 
provide a compromise between the tracking performance and control effort requirements and 
it is found that a small value of R is to be reasonable, as the small size of these reflecting the 
large size of the control torques which must be applied to the wheelsets. However, the tuning 
of Q is not straightforward and the trial-error tuning has been used to give the best results by 
achieving the following forces on curves tracks (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 2007): 
• Zero longitudinal creep force on steady curve. 
• Equal lateral creep force. 
By choosing the weighting matrices Q and R in Equation (2.37), a control gain matrix K is 
obtained that provides desirable creep forces on curved tracks; the control input vector 
consisting of the two actuator torque signals is defined by Equation (2.38).  
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2.4.1.1 Stability analysis 
An unconstrained solid-axle wheelset is known to be inherently unstable and the natural 
frequency of the unstable mode (kinematic frequency) can be approximated in Equation 
(2.39), which is proportional to the speed and square root of the slope (conicity) of the wheel 
tread; and inversely proportional to the square root of the wheel radius and half distance of 
the two wheels (Goodall & Li, 2000; Wickens, 2003, p. 6). 
g
s
n
Lr
V
f
02


                                                            
 
                                                                                    Eq. 2-39 
 
The stabilisation of the conventional wheelsets may be provided through the use of passive 
suspensions or active control (Mei & Li, 2007). Table 2-1 compares the natural frequency 
and damping ratios of the vehicle dynamics associated with each mode between the vehicles 
without stability control, the vehicle with passive suspension and the vehicle with active 
control. The results reveal that in the case of the vehicle without stability control, the two 
modes associated with each wheelset are unstable at the kinematic frequencies of 5 and 5.8 
Hz. On the other hand, the vehicle with the passive suspension (kinematic frequencies of 4.8 
and 6.6 Hz) and active control (kinematic frequencies of 5.3 and 7.1 Hz) can provide 
sufficient damping for the kinematic modes. It can be seen that the high frequency modes of 
the wheelsets are highly damped, and their frequencies are significantly higher than the 
kinematic frequencies. It also indicates that the dynamic modes of a bogie frame and the body 
are sufficiently damped as expected. Note that the results in Table 2-1 are obtained with the 
nominal parameter values given in Appendix B, and the vehicle forward velocity of 50 (m/s). 
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Table 2-1: Natural frequencies and damping ratios of the vehicle dynamic modes with different 
approaches 
Eigenvalues Speed of 50 (m/s) 
Without stability control passive control Active control 
Damping (%) Frequency (Hz) Damping (%) Frequency (Hz) Damping (%) Frequency (Hz) 
Wheelset high 
frequency 
99.3 48.4 100 46.8  99.3 48.4 
99.3 48.4 99.8 46.8 99.3 48.4 
99.3 48.4 99.8 46.8 99.3 48.4 
99.3 48.4 100 46.8 99.3 48.4 
Bogie lateral 
and yaw 
100 38.3 79.3 27.4 22 11.4 
20.7 7.3 79.3 27.4 22 11.4 
20.7 7.3 83.7 9.5 40 7.2 
100 3.3 83.7 9.5 40 7.2 
Kinematic 
mode 1 
-0.1 5.8 36 6.6 20.3 7.1 
-0.1 5.8 36 6.6 20.3 7.1 
Kinematic 
mode 2 
-15.5 5 11.4 4.8 15 5.3 
-15.5 5 11.4 4.8 15 5.3 
Body lateral 19.4 0.9 19.1 0.9 19.5 0.9 
19.4 0.9 19.1 0.9 19.5 0.9 
 
2.4.1.2  Curving performance 
Principally, the control strategy for a good curving performance is concerned with 
minimising/ eliminating the creep forces, and therefore the idea of a good curving 
performance can be expressed as follows (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 2007): 
 No longitudinal creep force, as it tends to cause unwanted yaw motion, and therefore 
it is desirable to be eliminated. 
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 Equal lateral creep force, as some force in the lateral direction is demanded to 
compensate for the cant deficiency. It is preferred to distribute the lateral forces 
between all wheelsets. 
The use of passive suspensions for stability control is known to produce undesirable contact 
forces when a rail vehicle negotiates curved track (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 
2004). To study the responses of the actively controlled vehicle on a curved track, a curve 
radius of 1250 (m), connected to straight track via a transition of 2 (s) with a speed of 50 
(m/s) are used. Note also that the track is canted during the curve to reduce the lateral 
acceleration experienced by the passengers (Mei, Perez, & Goodall, 2000). Figure 2.9 
compares the lateral displacements at the leading and trailing wheelsets on the curved track 
between the active scheme and the passive vehicle system; where PVL and PVT depict the 
vehicle with passive suspension at the leading and trailing wheelsets, respectively; and AVL 
and AVT denote the vehicle with active control at the leading and trailing wheelsets, 
respectively. It clearly shows that the lateral displacement of both the leading and trailing 
wheelsets with the use of the active controller is approximately 1.4 (mm), which is the 
theoretical pure rolling line for this particular curve; whereas the two wheelsets of the passive 
vehicle behave differently, at 5.2 (mm) and 0.8 (mm), respectively, and are forced away from 
the pure rolling line due to the use of yaw stiffness for stabilisation.  
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Figure 2-9: Lateral displacement- active control vs passive 
Figure 2.10 shows the angle of attack (yaw motion) for the leading and trailing wheelsets 
with the use of active controllers and passive suspension. The actively controlled wheelsets 
have an equal angle of attack when running around the steady curve, to provide the 
appropriate lateral creep for the cant deficiency. For the passive vehicle, the angles of attack 
of the two wheelsets are deviated from the ideal position. 
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Figure 2-10: Angle of attack- active control vs passive 
The lateral displacement of the two wheelsets on the pure rolling line in the case of the 
actively controlled vehicle minimises the longitudinal contact force, as shown in Figure 2.11, 
where the longitudinal contact forces on a steady curve are nearly zero, whereas for a passive 
vehicle this is significantly higher for the leading and trailing wheelsets (Figure 2.12). 
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Figure 2-11: Longitudinal contact force‒active control 
 
 
Figure 2-12: Longitudinal contact force‒passive vehicle 
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In the lateral direction, some creep forces will be required to provide the necessary curving 
force to compensate for any cant deficiency, but this should be ideally equally shared 
between the wheelsets as in the case of the active control in Figure 2.13. In the passive case, 
however, the lateral creep force of the trailing wheelset is significantly higher than that of the 
leading wheelset.   
 
Figure 2-13: Lateral contact forces‒active control vs passive vehicle             
2.5 Actuator Dynamics 
The implementation of the active control requires the use of an actuator for each wheelset to 
deliver the control action in the yaw direction. There are a number of different actuator 
technologies such as pneumatic actuation, electro-hydraulic actuation, electro-mechanical 
actuation and electro-magnetic actuation (Pacchioni, Goodall, & Bruni, 2010). However, in 
this study electro-mechanical actuation is chosen to meet the main requirements for the active 
control in order to stabilise the wheelset kinematic modes, which are relatively high 
frequency (5-10 Hz) (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004).  
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Although the actuator models are not included in the control design to avoid the extra 
complexity of the control structures, the actuator dynamics will be included in the simulation 
to evaluate the vehicle performance (Mei, Nagy, Goodall, & Wickens, 2002). The actuator 
model dynamics consist of two parts: the electrical part, i.e. a dc motor, and mechanical part 
consisting of the rotor, gearbox. Figure 2.14 shows the key elements of the actuator and the 
connections to the wheelset and bogie. 
         
 
Figure 2-14: Actuator model 
The electrical and mechanical parts of the actuator are presented in Equations (2.40) and 
(2.41). 
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In the above equations, θA represents the combination of the rotor displacement (θm) and 
bogie’s yaw motion (ψg) due to the fact that the stator of the motor is considered to be 
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mounted to the bogie frame. The nomenclatures for the symbols used in Equations (2.40) and 
(2.41) are given in the Appendix B—together with the parameter values used for all 
calculations presented in this section. 
The torque output of the actuator must be maintained as closely as possible to the torque 
demand as calculated by the controller and therefore a local proportional-integral (PI) 
controller is used for each actuator to track the desired torque (τref) from the wheelset 
controller as given in Equation (2.42). 
)()(
s
K
KesC ip                                                                                              
 
Eq. 2-42 
 
where e represents an error value as the difference between the measured torque (τm) of the dc 
motor and the desired torque (τref). The proportional (kp=0.025) and integral gain (ki=0.567) 
are tuned to obtain a fast response necessary for wheelset control.  
This model is then added to the vehicle dynamics model in the computer simulations to 
assess the performance of the active control system. Figures 2.15 and 2.16 compare the 
lateral displacements and yaw motions of the leading and trailing wheelsets with and without 
the actuator dynamics, respectively. They clearly justify the design approach with and 
without actuator dynamics, as the desire curving performance is maintained.  
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Figure 2-15: lateral displacement with and without actuator dynamics 
 
Figure 2-16: Angle of attack with and without actuator dynamics 
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2.6 Estimator Design  
For the optimal control approaches, full state feedback (14 variables) is required. In practice, 
it would be very difficult and not cost effective to measure parameters such as wheel–rail 
deflection and wheelset angle of attack (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004). 
Therefore, some form of state estimation is required to provide accurate/ optimise state 
estimates in order for the controller to calculate the torque demands, one of the most well-
known and often used tools is known as the Kalman Filter (Kalman, 1960). The Kalman 
Filter (KF) is a model-based state estimator and uses a linear dynamic model that is 
formulated in the state space model, which is known as an “optimal recursive data 
processing algorithm” that is able to estimate unavailable process variables/measurements 
with an optimal/minimum error through combining all available process variables in real 
time, plus prior knowledge of the measurements (Maybeck, 1979, p. 4). In this research, the 
use of a Kalman Filter in a continuous time, which is known as Kalman-Bucy Filter, is 
considered to provide the required feedback variables for the controller. Figure 2.17 shows 
the basic structure of the system, where the vehicle is stabilised by an optimal controller and 
the output of the KF is used to provide the feedback signals required by the controller. 
 
Figure 2-17: The overall control strategy 
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The proposed Kalman Filter for the estimation of the states is re-formulated from the state 
equation in (Mei, Li, & Goodall , 2001) such that the deterministic features of the track have 
been included as a part of the control input to the Kalman Filter as those can be readily made 
available in practice. The re-formulated equation for the design of the Kalman Filter is given 
in Equation (2-43). 
kkkkk wHuBxAx ...   
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In Equation (2-43), x is the vector of state variables from Equation (2.34) and the derivative 
of the track irregularities considered as the input white noise in the design process wk. A total 
of eight sensors (six accelerometers and two displacements) are used. The accelerometers are 
used to measure the lateral and yaw acceleration of the leading and trailing wheelsets and the 
bogie frame and the two displacement sensors are used to measure the yaw motion between 
the bogie frame and each wheelset — the latter is used to provide information regarding the 
wheelset, but to avoid the need for axle-mounted sensors which would be problematic in 
practice due to the hostile working environment (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014). The 
output equation for the measurements is given in Equation (2.44). 
 55 
 
;.. kkkkkk vuDxCy                                                                                
Where; 
 
gww
gww
T
wwggwwwwk yyyy






22
11
212211
;
;
 
Eq. 2-44 
 
where kv represents the measurement noise vector and  all measurement noises are set to 2% 
of their maximum value which is representative of real sensors of this type (Mei, Li, & 
Goodall , 2001); and the measurement matrix kC  is obtained readily from the system matrix
A . The provided states can be used to determine the Kalman gain and a general structure of 
the Kalman-Bucy Filter (Maybeck, 1979) is given in Figure 2.18. 
      
Figure 2-18: A general structure of the Kalman-Bucy Filter 
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The state-equation of the Kalman-Bucy Filter can be written as: 
)u.Dxˆ.Cy(Ku.BxˆAxˆ kkkkkkkkkk 
  Eq. 2-45 
 
where Kk is called Kalman gain and it must be determined through an algebraic Riccati 
equation as given in Equation (2.46). 
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Eq. 2-46 
 
where Pk is an estimate of the covariance of the measurement error, and Qk and Rk represent 
process and measurement covariance, respectively. The performance of the Kalman Filter 
will be assessed by the fine-tuning of the measurement noise covariance Rk and process 
disturbance (track noise) Qk. Here, the measurement noise covariance matrix can be 
calculated directly from the measurement noise ( kv ) as given in the Equation (2-47). 
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Where  
n = 8;  total number of sensors 
Eq. 2-47 
 
However, the determination of the track noise Qk is generally not straightforward and trial-
error tuning has been used to  find the best result such that the performance and robustness of 
the Kalman Filter can be assessed and final value are given in Equation (2.48). 
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Eq. 2-48 
 
By tuning Qk and Rk, a Kalman gain matrix (Kk) is obtained that generates optimal full state 
estimations. Table 2-2 summarises the root mean square of the measurements’ data along 
with their estimation error in order to study the performance of the Kalman Filter on a 
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random track. An analysis of the generated data shows that the Kalman Filter can provide 
good estimation results and that the estimation errors are small and mainly due to sensor 
noises in the measurement. 
Table 2-2: Root mean square of the measurements, estimation and error data 
 Root mean square (r.m.s) 
 Measurement 
 
estimation error 
 
 
 
Leading 
wheelset 
Lateral acceleration (m/s
2
) 3.56e-1 
 
3.15e-1 5.37e-2 
Yaw acceleration (rad/s
2
) 4.15e-1 
 
4.17e-1 1.78e-1 
Relative yaw displacement (rad) 5.58e-4 
 
5.27e-4 1.07e-4 
 
 
 
Trailing 
wheelset 
Lateral acceleration (m/s
2
) 5.51e-1 
 
5.21e-1 1.54e-1 
Yaw acceleration (rad/s
2
) 5.99e-1 
 
6.18e-1 2.37e-1 
Relative yaw displacement (rad) 2.84e-4 
 
2.21e-4 9.12e-5 
 
Bogie 
Lateral acceleration  (m/s
2
) 6.14e-1 
 
6.07e-1 2.59e-2 
Yaw acceleration  (rad/s
2
) 7.66e-1 
 
7.50e-1 6.20e-2 
 
Figures 2.19 and 2.20 give the estimated lateral displacement (wheel–rail), yaw motion and 
the estimation errors of the leading wheelset respectively and similar results are obtained for 
the trailing wheelset. Clearly, the Kalman Filter estimates the wheel–rail lateral deflection 
and yaw motion (angle of attack) very effectively. 
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  Figure 2-19: Estimated lateral displacement–front wheelset        
 
Figure 2-20: Estimated yaw motion‒front wheelset 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter represents the development of the modelling and the basic active control 
strategy for a conventional railway vehicle that provides a research platform for the study of 
the fault tolerant control for active primary suspensions. A control strategy (controller and 
estimator) that provides stability and good curving performance was designed and verified by 
studying the results. 
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Chapter 3 FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION (APPROACH 1) 
3.1 Introduction  
When a fault occurs in an actuator, the actuator may become dysfunctional or at least less 
effective in delivering the desired torque to the wheelsets of the vehicle. Therefore, it is 
essential to detect and isolate actuator failure for safety critical systems such as wheelset 
control in order to enable the controller to cope with the corresponding fault (Mirzapour, Mei, 
& Hussain, 2012). This study considers two types of actuator failures that are likely to occur: 
Fail-Hard (FH) and Fail-Soft (FS). A fail-hard is a failure condition in a mechanical part of 
the actuator where the motor shaft of the actuator becomes stuck or immovable; possibly due 
to lack of lubrication. This type of failure is considered in (Alwi, Christopher, Tan, & Chee, 
2011, pp. 8-10), and such an incident was reported for Flight 1080 (McMahan, 2005) 
(Montoya, et al., 1982), where one of the horizontal stabilisers jammed in the trailing edge-up 
position, and Flight 96, where the rudder jammed with an offset (Aircraft Accident Report: 
American Airlines 1972, 1973)  . A fail-soft is a failure that is most likely to occur in the 
electrical parts of the motors’ actuator due to either an Open Circuit (OC) or Short Circuit 
(SC), as a result of the power switch devices and/or the motor winding failing into a state of 
open or short circuit (Wolfgang, 2015, p. 163). The short circuit and open circuit correspond 
to zero voltage and zero current in the motor, respectively—resulting in re-generative braking 
or no motor torque from the actuator. This chapter presents the study of a fault detection 
scheme for actuator(s) through a vehicle model-based approach taking advantage of the fact 
that the dynamic properties and associated mathematical models for the railway vehicles are 
well established. Principally, this approach is proposed to explore the changes in vehicle 
dynamics in response to actuator failure(s) and hence the full vehicle model is used. The 
same Kalman Filter (KF) presented in the previous chapter to provide full state feedback for 
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the optimal controller will be used as the basis for the condition monitoring of the actuator 
status. In addition, sensor fault(s) are considered as the reliability of the fault detection and 
isolation scheme is highly dependent upon the information from the sensors. Figure 3.1 
illustrates the overall strategy for the fault detection and isolation purposes. In this approach, 
the residuals will be generated in order to capture changes in the difference between the 
estimated signals ( yˆ ) and measured data ( y ) from the sensors (Patton, Chen, & Nielsen, 
1995). Due to the actuator or sensor malfunction, the model used in the design of the Kalman 
Filter and the real vehicle dynamics would deviate from each other and therefore the 
estimation errors between the outputs of the Kalman filter and the measurements from the 
sensors are expected to increase. The data delivered by the estimator and measurements will 
be processed in the computation unit to extract the features specifically related to different 
fault conditions in order to detect and isolate any abnormal behaviour in the actuator(s) and 
sensor(s) (Isermann, 2005). 
 
Figure 3-1: Overall fault detection and isolation strategy‒Approach 1 
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3.2 Influence of Failure on Vehicle 
This section examines changes in the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle in the presence of the 
actuator failures in order to first establish a better understanding of how fault(s) will affect 
the vehicle dynamics, and then to develop a fault detection and isolation (FDI) scheme. 
3.2.1 Fail-hard 
In the case of actuator fail-hard, the motor is jammed at a constant position, with the relative 
motion between the wheelset and the bogie constrained only by the material stiffness in the 
actuator connections. Figure 3.2 shows the relative yaw angle of the front wheelset when the 
leading actuator fails in hard mode at the position zero (at the time zero). It is clear that the 
relative yaw motion of the front wheelset, when the front actuator fails hard, is significantly 
reduced compared to the normal condition where both actuators are functioning. Similar 
results will be obtained if the rear actuator fails hard. 
 
Figure 3-2: Relative yaw displacement‒front wheelset (fail-hard) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
x 10
-3
Time(s)
R
e
la
ti
v
e
 y
a
w
 d
is
p
la
c
e
m
e
n
t,
 f
ro
n
t 
w
h
e
e
ls
e
t 
(r
a
d
)
 
 
Normal condition
Fail hard
 63 
 
Further investigation shows that the vehicle stability is not necessarily a major concern in 
such an incident, even though the level of the damping may be reduced (Mirzapour, Mei, & 
Xuesong, 2014). Figure 3.3 compares the minimum damping ratio of the wheelset modes 
between the normal condition, where both actuators are functioning effectively, and when 
one of the actuators fails hard. It clearly shows that in the normal condition where both 
actuators are functioning, the bogie is designed to be stable. Although an actuator with hard 
failure would reduce the stability margins, it does not present a major concern for the 
stability—even in the case of trailing actuator failure, the critical speed is still around 85 
(m/s) or 306 (km/h) (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014). 
 
Figure 3-3: Minimum damping fail-hard vs normal condition‒original controller 
However, the fail-hard condition presents a much greater challenge for ensuring desirable 
curving performance due to much constrained motion for the wheelset concerned. Figures 3.4 
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                              Figure 3-4: Longitudinal contact force of leading wheelset‒locked actuator  
on curved track (Vs = 50 m/s, R = 1250 m, θ = 6
°) 
 
Figure 3-5: Longitudinal contact force of trailing wheelset‒locked actuator 
on curved track (Vs = 50 m/s, R = 1250 m, θ = 6
°) 
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The figures above clearly show that in the scenario of fail-hard in either the leading or trailing 
actuator, the contact creep forces at both the leading and trailing wheelsets significantly 
increase during curve negotiation due to the fact that the damaged actuator has very limited 
freedom of motion, resulting in poor steering performance. The generated forces in the lateral 
direction for the leading and trailing wheelsets should ideally be equal in order to achieve a 
good curving performance, because such equality can maintain the wheelsets in position to 
follow a curved track without deviating from each other (Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & 
Tsunashima, 2007). Figures 3.6 and 3.7 clearly show that the generated forces at the contact 
region in the lateral direction for the two wheelsets are far from being equal when one of the 
actuators fails hard for the leading and trailing wheelsets, where the normal condition is 
denoted by NC, leading fail-hard of the leading wheelset LHL, leading fail-hard of the 
trailing wheelset LHR, the trailing fail-hard of the leading THL and trailing wheelsets (THT). 
 
Figure 3-6: Lateral contact force‒leading actuator (fail-hard) 
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Figure 3-7: Lateral contact force‒trailing actuator (fail-hard) 
It can be deduced from the equation of motion given in chapter 2 that the increase of forces in 
the contact region is the result of the wheelset behaviour, especially on tight curves in terms 
of lateral displacement and angle of attack (Mei & Goodall, 2001). Figures 3.8 and 3.9 
indicate the lateral displacement of the leading and trailing wheelsets associated with actuator 
fail-hard, respectively. They reveal that the wheelset related to the faulty actuator resulted in 
a larger lateral displacement compared to that in the normal no fault condition. This is due to 
the fact that the movement of the wheelset concerned is severely restrained by the 
corresponding broken actuator, and the wheelset is forced away from the pure rolling line.  
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Figure 3-8: Lateral displacement‒leading actuator (fail-hard) 
 
Figure 3-9: Lateral displacement‒trailing actuator (fail-hard) 
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indicated in Figures 3.10 and 3.11 where the curve radius of 300 (m) is used and NCL, NCT 
stand for the lateral displacements of the leading and trailing wheelsets under the normal 
condition. In this case, the large lateral displacement for the vehicle with actuator fail-hard 
would lead to flange contact which would cause damage to both the wheelset and track and 
may increase the risk of derailment in more severe cases (Wickens, 2003, p. 4). 
 
Figure 3-10: Lateral displacement‒curve radius 300 (m) 
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Figure 3-11: Lateral displacement‒curve radius 300 (m) 
Therefore, the priority of the fault tolerance in the fail-hard scenario, on detection of the 
actuator fault, will be to re-configure the controller to minimise the adverse impact of the 
actuator failure on the curving performance.  
3.2.2 Fail-soft  
In the event of fail-soft, in either the short circuit or the open circuit case, the actuator will not 
be able to provide the required control torque to stabilise the kinematic mode of the wheelset 
(Mirzapour, Mei, & Hussain, 2012). Figure 3.12 compares the minimum damping ratio in the 
normal no fault, leading actuator fail-soft and the trailing actuator fail-soft conditions. In 
either of the fault conditions, the stability of the bogie is compromised significantly and the 
critical speed of the vehicle is reduced to less than 10 (m/s) (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 
2014). In practice, the operational speed will have to be kept at a very low level to avoid any 
potential compromise of safety if no other corrective control actions are taken (Mirzapour, 
Mei, & Hussain, 2012). 
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Figure 3-12: Minimum damping open circuit vs normal condition‒original controller 
Clearly, in the event of the short circuit and open circuit conditions, the priority of any fault 
tolerance strategy for the active control system is to preserve the stability control, whereas the 
curving performance is a secondary design issue (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014).   
3.3 Actuator Fault Detection and Isolation 
It is clear that the fail-hard condition leads to a much constrained motion of the actuators, 
whereas the fail-soft fault results in an instability condition in the wheelset. Whilst the 
measurements of the actuator displacement and wheelset motion may be used to detect and 
identify the actuator fault(s), this kind of direct approach is problematic if sensor faults are 
also included for consideration. A fault detection and isolation method is therefore proposed 
that combines the sensor measurement and the knowledge of the dynamics of the system in 
order to provide a more robust solution.  
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3.3.1 Fault detection 
In the event of actuator fail-hard, the motion of the wheelset (relative to the bogie frame) 
associated with the faulty actuator is severely constrained. This will lead to increased 
estimation error between the estimated data and measured data (i.e. the residual) because of 
the difference between the model used in the design of the Kalman Filter (for the normal no 
fault conditions) and changes in the real vehicle dynamics due to the fault. Figure 3.13 shows 
that in comparison to the normal no fault condition (NC), there is an increase in the generated 
residual of the relative yaw displacement of the leading wheelsets when the leading actuator 
fails hard (LH). On the other hand, the actuator fault at the leading wheelset is not expected 
to have any significant impact on the trailing wheelset, as shown in Figure 3.14. Similarly, in 
the scenario of the trailing actuator failing hard (TH), the generated residual of the yaw 
displacement at the leading wheelset is only marginally affected, but that at the trailing 
wheelset will be increased in comparison to the normal condition, as shown in Figures 3.13 
and 3.14. Further examination shows that the error between estimated data and measured data 
from lateral and yaw accelerometers on the wheelsets and the bogie frame in the event of the 
actuator fail-hard do not show a significant change compared to the normal condition. For 
example, Figures 3.15 and 3.16 reveal that the changes are relatively small in the generated 
residuals of the lateral accelerometer of the leading and trailing wheelsets in the event of 
actuator fail-hard and normal condition.   
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Figure 3-13: Residual of relative yaw displacement‒leading wheelset (fail-hard) 
 
Figure 3-14: Residual of relative yaw displacement‒trailing wheelset (fail-hard) 
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Figure 3-15: Residual of lateral acceleration‒leading wheelset (fail-hard) 
 
Figure 3-16: Residual of lateral acceleration‒trailing wheelset (fail-hard) 
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oscillation (or limit cycle if the nonlinearity of the wheelset profile is concerned) because of 
the close interactions between the different modes of the vehicle (Mirzapour, Mei, & 
Xuesong, 2014)  . Figure 3.17 presents the generated residuals from the relative yaw 
displacement between the wheelset and the bogie frame where the actuator is depicted with 
leading open circuit (LOC), leading short circuit (LSC), trailing open circuit (TOC), and 
trailing short circuit (TSC). It shows that in the case of either actuator fail-soft (i.e. open and 
short circuit) at the leading or trailing wheelsets, there is a significant increase in the 
generated residuals.  
 
Figure 3-17: Residual of relative yaw displacement‒leading wheelset (fail-soft) 
Table 3-1 summarises how different possible actuator faults will affect the generated 
residuals from the estimator, where r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7 and r8 represent the generated 
residuals from leading lateral accelerometer, leading yaw accelerometer, trailing lateral 
accelerometer, trailing yaw accelerometer, bogie lateral accelerometer, bogie yaw 
accelerometer, leading relative yaw displacement and trailing relative yaw displacement, 
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Table 3-1: The generated residuals from measured signals  
Actuator conditions  Residuals 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 
Normal condition 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fail-hard Front 
actuator 
0 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 
Rear 
actuator  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + 
Fail-soft Front 
actuator 
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Rear 
actuator  
++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
   (0) no change, (+) increase, (++) significant increase 
In Table 3-1, (+) stands for the increased residuals in respect to the normal condition 
(nominal value), (++) means that the fault leads to a significant increase of the residual, and 
(0) indicates that there is little influence of an actuator condition  on the residual . It can be 
seen from Table 3-1 that the fail-soft condition can be readily differentiated from the fail-hard 
and normal conditions through evaluation of the generated residuals from any of the lateral or 
yaw accelerometers on the wheelsets or the bogie frame, as those generated residuals are 
considerably increased in the incident of the fail-soft condition. In addition, the fail-hard 
condition shows that the error from the measurement of the relative wheelset yaw 
displacement increases compared to the normal condition, and therefore can be identified 
from the normal condition. However, the use of residuals alone is not sufficient to classify the 
location of the actuator fail-soft as all generated residuals are subject to significant increase. 
Therefore, it is necessary to include extra information in order to identify the location of the 
soft failure. Further investigation shows that, in the event of fail-soft, the measurement of the 
lateral accelerometer of the wheelset associated with the damaged actuator increases much 
faster than its residual, whereas the measurement of the lateral accelerometer of the wheelset 
with the operational actuator is almost identical to its residual (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 
2014). This is due to the fact that when the actuator fail-soft occurs either in the leading or 
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trailing wheelset, the faulty actuator is not able to deliver any torque to the wheelset and 
therefore the lateral oscillation of the wheelset without actuator torque significantly increases 
in the wheelset concerned in the incident of fail-soft. Note, in the case of short circuit, the 
actuator would work in the regenerative (passive) mode and the torque produced will be quite 
small as the back e.m.f of the motor is low due to the low velocity. As far as the wheelset is 
concerned, there is no controlled output from the faulty actuator to influence the stability of 
the vehicle – note that damping does not stabilise the wheelsets. 
For example, Figures 3.18 and 3.19 show the measurements and residuals of the lateral 
accelerometers. They clearly show that the measured signal associated with the defective 
actuator increases much faster than its estimated error, whereas the measurement from the 
healthy actuator is similar to its residual. A similar result will be generated for the trailing 
actuator in fail-soft (i.e. open and short circuits). Therefore, in order to isolate the location of 
the actuator fail-soft, the measurement data from the lateral acceleration of either the leading 
or trailing wheelset can be taken into consideration (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014).  
Note that the proposed FDI scheme treats the actuator open circuit and short circuit as a 
single case of fail-soft as there is little difference in the changes of the dynamic behaviour of 
the vehicle between the two and the control requirements to stabilise the vehicle are more or 
less the same in both cases – more will be explained in chapter 5.  
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Figure 3-18: Measured and residual of lateral acceleration‒leading wheelset (leading actuator open-circuit) 
 
Figure 3-19: Measured and residual of lateral acceleration‒trailing wheelset (leading actuator open-circuit) 
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3.3.2 Data processing 
Having established the links between the fault conditions and the symptoms through sensorial 
devices and the estimation of the dynamic system, it is necessary to develop a computation 
(processing) method to extract related features from the raw data (Rauber, Nascimento, 
Wandekokem, & Varejão, 2010).  Standard Deviation (STD) or Root Mean Square (RMS) 
are possible candidates  for smoothing out the fast varying vibration signals, before further 
processing for the different fault conditions.  In this study, standard deviation is preferred as, 
in the presence of fail-hard, the actuator’s motor may become locked in different positions, 
rather than zero position and the use of standard deviation can extract the features by 
determining the level of variation from its average value. For example, Figure 3.20 shows the 
angular displacement of the motor’s actuator locked-up at the position of -1.5×10-2(rad) when 
the leading actuator fails at the time of 1 (s). 
 
Figure 3-20: Angular displacement of the motor’s actuator- front actuator fail-hard (time=1s) 
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 A standard deviation with a window size of N is given in Equation 3.1, where xi represents 
the sampling point of the raw signal (Chapra & Canale, 2009, pp. 441-444). 
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For the fail-hard condition, although the errors from the measurement of the relative wheelset 
yaw displacement increase in comparison with the normal condition, it turns out that the level 
of the obtained residual is not significant enough to define a distinct threshold that 
consistently separates the fault from the non-fault condition. Figure 3.21 shows the standard 
deviation, using a moving window with the size of 1 (s), of the residual from the relative yaw 
displacement of the rear wheelset when the front actuator fails in hard mode at a time of 2 (s). 
It shows a clear overlap in the magnitude between the two conditions. Note, the use of a 
moving window with the length of 1 (s) requires a buffer, in order to compute the standard 
deviation from raw data. Therefore, the calculation of the standard deviation moving window 
from the buffer to delay 1 (s) its processing while the buffer refills.    Hence, in the following 
figure(s), which indicate the standard deviation moving window, the gap in data between 0 
(s) and 1 (s) is due to the use of buffer that cause 1 (s) delay. In addition, the window size of 
1 (s) on the standard deviation moving window has been chosen to provide a compromise 
between the vehicle performance requirement in the incidence of the actuator fail soft and to 
extract a distinguished threshold in the presence of the actuator fail hard. For example, Figure 
3.22 indicates the relative lateral displacement of the front wheelset when the rear actuator 
fail-soft at the time of 2 (s). It clearly shows that the relative lateral displacement of the 
wheelset reaches 8 (mm) after 1 (s) of the actuator failure. In practice, it means that there is 
severe flange contact between wheelset and rail, resulting in the vehicle derailment. 
Therefore, the window size larger than 1 (s) is not suitable in the event of fail soft. On the 
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other hand, the larger buffer size is required in the event of fail-hard in order to make a 
distinctive threshold (Figure 3.21) while increasing the length of the buffer more than 1 (s) 
would increase the risk of the vehicle derailment in the event of the actuator fail-soft (Figure 
3.22) . 
 
Figure 3-21: STD of relative yaw displacement‒front wheelset fail-hard (time=2s) 
 
Figure 3-22: relative lateral displacement of the front wheelset- rear actuator fail-soft (time=2s) 
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Therefore, it seems that the other information must be taken into account in order to improve 
the sensitivity to detect and isolate the actuator fail-hard within 1 (s). For this reason, the 
measured data from the relative wheelset yaw displacement is also included as the magnitude 
of the relative yaw displacement associated with the immovable actuator notably reduces 
compared to the normal condition. The inclusion of the latter measurement can ensure that 
the fault detection and isolation scheme is capable of responding quickly to the fail-hard 
condition. Further on, the information of the measurement and the associated residual cannot 
be evaluated individually in order to define a threshold as the residual does not show 
significant change compared to the measurement. Therefore, the use of a ratio to make a 
comparison between the measurement and its residual has been considered for the fault 
detection and isolation purpose.  In the data processing, the ratio of the measurement from the 
relative yaw displacement to its corresponding residual is proposed to extract the feature for 
the actuator fail-hard condition, as shown in Equations (3.2) and (3.3), where (ε) is a very 
small value. 
Leading  actuator fail-hard: 
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Trailing actuator fail-hard: 
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Figures 3.23 and 3.24 show the standard deviations (using the same moving window as 
above) of the ratio of the measured relative yaw displacement to its residual in the event of 
fail-hard where the incident occurs at a time of 2 (s). They clearly show that thresholds can be 
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readily set and an actuator fail-hard can be detected and identified if the monitored variable is 
reduced to below a (pre-definable thresholds).   
 
Figure 3-23: STD ratio of relative yaw displacement‒front wheelset fail-hard (time=2s) 
 
Figure 3-24: STD ratio of relative yaw displacement‒rear wheelset fail-hard (time=2s) 
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Time(s)
S
TD
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
re
la
ti
v
e
 y
a
w
 d
is
p
la
c
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 r
e
si
d
u
a
l,
 f
ro
n
t 
w
h
e
e
ls
e
t
 
 
LH
TH
Normal condition
Threshold 1
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Time (s)
S
TD
 r
a
ti
o
 o
f 
re
la
ti
v
e
 y
a
w
 d
is
p
la
c
e
m
e
n
t 
to
 r
e
si
d
u
a
l,
 r
e
a
r 
w
h
e
e
ls
e
t
 
 
LH
TH
Threshold 2
Normal condition
 83 
 
For the fail-soft conditions,  the location of the actuator fail-soft can be identified through the 
evaluation of the measurement of the lateral acceleration of the leading wheelset and its 
correspondent residual. In the event of the leading actuator failing soft, the measured lateral 
accelerometer of the leading wheelset significantly increases compared to its residual, 
whereas in the case of the fail-soft condition at the trailing wheelset the measured lateral 
accelerometer of the front wheelset (associated with the healthy actuator) remains almost 
identical to its residual. Therefore, the standard deviation ratio of the measurement to the 
corresponding residual can be considered to extract the feature for the actuator fail-soft, as 
expressed in Equations (3.4) and (3.5): 
Leading  actuator fail-soft: 
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Trailing actuator  fail-soft: 
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Figure 3.25 shows the standard deviation of the ratio of the front lateral acceleration to its 
residual in the incident of short and open circuit in one of the actuators, respectively. In the 
figure, LOC and LSC represent the leading open circuit and leading short circuit; and TOC 
and TSC indicate the trailing open circuit and trailing short circuit, respectively. It clearly 
indicates that the rear actuator is in a fail-soft condition (i.e. open and short circuits) if the 
monitored variable is below a certain threshold. Exceedance of the threshold depicts the 
incident of the fail-soft for the front actuator.   
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Figure 3-25: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset fail-soft (time=2s) 
Figure 3.26 illustrates the steps for the actuator fault detection and isolation for the proposed 
approach.   In summary, a fail-soft condition can be isolated from the normal condition and 
the fail-hard through the evaluation of the residual of the lateral acceleration on the leading 
wheelset―this latter being used as it has already been considered to identify the location of 
the fail-soft condition.   A fail-hard mode can be isolated through the ratio in standard 
deviation between the measured actuator displacement and its corresponding residuals 
generated from the state estimator.  
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Figure 3-26: A block diagram for fault detection and isolation (Approach 1) 
3.4 Assessment of the Fault Detection and Isolation Scheme  
The proposed fault detection and isolation scheme is required to have the potential to provide 
robust fault detection and isolation in the incident of actuator failure.   As the proposed 
strategy has been developed through a vehicle model-based approach, it must be able to 
diagnose the actuator failure in the presence of parameter variations, especially those related 
to the wheel-rail contact which is subject to large variations (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & 
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Himmelstein, 2004).  Also, the   dynamic response of a vehicle is highly dependent on their 
input (Mei & Goodall, 2001) and therefore it is necessary to evaluate the features for fault 
detection and isolation on different track inputs. Furthermore, fault detection and isolation at 
different failure conditions will also depend on the reliability and availability of the sensors. 
Therefore, it is also necessary to establish that sensor failures do not compromise the 
effectiveness of the proposed fault detection and isolation in the presence of a faulty actuator. 
The assessment of the fault detection and isolation scheme with a parameter variation will be 
discussed in subsection 3.4.1, while the assessment of the fault detection and isolation on the 
different track inputs is given in section 3.4.2. Finally, the fault detection and isolation will be 
assessed in the event of sensor failure(s). 
3.4.1 Assessment with parameter variation 
The results of fault detection and isolation have so far been assessed using the nominal values 
of the vehicle model (with the conicity of 0.2 and creep coefficient of 10MN). However, it is 
necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed fault detection and isolation scheme 
when the dynamics of the vehicle change due to the deviation of those parameters at the 
wheel–rail interface. Therefore, in this study the conicity of 0.1 and 0.35 and creep 
coefficient of 5MN will be considered to analyse the proposed fault detection and isolation. 
Figure 3.27 shows the standard deviation ratio of the measurement of the relative yaw 
displacement of the front wheelset to its residual in the event of leading actuator with the hard 
failure at different conicities, where the front actuator fail-hard at a time of 2 (s) at the 
conicities of 0.2, 0.1 and 0.35, respectively. It clearly indicates the fault detection and 
isolation is still valid when the conicity is deviated from its nominal value, as the ratio of the 
measured signal to its residual in the event of actuator fail-hard is always below the threshold, 
whereas the standard deviation of the measured signal to its residual from the wheelset with 
the healthy actuator (rear wheelset) does not show a significant change to the normal 
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condition, as shown in Figure 3.28. Similar results are obtained if the rear actuator fails hard, 
as shown in Figures 3.29 and 3.30. 
 
Figure 3-27: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
 
Figure 3-28: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒rear wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
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Figure 3-29: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (rear actuator fail-hard at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
 
Figure 3-30: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
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measurement of the relative yaw displacement of the leading wheelset to its residual in the 
event of leading actuator in the fail-hard condition at different creep coefficients, where the 
front actuator fail-hard at a time of 2 (s) at the creep coefficients of 10MN and 5MN, 
respectively.  It is clear that the fault detection and isolation is again valid when the creep 
coefficient is changed from its nominal value, as the ratio of the measured signal to its 
residual in the event of actuator fail-hard is always below the threshold. In contrast, the 
standard deviation of the measured signal to its residual from the wheelset with the healthy 
actuator (rear wheelset) does not show a significant change to the normal condition, as shown 
in Figure 3.32. Similar results are obtained if the rear actuator fails hard. 
 
Figure 3-31: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=2s) at different 
creep coefficients 
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Figure 3-32: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒rear wheelset (front actuator fail-hard) at different creep 
coefficients 
The analysis of the simulation results indicates a similar level of robustness again the 
parameter variations in the event of actuator fail-soft (open and short circuits). Figure 3.33 
and Figure 3.34 shows the standard deviation ratio of the measured lateral acceleration to its 
residual from the leading accelerometer on the leading wheelset when the incident of short 
circuit at the leading and trailing  actuator occurs at time of 2(s) at different conicities 
respectively. Again, the standard deviation ratio is always above a threshold when the front 
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Figure 3-33: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (actuator open-circuit at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
 
Figure 3-34: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (actuator short-circuit at time=2s) at different 
conicities 
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Figure 3.35 and Figure 3.36 show the standard deviation ratio of the measured lateral 
acceleration of the leading wheelset to its residual in the event of leading and trailing actuator 
with open circuit (failure occurs at a time of 2 (s)) at different creep coefficients. It clearly 
shows that the standard deviation ratio is always above a threshold when the front actuator 
fails with open circuit (Figure 3.35), whereas it is below the threshold in the incidence of 
open circuit for the rear actuator (Figure 3.36). Similar results can be seen in the incidence of 
the short circuit. 
 
Figure 3-35: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (leading actuator open-circuit at time=2s) at 
different creep coefficient 
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Figure 3-36: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (trailing actuator open-circuit at time=2s) 
different creep coefficient                      
3.4.2 Assessment with different track input 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the fault detection and isolation, both deterministic and 
real track inputs are used in the simulation. The considered deterministic track input consists 
of  a curve of the radius of 1250 (m) and cant angle of 6 degrees connected to a straight track 
via a transition of 2 (s)  at the vehicle speed of 50 (m/s) (with no track irregularities). 
Although the measured data from a real track is less representative, nevertheless the real track 
data measured from a railway line between Paddington and Bristol in the U.K. are also used 
in the simulation, in addition to the computer generated random track input (Mei & Goodall, 
2001). 
 The simulation results reveal that the proposed actuator fault detection and isolation is 
similarly effective on the real track measured data in terms of both detecting and identifying  
the type and location of the actuator failures. Figure 3.37 shows the standard deviation ratio 
of the measured relative yaw displacement from the leading wheelset to its residual when the 
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leading actuator fails-hard at the initial time of the simulation. In the figure, there is a clear 
reduction in the ratio for the immovable actuator compared to the normal condition, whereas 
the level of ratio remains almost identical to the normal condition for the healthy actuator at 
the rear wheelset, as indicated in Figure 3.38.   
 
Figure 3-37: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=0) 
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Figure 3-38: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒rear wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=0) 
For identifying which actuator fails soft, Figure 3.39 indicates the standard deviation ratio of 
the lateral acceleration of the leading wheelset to its residual in the incident of fail-soft. It 
confirms that the amount of ratio increases in the event of leading soft failure, and will 
decrease in the event of trailing actuator soft failure. 
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Figure 3-39: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (actuator fail-soft at time=0) 
Furthermore, when  the vehicle runs along a curved track, the proposed fault detection and 
isolation method is also shown to be able to identify the actuator failures. Figure 3.40 shows 
the standard deviation ratio of the relative yaw displacement to its residual when the leading 
actuator fails on the deterministic track. It clearly shows that the level of the ratio for the 
actuator with the hard failure is significantly reduced on the curved track compared to the 
vehicle with operational actuators.  
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Figure 3-40: STD ratio of yaw displacement‒front wheelset (front actuator fail-hard at time=0) 
Figure 3.41 indicates the standard deviation ratio of the lateral acceleration of the leading 
wheelset to its residual in the incident of fail-soft. The obtained result on a deterministic track 
is almost identical compared to either the random or real track data. This can be expected due 
to the fact that the fail-soft failure leads to system instability – a condition where the internal 
dynamic properties play a far more significant role than the differences in input incitation.  
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Figure 3-41: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (actuator fail soft at time=0) 
Table 3-2 summarises the different track inputs and vehicle parameters that have been used in 
the simulation in order to evaluate the robustness of the proposed fault detection and isolation 
strategy.  In the table “v” means the definition of the fault detection and isolation can provide 
reliable information in order to exclude the actuator malfunction among the healthy actuator 
without making any changes to the suggested fault detection and isolation definitions.   
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Table 3-2: Summarise the robustness of FDI at different track inputs and vehicle parameters; (v) means 
fault detection and isolation is valid 
 Robustness checks 
 
Actuator   
failure 
types 
Fault detection and 
isolation  
 
Parameter variations Track inputs 
Creep coefficient 
values 
Conicity values Curved 
track 
(1250 m) 
Random Real 
track 
5 MN 10MN 0.1 0.2 0.35 
Leading 
actuator 
fail-hard  
 
2
22
2
1
11
1
11
threshold
std)wˆw(
std)w
(
AND
threshold
std)wˆw(
std)w(
AND
thresholdstd)wyˆwy(




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
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
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Trailing 
actuator 
fail-hard  
 
2
22
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1
11
1
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std)wˆw(
std)w
(
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threshold
std)wˆw(
std)w(
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thresholdstd)wyˆwy(










 
 
v 
v 
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Leading 
actuator 
fail-soft  
 
3
11
1
11
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v 
 
v 
 
v 
 
v 
 
3.4.3 Sensors Failure 
The failure of sensors may have different impacts on the overall system performance due to 
the fact that a faulty sensor gives incorrect information about the current state of the system, 
which could cause severe problems as it may lead to poor performance and also affect the 
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fault detection and isolation of the actuators (Kwan & Xu, 2004). It is therefore essential to 
detect sensor failures and isolate the faults from those of actuators.  
The sensor faults may occur due to an abnormal change in the different parts of the sensor. 
Studies in (Sharma, Golubchik, & Govindan, 2010; Xu, Hines, & Uhrig, 1998) suggested the 
typical hardware faults that have been observed to cause sensor faults include damaged 
sensors, short-circuit connection, low battery and calibration errors. However, this study 
considers only a simple failure mode of zero output to demonstrate the possibility of 
detecting and isolating the sensor fault(s), as it is not the main objective of the study. In this 
case, the sensor under consideration will output a zero value for a large number of successive 
samples resulting in an increased estimation error from the Kalman Filter.   
The effects of different sensor faults on the residuals are summarised in Table 3-3. The 
deviation is relative to the fault-free condition (normal condition) where all the sensors are 
functional. Although the use of residuals may detect a possible fault in one of the sensors, the 
table also reveals that it is difficult to use the residuals to isolate the sensor failure as the 
majority of the residuals increase for different sensor failures 
Table 3-3: The deviation of residuals in the event of sensors failure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Evidently, in the incident of sensor(s) failure the standard deviation ratio of the measured 
signal from a faulty sensor to its correspondent residual would drop to nearly zero, as the 
damaged sensor fails to zero value. This calculation has already been employed for the 
Sensors  Location                    Symptoms  
                         Residuals 
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 
Normal condition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lateral 
accelerometer 
Front wheelset + + + + + + + + 
Rear wheelset + + + + + + + + 
Bogie + 0 + 0 + + + + 
Yaw  
accelerometer 
Front wheelset + + 0 - + + + 0 
Rear wheelset 0 + + + + + + 0 
Bogie + 0 + + + + + + 
Yaw  
displacement 
Front wheelset 0 + 0 0 + + + 0 
Rear wheelset 0 0 0 + + + 0 + 
 101 
 
actuator fault detection and isolation, and is extended here to detect and isolate the sensor 
failure of the yaw accelerometers mounted on the wheelsets, lateral and yaw accelerometers 
on the bogie frame without compromising actuator fault detection and identification as those 
sensors are not used directly for the purpose of actuator fault detection and isolation. On the 
other hand, the lateral accelerometer on the leading wheelset and relative yaw displacement 
on both the leading and trailing wheelsets are directly involved in the actuator fault detection 
and isolation and therefore alternative measures are needed to identify the fault(s) of those 
sensors. 
It has been shown that in the event of actuator fail-soft (open and short circuits), the standard 
deviation ratio of the measurement of lateral accelerometer of the leading wheelset to its 
residual exceeds the threshold if the leading actuator fails, whereas it will fall below the 
threshold if the trailing actuator fails. Also, the level of the ratio will also fall below the 
threshold if the lateral accelerometer sensor fails, as shown in Figure 3.42. In the presented 
figure, S1 denotes the failure of the lateral accelerometer sensor on the front wheelset. It 
clearly shows that the ratio is at similar level in the lateral accelerometer failure and trailing 
actuator fail-soft.  
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Figure 3-42: STD ratio of lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (failures occur at time=0) 
However, in the event of the sensor failure, the measured signal is zero (apart from sensor 
noises) and the estimated signal from the observer is not zero, as shown in Figure 3.43. 
Therefore, the difference between the measured signal and the estimated signal always tends 
to be negative (Figure 3.44). On the other hand, it has been highlighted that in the event of 
the trailing actuator fail-soft, the measured acceleration of the leading wheelset changes 
slower than its corresponding estimation data and consequently the difference between the 
measured signal and the estimated signal is expected to be positive in the incident of the 
trailing actuator failing soft (Figure 3.45).  Therefore, in order to avoid the conflict between 
the actuator fail-soft and the failure of the lateral accelerometer on the wheelsets, the 
difference between the standard deviation of the lateral acceleration measurement and the 
standard deviation of the estimated wheelset lateral acceleration are included to enable the 
isolation of sensor and actuator faults, as expressed in Equations (3.6) and (3.7). 
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 Trailing actuator  fail-soft: 
 
 
 
    0ˆ
11

stdwstdw
yy 
 
   
 
Eq. 3-6 
 
 
Lateral accelerometer sensor failure: 
 
 
 
 
 
    0ˆ
11

stdwstdw
yy   
 
 
 
                                                  
 
Eq. 3-7 
 
Figure 3-43: Measured and estimated lateral acceleration‒front wheelset (front lateral accelerometer fails at 
time=0)                         
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Figure 3-44: STD difference between the measured and estimated lateral acceleration‒sensor failure at 
time=0 
 
Figure 3-45: STD difference between the measured and estimated lateral acceleration‒trailing actuator 
(fail-soft at time=0) 
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Similarly, other measures (in addition to the standard deviation ratio of the relative yaw 
displacement to its residual) are needed to separate the actuator fail-hard and the failure of the 
relative yaw displacement sensors, as shown in Figure 3.46, where S7 indicates the failure of 
the relative yaw displacement sensor on the front wheelset. A similar result will be obtained 
if the yaw displacement sensor failure and actuator fail-hard present at the trailing wheelset, 
as given in Figure 3.47, where S8 indicates the failure of the yaw displacement. 
 
Figure 3-46: STD ratio of the yaw displacement‒front wheelset, fails at time=0 
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Figure 3-47: STD ratio of the yaw displacement‒rear wheelset fails at time=0 
However, this study shows that the generated residuals are significantly increased in the event 
of sensor failure compared to the normal condition or actuator fail-hard. Therefore, the use of 
the residual as an additional feature can overcome the apparent conflict between fault 
detection and isolation of the actuator fail-hard and the failure of the relative yaw 
displacement sensors. Figures 3.48 and Figure 3.49 show the standard deviation of the 
generated residual from the relative yaw displacement in the event of sensor and actuator fail-
hard conditions. They clearly indicate that the generated residual in the event of sensor failure 
significantly increases compared to the actuator fail-hard and normal conditions. Therefore, 
the failure of the relative yaw displacement’s sensor can be isolated from the actuator fail-
hard through an evaluation of its residual. 
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Figure 3-48: STD of residual from yaw displacement‒front wheelset (faults occur at time = 0) 
 
Figure 3-49: STD of residual from yaw displacement‒rear wheelset (faults occur time=0) 
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Table 3.4 summarises the proposed strategy for fault detection and isolation in the event of 
actuator and sensor failures.  
Table 3-4: Strategy for fault detection and isolation in the event of the actuator and sensor failures 
Mode types Fault detection and defection 
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a fault detection and isolation strategy for actively controlled railway 
vehicles for actuator failures as well as some cases of sensor faults. In this methodology, a 
vehicle-based approach through the use of a state estimator has been developed to identify the 
actuator failure by evaluating the residuals in the time domain. It has been proposed that the 
actuator in a hard mode can be isolated through evaluating the standard deviation ratio of 
measurement of the relative yaw displacement to their residuals. The actuator with the soft 
failure (open and short circuits) can be diagnosed by computing the standard deviation ratio 
of the measurement of the lateral accelerometer of the front wheelset to its residual. The 
proposed features for the actuator fault detection and isolation have been assessed in the 
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presence of parameter variations at the wheel–rail interface and different track inputs. It has 
been shown that the features for the actuator fault detection and isolation can provide robust 
information in order to diagnose the actuator failure. One of the critical design aspects is that 
the features for fault detection rely on the reliability of the sensors; therefore, the 
effectiveness of the actuator fault detection and isolation in the incident of the sensor failure 
has also been thoroughly studied. It has been shown that the failure of the wheelset yaw 
accelerometers, the wheelset leading lateral accelerometer, and mounted sensors on the bogie 
frame can be readily identified through evaluation of the residuals and standard deviation 
ratio of the measurement of that sensor failure to its residual, due to the fact that those 
measurement signals have not been used for the actuator fault detection and isolation. It has 
been demonstrated that there is a conflict between lateral accelerometer failure and trailing 
actuator fail-soft, as the amount of ratio for both events is below the threshold. In order to 
overcome the conflict between the actuator fail-soft and the lateral accelerometer sensor 
failure on the wheelsets, the difference between the standard deviation of lateral acceleration 
measurement and the standard deviation of the estimated wheelset lateral acceleration are 
included to remove such disagreement. Furthermore, the standard deviation ratio of the yaw 
displacement to its residual will be significantly reduced in the incident of actuator fail-hard 
and sensor failure of the yaw displacement. This study showed that the generated residuals 
significantly magnified in the event of yaw displacement failure compared to the normal 
condition and actuator fail-hard. Therefore, the use of residual as an additional feature can 
overcome the conflict between fault detection and isolation of the actuator fail-hard and the 
failure of the yaw displacement sensors.  
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Chapter 4 FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION (APPROACH 2) 
4.1 Introduction  
It has been shown in chapter 3 that the detection and isolation of actuator failure(s) can be 
achieved through the use of a vehicle-model based approach. The drawback is that this 
strategy will be reliant on the high order of the vehicle model, which can be problematic for 
practical implementation due to the increased complexity and the scheme is more dependent 
on the dynamic behaviour of the vehicle rather than that of the actuator itself.   
This chapter aims to provide an alternative fault detection and isolation strategy by 
introducing an actuator model-based approach that detects actuator fault(s) from changes in 
actuator dynamics, where sensor fault(s) are also considered as the reliability of the FDI 
scheme is highly reliant on the information provided by the sensors. This approach will be 
based on the use of a Local Kalman Filter (LKF) for each of the two actuators for the fault 
detection and isolation for the actuators and sensors (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014). Figure 4.1 
illustrates the overall fault detection and isolation strategy for the active wheelset control 
system. The output measurements from sensors of each actuator are fed to a local Kalman 
Filter (LKF) that generates individual residuals which are then analysed in order to provide 
information for monitoring the status of the actuator as well as that of the sensors.  
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Figure 4-1: Overall fault detection and isolation strategy (Approach 2) 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.1 presents the formulation and basic design of 
the actuator model-based approach for the proposed fault detection and isolation scheme. 
Section 4.2 establishes a fault detection and isolation methodology for both actuator and 
sensor malfunctions, Details to extract the features for fault detection and isolation are 
provided in section 4.3. Section 4.4 assesses the robustness of the proposed FDI on different 
track inputs. Finally, a summary will be provided. 
4.2 Local Kalman Filter Design for Actuators  
Although the detection and isolation of actuator malfunctions may be realised directly by 
using sensor measurement signals from the actuators, additional safeguards would be needed 
if sensor failures are also considered. Therefore, the actuator model-based approach is 
developed through the use of a Local Kalman Filter (LKF) as the actuator dynamics are well 
known. The generated errors between estimated data and measured data will be used to detect 
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and isolate both actuator and sensor failure(s). The term of ‘local’ is used as the employed 
Kalman-Bucy Filter only represents the dynamics of each actuator at the local level. Equation 
(4.1) defines a state–space representation of the actuator model (from the actuator dynamics 
in chapter 2) for each wheelset for the LKF design, where xac is a vector of state variables; uac 
is the actuator’s control input vector. The output torque of the actuator and the motor voltage 
are considered as control inputs to the Kalman filter and they can be readily made available 
from the sensor measurement and the local torque controller respectively. 
acacacacacacac w.Gu.Bx.Ax  ; 
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Eq. 4-1 
 
 
In the equation, the state-space representation of the actuator is re-formulated to include the 
output torque ( g ) as one of the state variables so that the effect of the vehicle dynamics on 
the actuator behaviours can be taken into account without the need to include the more 
complex models. In the design, a small value of 10
-3
 is used in the state matrix for the torque 
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variable ( g ) in order to have a full rank of matrix Aac and the derivative of ( g ) is treated as 
a source of random disturbance – both are technical measures in the model based design 
approaches. Each actuator is equipped with three sensors for the measurement of the actuator 
speed (motor rotational velocity), the motor current and the output torque to be applied to the 
wheelsets from the actuator gearbox (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014). The output equation for the 
measurements is given in Equation (4.2). The measurement noises (vac) are set to 2% of their 
maximum absolute values of the corresponding sensors, which are considered typical for the 
sensors of this kind.   
a ca ca ca ca c vHxCy ..   
Where; 
 
;C
;iy
ac
T
gamac












100
010
001

 
Eq. 4-2 
 
The state-space representation of the actuator in Equation (4.1) and (4.2) enable the necessary 
matrices and vectors to determine the gain for the local Kalman Filter as given in Equation 
(4.3). However, in order to obtain the Kalman gain the states from the Riccati equation as 
given in Equation (4.3) should be calculated at the first step (Maybeck, 1979). 
1
 ac
T
acacac RCPK  
Eq. 4-3 
acacacac
T
acacacacac
Q)t(P.C.KA)t(P)t(PA)t(P   
Eq. 4-4 
 
where Kac is the Kalman gain and Pac the covariance matrix. By tuning the covariance 
matrices for the process noise Qac and measurement noise Rac, the above Riccati equation can 
provide the desired tracking performance and robustness of the LKF in both the normal 
conditions and in the event of either actuator or sensor failures. The measurement noise 
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matrix (Rac) for each actuator can be calculated from measurement noise (vac) as given in 
Equation (4.5). 



n
i
iac
T
iac
ac
n
)v.v(
R
1
 
Where  
n = 3;  due to the number of sensors for each actuator 
Eq. 4-5 
 
However, the process noise covariance has been tuned manually and a value of 7.4×10
3
 for 
the process noise is found to deliver a desirable performance. The calculated covariance 
matrix (Pac) and the Kalman gain (Kac) generate the state estimate as given in Equation (4.6). 
)u.Dxˆ.Cy(KuBxˆAxˆ acacacacacacacacacacac 
  Eq. 4-6 
For example, Figure 4.2 gives the measured and estimated motor rotational velocity of the 
front actuator in the normal no fault condition, where the estimation error is also shown - a 
close match between the measurement and estimation is self-evident. The generated residuals 
(estimated errors) of the LKF are then used to detect actuator and sensor faults (Mirzapour & 
Mei, 2014) as described in the next section 
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Figure 4-2: Motor rotational velocity under normal condition 
4.3 Fault Detection and Isolation for Actuators and Sensors 
Different failure modes of the actuators (i.e. fail-hard and fail-soft) and the sensor faults can 
be detected and isolated by evaluating the estimation errors generated by the local Kalman 
filter(s).    
4.3.1 Actuator fail-hard 
In the incident of actuator fail-hard, the rate of change of the motor rotation displacement of 
the actuator is reduced to zero and the relative movement between the wheelset and the bogie 
frame would be severely restricted – the latter is only possible due to elasticity in the 
connections (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014). On the other hand, the actuator dynamics in the 
normal condition is used in the design of the local Kalman filter and therefore differences 
between the measurements and the estimations will be expected.   
From figure 4.3, it is apparent that the motor current in the event of fail-hard significantly 
increases compared to the normal condition where the fault occurs at a time of 2 (s). This is 
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because the wheelset control associated with the faulty actuator is demanding more torque as 
a consequence of the lack of controlled motion or controlled torque output at the wheelset. 
 
Figure 4-3: Motor current‒actuator (fail-hard at time=2s) 
On the other hand, the measured torque from the actuator (at the point of the output to the 
wheelset) is only a consequence of the high stiffness in the connection between the actuator 
and wheelset in response to track inputs, and this torque would be expected to increase as the 
actuator is locked in the fail hard condition as shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4-4: Gearbox torque –actuator (fail-hard at tim=2s) 
Therefore, the estimation errors associated with the faulty actuator are also expected to 
increase in comparison to the normal condition. Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 compare the 
generated residuals for the leading actuator between the normal conditions and when the 
leading actuator is in the fail-to-hard mode ―the fault occurs at time of 2(s) in the 
simulation. They clearly show that the level of the error signals is significantly increased for 
the faulty actuator, whereas the generated residuals for the healthy (rear) actuator should 
remain almost identical to those in the normal condition. Further on, in the case of trailing 
actuator fail-hard, the generated residuals for the leading actuator are approximately equal to 
the normal condition, while the faulty actuator for the trailing wheelset generates much 
increased residuals compared to the normal condition (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014).   
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Figure 4-5: Residual from motor rotational velocity‒actuator (fail-hard at time=2s) 
 
Figure 4-6: Residual from motor current‒actuator (fail-hard at time=2s) 
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Figure 4-7: Residual from output torque‒actuator (fail-hard at time=2s) 
4.3.2 Actuator fail-soft 
The actuator fail-soft leads to the system instability and therefore the estimation errors 
generated by the observer will be expected to show an oscillation (Mirzapour, Mei, & 
Xuesong, 2014).  Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 compare the generated residuals of motor 
rotational speed, motor current and gearbox torque from the actuator in the incident of fail-
soft (open & short circuit) in the normal condition and when the leading actuator fails in the 
soft mode at the initial time of the simulation. They clearly indicate that the generated 
residuals associated with the damaged actuator tends to increase significantly compared to the 
normal condition (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014).  
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Figure 4-8: Residual from motor rotational velocity‒actuator (fail-soft at time=2s) 
 
Figure 4-9: Residual from motor current‒actuator (fail-soft at time=2s) 
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Figure 4-10: Residual from gearbox torque‒actuator (fail-soft at time=2s) 
However, it is necessary to identify the actuator fail-hard from the fail soft (open or short 
circuit) condition, as the two failure modes lead to different consequences for the vehicle 
dynamic behaviour and hence require different control re-configurations. From the results 
above, it is evident that the all generated residuals associated with the faulty actuator (either 
fail-hard or fail-soft) tend to increase and the use of residuals alone is not sufficient to 
provide adequate information in order to separate the actuator fail hard from the fail soft. 
Hence, it is essential to include extra measures in order to isolate the type of actuator fault 
and in this case that the measurement of the motor rotational velocity (which is already used 
by the local Kalman filter) can be added as an indicator for isolating fail hard for the incident 
of short and open circuit (Mirzapour & Mei, 2014). 
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4.3.3 Sensor failure 
The proposed strategy for the actuator fault detection and isolation is highly dependent on the 
reliability of the information that is provided by the sensors (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 
2014). Each actuator employs three sensors to measure the rotational velocity, current and 
output torque. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that an abnormal change in one of those 
sensors does not affect the reliability of the fault detection and isolation for the actuators. In 
this study, only a relative simple (but common) failure mode of sensor output failing to zero 
is considered - investigations for other failure modes are possible, but are recommended for 
further studies due to the time constraint.  
It is reasonable to expect that, in the case of any of the sensor failures, only generated 
residuals associated with the faulty sensor will increase in any substantial way (Patton, Chen, 
& Nielsen, 1995), whereas the residuals of other measurements are not (or at least much less) 
affected – unlike in the case of actuator faults where all residuals are affected. This is because 
in the presence of the sensor failure, the observer (LKF) cannot provide good tracking 
performance for the sensor concerned and therefore the estimation error increases compared 
to the normal condition. For example, Figure 4.11 shows the generated residual from the 
motor rotational velocity in the incident of the speed sensor failure. The estimation error in 
the presence of the sensor failure is significantly increased in comparison to the normal 
condition. 
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Figure 4-11: Residual from motor rotational velocity‒sensor failure at time=0 
4.4 Fault Detection and Isolation Scheme 
In order to compute and extract the feature(s) to detect and isolate different faults of the 
actuators and sensors, the calculation of standard deviation moving window is used. 
In order to choose a suitable window size a compromise has to be made between limiting the 
motor current, especially in the event of fail-hard, and the ability to detect any abnormal 
changes quickly enough. In the case of the actuator fail-hard the motor current increases 
rapidly as the faulty actuator requests more torque.  The simulation analysis shows that a 
window size of 300 (m.s) can provide a reliable fault detection and isolation without letting 
the faulty actuator draw further high current as a consequence of the lack of controlled 
motion at the wheelset. For example, Figure 4.12 shows the magnitude of the motor current 
increased quickly to nearly 80 (A) after 300 (m.s) of the actuator failure. It seems that tuning 
the window size of 300 (m.s) excludes the fault actuator from the system in order to avoid a 
further damage to the motor. 
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Figure 4-12: Motor current- fail hard at time=2s 
Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 show the standard deviations of the motor velocity, motor current 
and the output torque using the moving window of 300 (m.s) in the case of the actuator 
failure, where the different actuator faults are introduced at the time of 1 (s). They clearly 
indicated that the all generated residuals are significantly increased after the time of 1 (s) 
where a failure is present in the actuator.  
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Figure 4-13: Residual from motor rotational velocity‒actuator failures at time=1s 
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Figure 4-14: Residual of motor current‒actuator failures at time=1s 
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Figure 4-15: Residual of output torque (gearbox torque)‒actuator failures at time=1s 
On the other hand, the sensor failure can be detected and isolated through the use of residuals 
as there is a clear increase in the residual from the sensor concerned. For example, Figure 
4.16 presents the standard deviation of the residuals for the motor rotational velocity, motor 
current and output torque respectively using a moving window of 300(m.s), where the torque 
sensor of the motor fails at the time of 1 (s). It clearly reveals how the estimation errors are 
starting to increase when torque sensor faults occurs whereas the generated residuals from 
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motor rotational velocity and motor current remain at the similar level as those in the normal 
condition.   
 
Figure 4-16: STD of residuals‒torque sensor failure at time=1s 
Table 4-1 summarises the different faults and how the detection and isolation may be 
achieved, where (+) and (―) indicate an increase and decrease, respectively,  of the residuals 
or measurements relative to the normal condition and (0) indicates that there is no significant 
change from the normal condition. It appears from Table 4-1, in the case of the actuator 
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failure, the increases in all generated residuals from the motor velocity, motor current and 
gearbox torque are observed. In addition, the type of actuator failure can be identified through 
the use of the measurement of the motor rotational velocity as its measurement is reduced to 
zero in the event of fail hard.  Furthermore, the location of the faulty actuator can be easily 
diagnosed through the evaluation of their residuals as the errors associated with damaged 
actuator are subject to increase whereas the estimation errors from the healthy actuator do not 
show substantial changes.  Also Table 4-1 demonstrates that the sensors’ failure can be 
identified through evaluation of the residual associated with damaged sensor. Further on, 
Figure 4.17 illustrates how the concluded results that have been obtained in Table 4-1 can be 
used in order to implement fault detection and isolation concept for different failure modes; 
where R1, R2 and R3 represent the generated residuals from motor rotational velocity, motor 
current and gear-box torque of the front actuator and R4, R5 and R6 denote the generated 
residuals from motor rotational velocity, motor current and gear-box torque of the rear 
actuator. 
Table 4-1: The symptoms for FDI 
Fault Symptoms 
Residual Measured 
11
ˆ
mm 
 
 
11
ˆ
aa ii 
 
11
ˆ
gg  
 
22
ˆ
mm 
   22
ˆ
aa ii   22
ˆ
gg  
 
1m
  
2m
  
Normal Condition 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Leading                             
Actuator 
Hard + + + 0 0 0 ― 0 
Open circuit + + + 0 0 0 + + 
Short circuit + + + 0 0 0 + + 
Trailing             
Actuator 
Hard 0 0 0 + + + 0 ― 
Open circuit 0 0 0 + + + + + 
Short circuit 0 0 0 + + + + + 
Sensors of 
front 
Actuator 
Motor velocity + 0 0 0 0 0 ― 0 
Motor current 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gearbox torque 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 0 
Sensors of 
rear 
Actuator  
Motor velocity 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 ― 
Motor current 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 
Gearbox torque 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 4-17: A block diagram for fault detection and isolation (Approach 2) 
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4.5 Assessment of Fault Detection and Isolation 
This approach uses the local Kalman filter and, unlike the vehicle model based approach as 
presented in the previous chapter, it is not affected by the condition changes in the vehicles or 
at the wheel-rail interface as the model does not use the vehicle model.  For example, Figure 
4.18 shows the standard deviation moving window of the residuals from the motor velocity of 
the actuator in the hard failure condition at different conicity values when the incident occurs 
at the initial time of the simulation. In the figure, NC2, NC1 and NC3 represent the normal 
condition at the conicities of 0.2, 0.1 and 0.35, respectively; LH2, LH1 and LH3 denote the 
leading actuator failing in the hard mode at the conicities of 0.2, 0.1 and 0.35, respectively.  
 
Figure 4-18: STD of residual from motor rotational velocity–actuator (fail-hard at time=0) vs conicity 
The difference between different conicity values in the case of actuator fault is caused by the 
different control demand from the active controller in response to the condition change at the 
wheel-rail interface, but it is clear that there is no difficulty to detect and isolate the fault from 
the normal condition. 
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4.5.1 Deterministic track inputs 
The assessment of the proposed fault detection and isolation strategy above is carried out 
using a straight track with irregularities. A deterministic track section (with no track 
irregularities) is included here to evaluate the performance, using a curved track with a radius 
of 1250 (m) radius and a cant angle of 6° having transition sections of 2 (s) at both ends. The 
simulation analysis shows that the proposed strategy for FDI can provide reliable information 
to identify any abnormal changes of either actuators or sensors.  Figures 4.19 and 4.20 show 
the standard deviation in the incident of the fail hard at time 0. As figures show the estimation 
errors on the transition times are significantly increased compared to the normal condition. 
The level of changes of the estimation errors are reduced on a constant curve, nevertheless 
they are still clearly higher compared to the normal condition for the purpose of fault 
detection and isolation.    
             
Figure 4-19: STD of residual from motor velocity‒actuator (fail hard at time=0) on curved track 
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Figure 4-20: STD of residual from motor current‒actuator (fail hard at time=0) on curved track 
In the case of the actuator fail soft, the generated residuals are significantly increased on 
either constant curve or transition times as shown in Figures 4.21 and 4.22. The generated 
residuals for the actuator fail soft are shown for the first 2 seconds only due to the fact the 
system is unstable and the generated residuals from the faulty actuator  increase exponentially 
with time.  
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Figure 4-21: STD of residual from motor current‒actuator (fail-soft at time=0) on curved track        
 
Figure 4-22: STD of residual from motor current‒actuator (fail-soft at time=0) on curved track 
Figures 4.23, 4.24 and 4.25 show the standard deviation of the residuals in the incident of 
motor velocity sensor failure, motor current failure and gearbox torque sensor failure 
respectively. The simulation analysis shows that in the case of any of the sensor failures the 
generated error of the damaged sensors are higher on the transition times compared to the 
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constant curve. However, a threshold can be readily set on the generated residuals in all cases 
of the sensor failures for the purpose of diagnosing any abnormal changes in the sensors.  
 
Figure 4-23: STD of residual from motor velocity‒motor velocity sensor failure at time=0 on curved track 
 
 
Figure 4-24: STD of residual from motor current‒motor current sensor failure at time=0 on curved track 
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Figure 4-25: STD of residual from gearbox torque‒torque sensor failure at time=0  on curved track                            
4.5.2 Measure track data 
Figures 4.26 and 4.27 show the standard deviations, using a moving widow with the size of 
300(m.s), of the generated residuals in the incident of the actuator failures. It shows that when 
the vehicle is operated under a normal condition of up to 1 (s) the genereted residuals are 
very low; whereas when fault occurs at time of 1(s) the error in the actuator subject to a 
significant increases compared to the normal condition. 
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Figure 4-26: STD of residual from motor velocity‒actuator failures at time=0 on real track data 
 
Figure 4-27: STD of residual from motor current‒actuator failures at time=0 on real track data 
Figure 4.28 shows the generated residuals in the incident of the sensor failures, where SF1, 
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respectively.  It shows that when the vehicle is operated under a normal condition of up to 1 
(s) the genereted residuals are very low; whereas when fault occurs in the sensors at time of 
1(s) the error of sensor failures tends to increase.  
 
Figure 4-28: STD of residuals‒sensor failures at time=0 on real track data 
Table 4-2 summaries the type of the different track input that has been used in order to 
evaluate the robustness of the proposed fault detection and isolation strategy. The simulation 
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reliable information about any abnormal changes in actuator or sensor without the need of 
making any changes to the definition of the fault detection and isolation. 
Table 4-2: Type of different track inputs to test the robustness of the FDI (approach 2) 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the development of a fault detection and isolation strategy for the 
detection of actuator and sensor faults using local Kalman filters based on the actuator 
dynamics. It has been shown that the fault(s) in the actuators can be diagnosed by a 
combination of the estimation errors from the KF based-actuator and measurement signals; 
whereas the fault(s) in the sensor can be identified through an evaluation of the estimation 
error from the sensor concerned. The standard deviation with a moving window has been 
suggested to extract the features for the FDI. It was shown that in the case of either of the 
sensors failures, there is a clear increase in the residual from the sensor concerned. On the 
other hand, in the case of the actuator failure, although the increase in generated residuals 
from the motor rotational velocity, the motor current and output torque of the motor is 
perceived, but only the generated residuals from the motor velocity and motor current were 
considered for the purpose of FDI.   Further on, in order to separate the fail-hard from the 
fail-soft (either short or open circuit) conditions, the use of residuals alone was not sufficient 
as all generated residuals associated with the faulty actuator are largely increased. Therefore 
Track inputs 
Curved track Random 
 
Real track data 
Curve radius 1250 (m) 
Cant angle 6
° 
The random track input 
represents the roughness of a 
typical high speed main 
Line―generated from filtered 
white-noise in order to 
provide a broad frequency 
spectrum with a relatively 
high level of irregularities 
Measured real track data 
between Paddington and 
Bristol in UK 
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the sensor output for the motor velocity was used as a supplement measure to provide 
information for isolating actuator fail hard from the cases of short and open circuits. In 
addition, both real track data and deterministic track were used as inputs in the simulation in 
order to ensure that the proposed strategy can provide valid information when the vehicle 
runs along different track inputs.  
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Chapter 5 CONTROL RE-CONFIGURATION & INTEGRATION  
5.1 Introduction  
The previous chapters have studied two approaches for detecting and isolating faults of the 
actuators, which can be used to enable a change of control strategies (through control re-
configuration) that will cope with the identified fault(s) in order to guarantee the vehicle’s 
stability and curving performance. This must be achieved only through the remaining 
actuator. The level of control input, i.e. the number of operational actuators, is reduced and 
consequently increased control effort for the remaining actuator may be expected. Hence, 
there is a design trade-off for the control reconfiguration between the stability and curving 
performance of the vehicle and the actuation requirements. Furthermore, railway vehicles are 
subject to parameter variations especially at the wheel-rail interface such as conicity 
(Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & Himmelstein, 2004), and therefore the robustness of the re-
configuration strategies must be ensured (Zhang & Jiang, 2008). This chapter is organised as 
follows. Section 5.2 studies the control-reconfiguration strategies for the different fault 
conditions (i.e. fail hard and fail soft).  Section 5.3 presents the integration of the proposed 
control reconfiguration strategies with the fault detection and isolation schemes as developed 
in the previous chapters to demonstrate how the two parts of the entire fault tolerant strategy 
work together in a simulated ‘real situation’ environment. Section 5.4 assesses the robustness 
of the fault tolerant strategy against parameter variations. 
5.2 Control Re-configuration Strategy 
After a fault is detected and isolated, the controller will need to be re-configured (Patton, 
Chen, & Nielsen, 1995; Frank, 1990) in order to deliver the desired torque demand to the 
wheelsets through the remaining actuator in order to maintain stability and curving 
performance. The re-configuration for performance is concerned with the minimisation or 
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elimination of all unnecessary creep forces at the wheel–rail interfaces along the curved track 
(Bruni, Goodall, Mei, & Tsunashima, 2007) in order to minimise the contact forces at the 
wheel–rail interface in order to reduce the wear and rolling contact fatigue (Perez, Stow, & 
Iwnicki, 2006), especially during curving (Mei & Goodall, 2003a). In the longitudinal 
direction it is desirable to eliminate the creep force to reduce unwanted yaw motion, whereas 
in the lateral direction some creep forces are required to provide the force necessary to 
compensate for any cant deficiency when the wheelset negotiates the curved track (Monk-
Steel, Thompson, de Beer, & Janssen, 2006). This is achievable or partially achievable 
through the re-design and tuning of the gains of the optimal control with the input reduced 
from two to one (Mirzapour, et al., 2012). 
5.2.1 Control re-configuration for actuator fail-hard 
In the event of the actuator failing hard, the objective of the re-configuration is to re-
configure the controller with the remaining (operational) actuator with the main aim to 
maintain as much as possible the vehicle’s performance (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014). 
It should be noted that the fail-hard condition means that one of the wheelsets is locked in a 
fixed position of yaw displacement relative to the bogie frame such that it cannot take the 
desired position on the curved tracks or straight track depending on the exact position it is 
locked to. Therefore some level of performance degradation (Zhang & Jiang, 2008) for the 
wheelset affected will be inevitable and the control re-configuration will aim to provide a 
performance at least not worse than that of the vehicle with passive suspensions. 
The re-configuration of the controller can be achieved by re-tuning the control gain (Blanke, 
Staroswieck, & Wu, 2001) for the remaining actuator in order to compensate for the degraded 
performance as a consequence of the actuator hard failure. In the re-design of the optimal 
controller with a single input from the remaining functional actuator, the effect of the failed 
actuator will need to be considered and is modelled in the form of high level stiffness 
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between the wheelset and the bogie frame to represent the material stiffness in the 
connections of the actuators to the bogie frame and wheelset. Equations (5.1) and (5.2) show 
the mathematical representations of the torque input for actuator failing hard at the leading 
and trailing wheelsets respectively; Kf represents the effective yaw stiffness from the material 
stiffness in the connections of the actuator to the bogie frame and wheelset. In the equations 
(α1) and (α2) also represent the radial angular positions of the locked actuators in the non-zero 
positions of the leading and trailing wheelsets respectively and (
R
Lv ) represents the impact of 
the track curvature. 
Leading actuator fail- hard:  
                                                  )
R
L
(K vgwff 1
1
11
   
 
 
Eq. 5-1 
Trailing actuator fail- hard:  
                                                   )
R
L
(K vgwff 2
2
22
   
      
 
  Eq. 5-2 
By Substituting the Equations (5.1) or (5.2) in the vehicle dynamics model that are provided 
in chapter 2 gives the revised model of the vehicle in the incidence of hard failure. Equations 
(5.3)–(5.8) represent the dynamics of the wheelsets and bogie frame in the yaw direction in 
the presence of hard failure for the leading and trailing wheelsets. 
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For leading actuator fail-hard: 
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For trailing actuator fail-hard: 
],
2222
[1
11111
0
11
1
2
11
0
11
2
11
wt
gg
w
g
w
s
g
w
w yr
Lf
R
Lf
y
r
Lf
V
Lf
I


  
         
Eq. 5-6 
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Eq. 5-8 
 
To re-design the controller for the fault conditions, the number of control inputs will be 
reduced to one input (Mirzapour, Mei, & Hussain, 2012) and the control input ),(
21 ww
  
represents the torque in the yaw direction at either wheelset produced by the remaining 
operational actuator. Equations (5.9) and (5.10) define a state–space representation of the 
vehicle model suitable for the optimal control design (with reduced control input), where x is 
a vector of state variables, u is the control input vector, w is a vector of track inputs, and y is a 
vector of outputs or measurements. 
 146 
 
A general diagram of the re-design control structure is shown in Figure 5.1 where a dotted 
box indicates the weighting factor for tuning the re-design controller. A control gain matrix 
for the re-configured control with the single control input can be tuned to ensure a good 
design by optimising the weighting matrices of Q and R. In this study the values of the 
weighting matrices have been chosen manually to gives the best results by achieving the 
following forces on curves tracks: 
• Zero longitudinal creep force on steady curve. 
• Equal lateral creep force. 
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Figure 5-1: Re-design control strategy scheme 
Equations (5.11) and (5.12) represent the selected value for Q and R for the leading and 
trailing fail-hard, respectively.  
In order to assess the vehicle curving performance, a deterministic track input is used in the 
simulation with a radius of 1250 (m) and a cant angle of 6
°
, connected to a straight track via a 
transition time of 2 (s). The vehicle speed of 50 (m/s) is used. Figure 5.2 reveals that the 
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control re-configuration in the incident of leading actuator fail-hard can help to reduce the 
contact forces in the longitudinal direction for the rear wheelset compared to the original 
controller without re-configuration, but there is only a small reduction in the contact force at 
the front wheelset where the actuator fault occurs as the actuator in a fail-hard condition locks 
the wheelset and there is little scope for improvement. A similar performance improvement is 
obtained for the rear actuator failure, as shown in Figure 5.3.  
 
Figure 5-2: Longitudinal contact force in incident of leading fail hard‒original vs re-configuration control 
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Figure 5-3: Longitudinal contact force in incident of trailing fail hard‒original vs re-configuration control 
The tuning of the re-configured controller is carried out also to ensure that the demanded 
control effort for control re-configuration is not significantly increased compared to the 
normal condition. As shown in Figure 5.4, the maximum control torque on the transition 
curve is nearly 180 (N.m) for the normal condition and it is at a similar level for the actuator 
fail-hard conditions. 
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Figure 5-4: Control effort‒normal condition vs re-configuration control (fail-hard) 
The results in Table 5-1 compare the root mean square values of the control effort between 
the normal condition and fail-hard on the curve with the radius of 1250 (m) and the straight 
track with irregularities. They suggest that the demand for control effort is dominated by the 
requirements on a random track, which are much higher than that on the curved track. This is 
particularly the case for high-speed vehicles, as the effect of the track roughness becomes 
worse when the vehicle travelling speed increases. As indicated in Table 5-1, the required 
control effort for the actuator fail-hard can be smaller compared to the normal condition on a 
curved track; especially for the leading actuator fail-hard. However, on a random track the 
required control effort for the actuator fail-hard shows an increase compared to the normal 
condition.  
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Table 5-1: The requirements of the control effort between normal condition and fail-hard 
5.2.2 Control re-configuration for actuator fail-soft 
In the event of the fail-soft condition, the original active controller would not be able to 
stabilise the vehicle and the priority of the control re-configuration for the active control 
systems is then to restore stability, with the curving performance a secondary design issue 
(Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014).  Equations (5.13)–(5.18) represent the dynamics of the 
wheelsets and bogie frame in the yaw direction in the presence of the fail-soft actuator for the 
leading and trailing wheelsets.  
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Actuator condition/ failures Actuator control effort (r.m.s) 
Random track Curved track 
Normal condition 2.4 (k.N.m) 
 
78.5 (N.m) 
 
 
        Fail-hard 
 
       Front actuator  3.1 (k.N.m) 45.8 (N.m) 
 
      Rear actuator  2.9 (k.N.m) 62.7 (N.m) 
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For trailing actuator fail-soft: 
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The control input of either τw1 or τw2 represents the torque in the yaw direction produced by 
the remaining operational actuator, where the input from the failed actuator is set to zero to 
represent the fail-soft condition. The other aspects of the state-space model for the vehicle 
dynamics are the same as in the fail-hard condition as defined in Equations (5.9) and (5.10) 
and the values of the weighting matrices given in Equations (5-19) and (5-20) have been 
chosen manually to minimise the control effort and the contact forces (Mirzapour, Mei, & 
Hussain, 2012). 
The vehicle stability is guaranteed as the design formulation for the full state feedback and 
optimal control takes into account the reduction of control input from two to one (Mirzapour, 
Mei, & Hussain, 2012). Note that both the open circuit and short circuit will be stabilised 
with the same control gains as the difference in the effect of the two types of faults is trivial 
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due to the low velocity operation of the actuators and hence relatively low level of the back 
e.m.f produced in the case of short circuit. Table 5-2 shows that the eigenvalues of the 
vehicle dynamics in the event of the leading actuator fail-soft (open-circuit) are well damped 
by the re-designed control (for re-configuration), where the parameter values given in 
Appendix B are used. Similar results for the short circuit and the trailing actuator fail soft are 
also obtained.  
Table 5-2: Eigenvalue analysis of the vehicle dynamic modes for re-configuration control 
Eigenvalues                                   Speed of 50 (m/sec) 
Damping (%) Frequency (Hz) 
Wheelset high frequency 93 106.71 
93 106.71 
98 113.7 
98 113.7 
Bogie  28 48.4 
28 48.4 
33 10.8 
33 10.8 
Kinematic mode 1 18 7 
18 7 
Kinematic mode 2 14 5.8 
14 5.8 
Body of vehicle 20 0.91 
20 0.91 
Figure 5.5 gives the longitudinal forces at the wheel–rail contact patches for the front and rear 
wheelsets in the event of open circuit and short circuit at the leading actuator, where RCO1 
and RCO2 show the performances of the leading and trailing wheelsets of the re-configured 
controller in the event of open circuit; RCS1 and RCS2 show the performance of the leading 
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and trailing wheelsets of the re-configured controller in the event of short circuit; and NC1 
and NC2 denote the front and rear wheelsets in the normal condition where both actuators are 
functioning. The simulation results reveal that, when the controller is re-configured with one 
control input, good steering performance can be achieved on the curved track. The contact 
forces at the leading wheelset are almost zero and very similar to that in the normal condition 
which is also almost zero. Interestingly, however, the tuning of the controller for a balance 
between the control effort and the curving appear to lead to some increase of the contact 
forces at the rear wheelset (with the healthy actuator) in comparison with the normal 
condition. 
 
Figure 5-5: Longitudinal contact force of leading fail soft‒normal condition vs re-configuration control 
However, the simulation analysis shows that when the trailing actuator fails in soft mode, the 
increase of the longitudinal contact force which occurred to the leading wheelset (operated 
actuator) is approximately two times higher compared to the contact force of the trailing 
wheelset when the soft failure is apparent at the leading actuator (Figure 5.6). 
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Figure 5-6: Longitudinal contact force‒actuator (fail-soft) with re-configuration control 
Further investigation reveals that the lateral contact forces of the two wheelsets are not 
affected once the stability is restored by the reconfigured control, and they remain almost 
identical in either the normal condition or actuator fail-soft as shown in Figure 5.7. 
 
Figure 5-7: Lateral contact force‒leading actuator (fail-soft) vs normal condition 
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The control torque required to maintain stability and good curving performance with a single 
actuator in the event of the other actuator failing soft is expected to be higher in comparison 
to the normal condition. Figure 5.8 compares the actuator torque demand between the normal 
condition (NC) and when one of the actuators fails in the soft mode (i.e. open and short 
ciruites) on the curved track, which suggests that the required torque demand in the event of 
trailing fail-soft (TFS) may be two times higher than the normal condition and leading fail-
soft (LFS). 
 
Figure 5-8: Actuator torque demand‒normal condition vs re-configuration control (fail-soft)  
The results in Table 5-3 compare the requirements of the control effort between the normal 
condition and actuator fail-soft on both the curve with the radius of 1250 (m) and the straight 
track with random roughness. It is clear that the demand for control effort is dominated by the 
requirements on the random track, which is consistent with the case of fail-hard condition but 
at a much higher level (at 13 k.N.m and 8.6 k.N.m for the leading and trailing actuator fail-
soft). An important observation drawn from this is that the fail-soft (i.e., short circuit and 
open circuit) condition is the most demanding to provide the stability control in term of 
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actuator output because the need to provide stability and cope with the high frequency 
components of the track irregularities especially when the vehicle travelling speed increases. 
Table 5-3: The requirements of the control effort between normal condition and fail-soft 
 
5.3 Robustness of the Control Re-configuration  
The developed control re-configuration is required to be robust against vehicle parameter 
variations in the system such as changes due to the non-linearity profile at wheel–rail 
interface in particular the conicity of the wheelsets at the contact point with the rail surface 
(Mei & Goodall, 2001). It has been shown previously that the proposed FDI schemes can 
provide robust detection and isolation of the actuator malfunction. Therefore, the robustness 
of the re-configured controllers should also be thoroughly investigated in order to ensure that 
the fault tolerant strategy for the active wheelset control will also work reliably when the 
vehicle parameters deviate from their nominal values (Pearson, Goodall, Mei, & 
Himmelstein, 2004). The robustness of the re-configuration control is assessed against the 
variation of the wheelset conicity in the typical range of 0.15 and 0.35. Figure 5.9 shows the 
level of the damping for the re-configured controllers (for fail-hard) over a range of conicities 
between 0.1 and 0.4, where a minimum damping of 8% and 5.65% at the worst case of the 
conicity of 0.4 is achieved for the leading and trailing actuator fail-hard (LH, TH) 
Actuator condition/ failures 
 
Actuator control effort (r.m.s) 
Random track Curved track 
Normal condition 2.4 (k.N.m) 
 
78.5 (N.m) 
 
Open and short circuits  
 
Front actuator  13 (k.N.m) 141 (N.m) 
 
Rear actuator  8.6 (k.N.m) 240 (N.m) 
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respectively. This confirms the previous observation that the stability is not a primary 
concern for the fail-hard conditions. 
 
Figure 5-9: Fail-hard minimum damping vs conicity 
However, this is a more serious concern in the event of fail-soft (i.e., open and short circuit) 
as this type of failure leads to vehicle instability. Figure 5.10 shows the minimum damping 
with the re-configured controller when the leading actuator fails in the open-circuit mode. It 
reveals that the re-configured control (tuned manually) is only able to stabilise the vehicle for 
the conicity range between 0.18 and 0.25.  
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Figure 5-10: Short-circuit minimum damping vs conicity 
In this study, the genetic algorithms (GA) are also considered for the purpose of optimisation 
in order to search for the best control gains to ensure that the re-configured controller can 
provide good stability over a range of conicities. The GA is an optimisation technique that 
searches globally based on the principle of biological evolution, and operates on a population 
which is built up with many individuals to evolve under specified selection rules that 
minimise the cost function and satisfying constraint simultaneously ( Haupt & Haupt, 2004, 
p. 36). One of the most important issues in the use of GA is the definition of the objective 
functions (Mei & Goodall, 2000b). The objective in this study is to minimise the largest root 
mean square (RMS) value of the control effort of the healthy actuator within the constraint of 
the minimum damping above 5% at three different levels of conicity, as shown in Equation 
(5.21).  
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Eq. 5-21 
 
Subject to; 
 %%;%;maxSub ... 555 402010    
 
Where (λ0.1, λ0.2, λ0.4) represent the conicity at 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4, respectively, and N is the 
index of the variable’s time response vectors over the period of the simulation. Although a 
real wheelset has significant conicity variations between 0.1 and 0.6 especially if flange 
contact occurs. But, the study used the linearised models of the wheel-rail contact mechanism 
due to the fact the nonlinearities are fairly small unless there is flange contact, a condition 
which actively controlled wheelset avoids. Therefore, the choice of conicity between 0.1 and 
0.4 (worst case) can ensure that the re-designed controllers are robust against the parameter 
variations at wheel-rail interface especially during negotiation of curves.  The simulation 
analysis shows that the GA tuned control gains can improve the robustness of the re-
configuration controller at different conicities. Figure 5.11 compares the minimum damping 
of the two re-configuration controllers when the leading actuator fails soft in open circuit. It 
clearly reveals that the GA tuned controller for reconfiguration can provide stability for the 
vehicle at different conicities. 
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Figure 5-11: Minimum damping with two different re-tunings 
Although stabilisation becomes a possibility through the GA optimisation, the control effort 
significantly increases compared with the optimal approach that is designed with the nominal 
value. Table 5-4 indicates the required control effort with GA approaches to maintain 
stability over a range of conicities. It demonstrates that the maximum control effort with the 
GA approach that can guarantee the stability reaches nearly 80 (k.N.m) on the curved track, 
whereas it is increased to nearly 300 (k.N.m) on the random track. 
Table 5-4: The required control effort with GA  
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Therefore, one of the critical design challenges is that the actuation requirement significantly 
increases in order to guarantee the robustness of the re-configuration controller. This is 
because the effects of the conicity on the dynamic properties of a rail vehicle in the scenarios 
of short-circuit and open-circuit actuator can be significant. Future research should attempt to 
ensure that the re-configuration controller meets the robust requirement without having 
substantial adverse impact on the actuator size. Previous research in ( Charles, Goodall , & 
Dixon , 2008) presented an approach based around an Extended-Kalman Filter (EKF) method 
that includes conicity as an extra estimation parameter, although the drawback of this 
approach is that it would increase the complexity due to the complex wheel–rail geometry. 
The other approach that might be considered is to include extra measurements as part of the 
feedback to improve robustness (Mirzapour, Mei, & Xuesong, 2014). However, both 
approaches need to be investigated for future development in order to implement the fault 
tolerance technique for actively controlled wheelsets to justify the safety and reliability of 
this new technology in the railway industry. 
5.4 Integrated FDI and Control Re-configuration  
It has been shown that the proposed re-configuration control can maintain stability and good 
curving performance. However, it is necessary to integrate the re-configured controllers with 
the FDI schemes in order to evaluate fully the effectiveness of the overall fault tolerant 
strategy in the different actuator failure modes. Both the vehicle model based schemes and 
local actuator model based schemes for the fault detection and isolation are considered for the 
Rear actuator  
Deterministic 
 
80.8 
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integration with the control reconfiguration strategies to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of each fault detection scheme. 
5.4.1 Fail-hard 
In the fail-hard conditions, the two different FDI schemes (i.e., the vehicle-based approach 
and actuator-based approach) provide similar results when integrated with re-configured 
control. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 compare the generated longitudinal contact forces at the 
leading and trailing wheelsets and Figures 5.14 and 5.15 show the generated lateral contact 
forces with two different FDI schemes; where the front actuator fails hard at the time of 5 (s) 
on a curved track (without track irregularities). In each figure FDI 1 denotes the fault 
detection and isolation scheme through vehicle model based approach (chapter 3) and FDI 2 
represents the fault detection and isolation through actuator model-based approach (chapter 
4).  It is evident that either FDI approach detects the fault quickly to allow the re-
configuration in the system for the re-designed controller to take corrective actions.  It is 
apparent from Figures 5.12 and 5.13 that the longitudinal forces at the trailing wheelset can 
be significantly reduced compared to the leading wheelset where the failure occurs (locked 
actuator).  Meanwhile, the lateral contact forces for the trailing wheelset are increased 
compared to the leading wheelset in order to compensate the centrifugal forces around the 
curved track. 
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Figure 5-12: Longitudinal contact forces leading wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard)  
            
Figure 5-13: Longitudinal contact forces trailing wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard) 
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Figure 5-14: Lateral contact forces leading wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard) 
           
Figure 5-15: Lateral contact forces trailing wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard) 
Figures 5.16 and 5.17 compare the generated longitudinal contact forces at the leading and 
trailing wheelsets and Figures 5.18 and 5.19 reveal the generated lateral contact forces with 
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two different FDI schemes, when the front actuator is locked at the time of 1 (s) on a straight 
random track. Figures show that the performance of the fault tolerant strategy with the two 
different FDI schemes is almost identical. It can be seen from the figures that the longitudinal 
contact forces at the rear wheelst (Figure 5.17) are approximately half of those at the leading 
wheelset (Figure 5.16). This is due to the fact that the re-configured controller takes action at 
the trailing wheelset and therefore reduces the contact forces in the longitudinal direction 
compared to the leading wheelet where the wheelset is locked due to the actuator failure.  On 
the other hand, the lateral contact force at the trailing wheelset is higher in comparison to the 
leading wheelset.  
 
Figure 5-16: Longitudinal contact forces leading wheelset (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1&2(fail-hard) 
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Figure 5-17: Longitudinal contact forces trailing wheelset (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1&2(fail-hard) 
 
Figure 5-18: Lateral contact forces leading wheelset (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard) 
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Figure 5-19: Lateral contact forces trailing wheelset (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (fail-hard) 
5.4.2 Fail-soft 
However, the two FDI approaches have a significantly different effect on the performance of 
the fault tolerant strategy in the event of actuator open and short circuit. Figure 5.20 shows 
the longitudinal contact force of the rear wheelset when the short circuit occurs at the front 
actuator at the time of 5 (s) on a curved track. The vehicle model based FDI scheme (FDI 1) 
shows that it takes about 1.5 (s) for the control re-configuration to take place and there is a 
large increase in the contact force to cope with the identified fault. 
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Figure 5-20: Longitudinal contact force trailing wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approach 1 (short-circuit)  
The actuator model-based approach (FDI 2)  appears to provide a much better performance 
for a fault tolerant strategy due to its faster fault detection. Figure 5.21 shows that the reaction 
time of the fault tolerant control is much shorter (less than 0.5s) and the contact force for the 
transition time is significantly lower. Figure 5.22 compares the lateral contact forces at the 
trailing wheelsets with the two different fault detection approaches, and clearly reveals that 
the lateral contact force is also significantly lower when the fault tolerant strategy is 
implemented than with FDI 2 (actuator model-based).  
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Figure 5-21: Longitudinal contact force trailing wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approach 2 (short-circuit)  
 
Figure 5-22: Lateral contact forces trailing wheelset (curved track) ‒FDI approaches 1&2 (short-circuit) 
Figure 5.23 indicates how the different FDI schemes would affect the control effort. As the 
figure shows, the control effort for FDI  approach 1 (FDI 1) is significantly higher compared 
0 2 4 6 8 10
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
Time(s)
Lo
n
g
it
u
d
in
a
l 
c
o
n
ta
c
t 
fo
rc
e
 o
f 
tr
a
il
in
g
 w
h
e
e
ls
e
t 
(N
)
 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10
4
Time(s)
La
te
ra
l 
c
o
n
ta
c
t 
fo
rc
e
 o
f 
tr
a
ili
n
g
 w
h
e
e
ls
e
t 
(N
)
 
 
FDI 1 
FDI 2
 171 
 
to the FDI  approach 2 (FDI 2) due to the fact that the former required more time to cope with 
identified fault compared to the latter as already shown in Figure 5.20. 
  
Figures 5.24 and 5.25 show the generated contact forces in the longitudinal and lateral 
directions when the short circuit occurs in the front actuator at the time of 1 (s) on a random 
track. They clearly show that the generated contact forces when the fault tolerant strategy is 
implemented with the actuator model-based approach (FDI 2) are significantly lower when 
compared to FDI 1 (vehicle model-based), as the fault detection scheme through FDI 2  
provides a faster fault detection compared to FDI 1. Similar results are obtained in the event 
of open circuit and actuator failure at the rear wheelset. 
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Figure 5-24: Longitudinal contact force (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1& 2 (short-circuit)  
 
Figure 5-25: lateral contact force (random track) ‒FDI approaches 1 & 2 (short-circuit)  
The difference in the detection time between the two FDI schemes which will have an effect 
on the wheelset movement in the lateral and yaw directions.  Figure 5.26 shows  the lateral 
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displacement of the front and rear wheelsets when the trailing actuator fails in open circuit at 
the time of 5 (s), where approach 1 is used.  It clearly reveals that the slow fault detection 
would increase the oscillation; whereas the fault tolerant strategy through approach 2 would 
substantially reduce such oscillation as it can cope quickly with the faulty actuator, as shown 
in Figure 5.27. 
 
Figure 5-26: Lateral displacement‒FDI approach 1 (open-circuit) 
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Figure 5-27: Lateral displacement‒FDI approach 2 (open-circuit) 
5.5 Summary 
It has been demonstrated that in the scenario of fail-hard the stability is not the main concern, 
and a primary objective for the control re-configuration is to minimise the contact forces at 
the wheel–rail interface in order to reduce the wear and rolling contact fatigue, especially 
during curving. Furthermore, in the event of fail-soft (i.e., short circuit or open circuit), the 
main objective of the re-configuration control is to maintain the vehicle stability. It has been 
shown that in the event of actuator failure, the number of control inputs is reduced from two 
to one (as the number of actuators reduces); however, the feedback signals provided by the 
stated observer remain the same. Therefore, the control re-configuration can be achieved by 
re-tuning the control gains of the proposed optimal controller through weighting matrices for 
different failure modes. In addition, the actuator requirements for the re-configuration control 
have been demonstrated. This shows that the requirements of control effort for the actuator 
fail-hard do not show a significant increase compared to the normal condition, whereas the 
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demand of control effort significantly increases in the event of open and short circuits 
compared to the normal condition. Furthermore, the robustness of the re-configuration 
controller has been assessed at the variation of the wheelset conicity in a typical range of 0.1 
and 0.4. This was a particular concern in the case of fail-soft (in either open circuit or short 
circuit mode), whereas it is less of a problem for the fail-hard case. This reveals that in the 
event of fail-soft, the re-configuration control is only able to stabilise the vehicle for the 
conicity between 0.18 and 0.25. Moreover, the GA was considered to search for the best 
control gain in order to ensure that the re-configuration control can provide good damping 
over a range of conicities. It was highlighted that although the stabilisation can be achieved 
through the use of GA, the required control effort would significantly increase. Further 
research is required to ensure that the re-configuration controller meets the robust 
requirements. The re-configuration controller also has been integrated with two different FDI 
schemes in order to ensure that the fault tolerant strategy can work effectively to maintain 
stability and curving performance. Further on, it has been shown that the fault tolerant 
strategy provides better performance with an FDI that has been developed through the 
actuator-based approach, particularly in the presence of actuator open and short circuits.  
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Conclusion 
This research has been focussed on the development of a fault-tolerant strategy for active 
wheelset control in the presence of actuator failure(s) in order to maintain stability and good 
curving performance. In this study, the fault tolerance has been developed through an 
analytical redundancy without the need for redundant actuators, in order to keep the overall 
cost down. The proposed fault tolerant strategy consists of two main parts: Fault Detection 
and Isolation (FDI) and Re-configuration Control (RC). 
This research has considered three of the most common types of actuator failure for the 
electro-mechanical actuators used in the study for the active wheelset control: fail-hard (FH), 
short circuit (SC) and open circuit (OC). The fail-hard is a failure condition when the motor 
shaft of the actuator becomes immovable; whereas the short circuit and open circuit are 
failures that occur in the electrical parts of the actuator which correspond to zero voltage and 
zero current in the motor respectively. 
Two different FDI schemes for the actuators have been developed: the vehicle model-based 
approach and actuator mode-based approach. In the first method, a vehicle model-based 
approach using a Kalman Filter (KF) has been used to detect and identify the actuator failure 
in the time domain. The proposed Kalman Filter was also implemented in the control scheme 
to estimate the full state’s feedback for the controller. It has been demonstrated that the 
actuator fail-hard can be detected through the evaluation of the standard deviation ratio of the 
measured signal from the relative yaw motion to its residual. The actuator fail-soft (i.e., open 
and short circuits) can be isolated by the standard deviation ratio of the measurement of the 
lateral accelerometer of the front wheelset to its residual. The drawback of this approach was 
slower fault detection, particularly for the actuator fail-soft as a minimum window size of 1 
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(s) for computing the standard derivations is required to extract the feature for the fault 
detection purpose.  
The second FDI scheme has been developed based on the dynamic model for each of the two 
actuators through a Local Kalman Filter (LKF) to identify any abnormal changes in the 
actuator. The investigation has shown that a fault could be detected and isolated through the 
evaluation of the residual in the time domain by using the standard deviation with a moving 
window that is much less that the first approach. 
The robustness of the FDI schemes with the two different approaches has been assessed when 
the parameters at the wheel–rail interface such as conicity and creep coefficient are deviated 
from their nominal values. In addition, both straight track with irregularities and deterministic 
track have been used as inputs in the simulation in order to ensure that the proposed strategy 
can provide reliable and consistent information when the vehicle runs along different track 
inputs. The robustness of the FDI has also been assessed in the event of the sensor failure(s), 
as the detection and isolation of the actuator fault(s) are highly reliant on the reliability of the 
sensors. 
Furthermore, the control re-configuration to cope with different actuator faults and failure 
modes have been investigated in details. It has been demonstrated that, in the scenario of fail-
hard, a main objective for the control re-configuration is to minimise the contact forces at the 
wheel–rail interface in order to reduce the wear and rolling contact fatigue, especially during 
curving. In the event of fail-soft (i.e., short circuit or open circuit), the main objective of the 
control re-configuration is to maintain the vehicle stability, and the curving performance 
becomes a secondary issue.  
It has been demonstrated that the control re-configuration could be achieved by re-tuning the 
original controller to maintain stability and good curving performance. In order to improve 
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the robustness of the controller for the actuator fail-soft when the conicity deviates from its 
nominal value, Genetic Algorithms (GA) have been applied to search for the control gains.  
Finally, the re-configuration controllers have been integrated with the two different FDI 
schemes in order to ensure that the fault tolerant strategy can work effectively to maintain 
stability and curving performance. It has been illustrated that the fault tolerant strategy 
provides better performance with the FDI that has been developed through the actuator-based 
approach, particularly in the presence of actuator open and short circuits due to the faster 
fault detection and isolation.  
The key contributions of this research can be summarised as follows: 
 Proposing and developing a fault tolerant control system through an analytical 
redundancy in the incident of actuator failures in order to address the gap in the 
research field as fault tolerance for actuator failures has largely been achieved 
through hardware redundancies in reported applications. 
 Investigating and developing a thorough understanding of the effect of actuator 
faults and failure modes on the vehicle behaviours/properties that provide the 
necessary foundation for the development of the proposed fault-tolerant control 
scheme for the rail wheelsets.  
 Developing effective fault detection and isolation methods for actuator faults, but 
also taking into account of the reliability and robustness of the FDI schemes in the 
presence of sensor failures and parameter uncertainties in the system. 
6.2 Future Work 
Future research would be required to ensure that the re-configuration controller meets the 
robust requirement, e.g., by considering the use of additional measurements to increase the 
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robustness or Extend Kalman Filter where the conicity can be included as an extra estimation 
parameter.  
In the case of the actuator failure(s), this study only investigates a situation where the actuator 
is physically stuck or loses all its control effectiveness. However, the actuator failure(s) may 
be preceded by a slowing of actuator response and/or a greater current demand than normal 
for the required output torque. Therefore, it will be suggested that a condition where the 
actuator loses only part of its control effectiveness could be investigated for future study.  
In addition, this research has used a simplified model of the actuator and the vehicle for 
developing the fault tolerant strategy. In future, it is suggested that the concept is extended 
onto the whole vehicle model.   
Furthermore, the fault tolerant strategy concentrates only on the actuator failure, but there is 
also the possibility of other abnormal changes in the sensor and microcontroller. It seems that 
might the best solution be to use hardware redundancy for the sensors and analytical 
redundancy for the actuators. It is suggested that the concept of the fault tolerant strategy be 
developed for those hardware failures in the future in order to ensure the basic functionality 
of the whole system. 
Further on, this research has only considered the optimal controller with full-state; however, 
it is suggested that the concept of the fault tolerant strategy can be extended to use different 
controllers that have been developed for the actively controlled wheelset. Finally, while this 
research has considered the conventional solid-axle wheelset with bogie for developing the 
fault tolerant strategy, there is further scope in the future to extend the concept on different 
vehicle configuration such as the independently rotating wheelset, the directly independently 
rotating wheelset, the directly steered wheelset and the secondary yaw control. 
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APPENDIX A CALCULATION OF CREEPAGE  
I. This Appendix demonstrates the procedure for the calculation of the creepage in 
longitudinal, lateral and spin directions.  
Figure 1 shows a side view perspective of both the right and left wheelsets, with the two 
wheels fixed at the same axle. As the wheelset is travelling forward at a constant speed of Vs  , 
the rotational speed of the individual wheel is determined by: 
               
0r
Vs  
 
When the wheelset is moving along a track in the longitudinal direction, both the track 
curvature 1/R and the wheelset yaw motion ψ can affect the forward speed of the wheelset, 
and therefore the longitudinal creepage. 
 
Figure 1: Side view of the left and right wheel 
In the case of the wheelset moving during curve negotiation, the effect of the longitudinal 
velocity for both the left wheel LV1  and right wheel RV1  are diverse due to the impact of the 
track curvature 1/R , which is given as follows: 
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The effect of yaw motion ψ on the longitudinal velocity for both the left wheel LV1 and right 
wheel RV1  can be expressed as:
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Where ɛ is a small value 
 
            
The combination of equations  can express the total longitudinal velocity for both the left and 
right wheels denoted as V1R and V1L , respectively. 
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According to the definition of creepage: 
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Where 1  is the actual velocity when the creep exists and 1 is the pure rolling velocity when 
no creep exists. Therefore, creepage in the longitudinal direction can be expressed as:  
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The results from the creepage in the longitudinal direction clearly indicate that the creepage 
in the longitudinal direction is dependent upon the track curvature (1/R), yaw speed and 
relative displacement between the wheelset and track, as the rolling radii for the left and right 
wheel are determined by (y-yt), as explained in Equation (2.8). The creepage in the lateral 
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direction is determined by a combination of the component of travelling speed and the speed 
of lateral displacement of the wheels, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Creepage in the lateral direction 
The velocities in the lateral direction of the two wheels on the left/right side can be stated as 
follows: 
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According to the definition of creepage. 
   
Where 2 is the actual velocity when the creep exists and 2  is the pure rolling velocity when 
no creep exists. Therefore, creepage in the lateral direction can be express as:  
                                               
This clearly indicates that the creepage in the lateral direction is related to the speed of lateral 
displacement and yaw motion of the wheelset. The creepage in the spin direction is 
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determined by the relative angular velocity (about the normal axis to the contact patch) which 
is provided by both the rotation and yaw motion of the wheelset. The combination of the spin 
velocities of left and right wheels can be expressed as: 
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According to the definition of creepage: 
Where 3  is the actual velocity when the creep exists and 3  is the pure rolling velocity 
when no creep exists. Therefore, creepage in the lateral direction can be express as:  
 
As such, it can be deduced that the creepage in the spin direction is dependent upon the yaw 
velocity and relative lateral displacement between the wheelset and track.  
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APPENDIX B VEHICLE NUMERICAL PARAMETERS 
Vehicle symbol and parameter in the simulation  
Symbols Parameters 
g,Vs  
Vehicle forward speed (50m/s), Gravity (9.8 m.s
-2
)  
   
ww I,m  
wheelset mass (1250 kg) and yaw inertia (700   kgm
2
) 
 
vg l,l  
Half gauge of wheelset(0.75m), half spacing of        axle(1.225m) 
 
,r0  
wheel radius(0.45m), and conicity (0.2) 
 
gg I,m  
Bogie mass(6945 kg), and Yaw inertia   (3153 kgm
2
)  
 
scsc C,K  
Secondary Lateral and longitudinal  stiffness (511  kNm
-1
), and  damping(37 
kNsm
-1
)  
 
ss C,K  
primary Lateral  stiffness (4750 kNm
-1
), and  damping  (7705 N sm
-1
 )  
 
fK  Material stiffenss (10
8
 kNm
-1
) 
vm  
Half vehicle mass (15000kg) 
 
2211 f,f  
Longitudinal/ lateral creepage coefficient   (10MN). 
 
R1,R2 Radius of the curved track at the leading and trailing  Wheeslet(1250 m). 
21 cc
,  
cant angle of the curved track at the leading 
and    trailing  wheelset (6
°
) 
 
mI  
Motor’s rotor moment of inertia (0.00115 kg.m2) 
 
maI  
Motor’s stator moment of inertia (0.00345 kg.m2) 
 
aR  
Motor armature resistance (0.112Ω) 
 
aL  
Motor armature inductance (9.04e-4 H) 
 
tK  
Motor torque constants (2.685 N.m.A
-1
) 
 
bK  
Motor back e.m.f constant (0.435) 
 
n  Gear ratio (1/87) 
 
gK  Gearbox drive stiffness(1.131102e9 N.m.rad
-1
) 
gC  gearbox drive damping  (7540.7 N.m s.rads
-1
) 
mC  motor gearbox shaft damping (0.0084 N.m.rads
-1
) 
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Abstract— this paper studies the key issue of fault tolerance for 
actively controlled railway wheelsets. It assesses failure modes in 
such systems, with a focus on actuator failures, and consequence 
of those hardware failures. It seeks to establish the necessary 
basis for control reconfiguration to ensure system stability and 
performance in the event of a faulty, without the need for 
hardware redundancies. A number of control schemes (with and 
without faults) are included in the study. Both analytical and 
simulation results are presented. 
Keywords-Railway; Wheelset; Active control; Stability; 
Actuator; Fault tolerance. 
INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wheelset for the railway vehicle is composed of 
the two coned (or profiled) wheels rigidly fixed to a common 
axle to rotate at the same angular velocity. When an 
unconstraint wheelset rolling along the track it is displaced 
laterally due to track irregularities, the rolling radii therefore 
are different because of the profiles of these two wheelset. 
Consequently, different forward speeds obtained for each 
wheelset due to the difference rolling radii to provide a natural 
centering/curving action. However, an unconstrained wheelset 
also presents a problem of kinematic instability known as the 
“Kinematic Oscillation” or wheelset “hunting” [1,2]. 
Traditionally the wheelset is stabilized by using passive 
suspensions on conventional rail vehicle, but such additional 
stiffness affects the pure rolling action of the wheelset around 
the curve. It has been theoretically proven that to this design 
conflict between stability and curving performance can be 
solved by applying active control instead of conventional 
passive components within the primary suspension of railway 
vehicle [2].  
 Passive components in the primary suspensions can be 
designed in such a way not to fail in order to maintain the 
stability and steering performance of railway vehicle and they 
are generally accepted as “safe” in railway industry. However, 
any new technology must prove that it can cope with any 
failures to demonstrate that any component faults would not 
lead to the system failure such that passenger safety is not 
compromised under such conditions.  From a practical point of 
view, any active control scheme must be also able to maintain 
an effective operation of a rail system in order to meet the 
necessary standard of reliability [3]. Hardware redundancy 
technique may be used in the system to guarantee safety 
operation of such a system. Whilst it may be acceptable to 
apply the above technique in sensors due to their relatively 
low cost, it is far more difficult to justify the use of multiple 
actuators in a cost effective manner for redundancy or 
accommodate those within the limited space of railway bogie 
[3]. There are two main approaches for fault tolerant control 
systems. The first philosophy relies on the existing system 
redundancies to achieve acceptable performance in the event 
of component failures. In this type of systems, once the 
controllers designed, it will remain stable. It should be noted 
that the redundancies in such a system are usually in hardware 
forms. The second methodology takes a completely different 
approach to achieve fault tolerance. It involves such 
procedures as real-time fault detection, isolation, and control 
system reconfiguration.  The redundancy in such a system 
may be an analytical form [4] and help to minimize the use of 
the hardware redundancies in order to keep the overall cost 
down [5].  
The object of this study is to develop the fault tolerance 
approaches without using redundant actuators to provide 
stability across a range of operation conditions with different 
failure modes. It investigates the possibilities/feasibilities of 
re-configuring the controller based on the use of remaining 
actuator(s) in the system.  For this study, the paper will review 
first a number of different control methods for railway 
wheelsets in the normal condition to understand how control 
for stability and/or curving performance is achieved. A 
thorough assessment of failure modes and adverse effect of the 
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faults on the system stability and performance is then carried 
out, followed by an investigation into control re-tuning/re-
configuration for fault tolerance. The paper is organized as 
following. The mathematical dynamic model of railway 
vehicle is presented in Section п. Consideration of basic 
control scheme is given in section ш. Section V demonstrates 
the different fail modes of railway vehicle with the actuator 
faults and re-configuration of the controller based on the 
remaining actuator Finally, conclusion and future work will be 
discussed. 
 
MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE RAILWAY VEHICLE 
A railway vehicle mainly consists of a vehicle body and 
two bogie frames, and each bogie frame consists of a bogie 
frame and the two wheelsets. The wheelsets are connected to 
the bogie frame with springs and dampers in the longitudinal 
and lateral directions. For this study, only the plan-view 
dynamics of a half vehicle is used to analysis stability and 
steering performance of the vehicle, which is the accepted 
practice in railway industry [6]. Fig.1 gives a plan-view 
diagram of the half body vehicle model used for this study. 
The equations of motion for a railway vehicle when running 
along a track are mainly determined by the creep forces 
between wheel and rail contact patches.  In this paper, a linear 
model has been considered, which is justified as the active 
control tends to reduce the effect of non-linearity in the 
wheelsets [7].  The linear model of the motion contains seven 
degrees of freedom, i.e. the lateral and yaw motions for each 
wheelset and for the bogie frame, and a lateral displacement 
for the vehicle body defined by (1) to (7).  The model is 
therefore 14th order in total, and can be represented in the 
state space model by (8) [6]. 
 
 
 
The input vector u represents the control inputs to the 
wheelsets, and the vector µ is used to represent the inputs from 
the railway track, including the lateral displacement, cant, and 
curvature. The lateral track displacement is a random input, 
which represents track irregularities along the path track, 
whereas the track curvature and cant are the deterministic 
inputs [6]. More details of the vehicle parameters in the 
equations are provided in the Appendix A. 
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BASIC WHEELSET CONTROL SCHEMES 
The railway wheelset can be stabilized by using either passive 
suspension or through the use of active control. For active 
approaches, it is possible to achieve this by applying either a 
yaw torque or lateral force between the bogie and the wheelset, 
but the yaw control is preferred as it also tends to improve the 
ride quality experienced by passengers [8]. 
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                             Figure 1: Plane-view of the vehicle  
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Therefore, this study only discusses approaches that apply 
control in the yaw direction to provide desired damping to 
stabilize the system. The review of the control strategies is to 
provide a background for the study of fault tolerant control 
issues and more detail of the controls can be found in the 
references provided [9,6,10]. The suspension/control schemes 
are considered in the study are: 
• Passive Suspension that uses conventional passive 
yaw stiffness in the primary suspensions.  
• Active Yaw Damping where the two wheelset of the 
bogie are controlled by applying a yaw torque proportional to 
the lateral velocity of the wheelset. 
• Sky-hook Yaw Stiffness where the control output of 
each actuator is set to be proportional to the absolute yaw 
motion of each wheelset 
• Optimal Control where the controllers for the two 
inputs (actuators) are designed with the use of full state 
feedback (from either direct measurements or through the use 
of an estimator). 
The track input used in the simulation, to study the control 
performance on curves for both active controllers and passive 
suspension, represents a curved track with radius of 1250m 
connected to straight track via a transition of 2sec. The curved 
track is canted inward by 6 degrees to reduce the lateral 
acceleration experienced by the passengers (a normal features 
of railway track). The vehicle speed of 50m/s is used – 
parameters of the vehicle are provided is Appendix A.  The 
simulation result in Fig.2 and Fig.3 clearly illustrates that 
active control can provide good curving performances to 
reduce the longitudinal and lateral creep forces, compared with 
passive suspension, when both leading and trailing actuator 
functioning normally.  
 
                Figure 2: Passive Longitudinal/ Lateral creep forces  
 
             Figure 3: Active control Longitudinal/ Lateral contact forces 
 
However, the active controllers are designed based on the 
assumption that both actuators function as expected and extra  
measures (possibly through the use of fault tolerance) will be 
needed in order to maintain the stability and if possible 
curving performance if one of the control channels fails to 
deliver. Therefore, it is essential to establish first a full 
understanding how the fault(s) affect the bogie dynamics in 
the system and then define what corrective actions can be 
taken [3]. 
 
CONTROL ANLYSIS IN FAULT CONDITIONS 
In the normal condition with both actuators functioning, 
the bogie is designed to be stable. Fig.4 shows the minimum 
damping ratio of the wheelset modes with the different 
controllers where the stability is achieved across a wide range 
of speed with a critical speed of over 100m/s in the three of 
controllers except active yaw damper [3].  
 
               Figure 4: Comparison of different control scheme 
 
However, this is expected to change dramatically, when 
one of the actuators fails. In this study, two failure modes are 
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considered – one is fail-hard and the other fail-soft, 
representing an actuator jam and free-motion respectively.    
The aim of fault tolerance for actively control system is to 
preserve stability conditions and maintain the current curving 
performance close to desired ones (or at least not worse than 
the passive system in the normal condition) in the presence of 
actuator faults. In this study, the full state feedback is 
considered as a start point and a control gain matrix is 
designed to control the remaining actuator in order to explore 
the fault tolerant control possibilities. 
 
Fail-Hard 
In the fail hard mode, one of the actuators is assumed to be 
blocked and can be simulated as a spring with very high 
stiffness between the bogie frame and the axle. The bogie 
stability at different speed for the selected active control 
schemes are compared in Figs.5a and 5b, where the fail hard 
occurs in the leading and trailing wheelset respectively. In 
Figs.5a and 5b, the critical speed is reduced to 62m/s for the 
active sky-hook control scheme with the malfunction of the 
leading actuator and around 75m/s if the trailing actuator fails-
hard respectively. A fault in the trailing actuator would result in 
an even lower critical speed for all three active control 
schemes. However the fail-hard condition poses a more 
problem for the curving performance of the bogie.  
 
 Figure 5: Stability of different control schemes with leading/trailing fault 
 
The simulation result in Fig.6 and Fig.7 indicate clearly that 
when fail hard occurs in the leading and trailing control input 
respectively, the original controller will not be able to provide 
the ‘right’ control effort as the contact creep forces at the both 
leading and trailing wheelset increase significantly on the 
curved track, delivering a poor steering condition. The 
objective of the fault tolerance in the fail-hard case is therefore 
is to try and minimize the adverse impact of the actuator failure 
on the curving performance. It can be seen that the curving 
performance is more under risk when fail-hard occurs for the 
leading actuator. The simulation results in Fig. 6 and 7 suggest 
that the contact forces with the original controller are even 
worse than that with the passive suspension (Fig.2). However, 
retuning of the control gains for the remaining actuator does  
seem to provide a solution to improve curving performance of 
the bogie in the event of fail-hard in the leading or trailing 
actuator as evidenced by results in Fig.8 and Fig.9 respectively.                          
The simulation results in Fig.8 and 9 in comparison with Fig.6 
and 7 of the original controller indicate that the re-tuned 
optimal controller for the remaining actuator can reduce the 
contact forces and maintain curving performance close to that 
of the passive suspension. In this approach optimal controllers 
are tuned manually by choosing different values for weighting 
factor. Although the stability is guaranteed with the optimal 
control design, the re-design of the other active control 
schemes is less straight-forward and the research is ongoing to 
ensure such designs will meet both stability and performance 
requirements, e.g. by applying optimization technique to search 
for the best control structures and control gains.  
 
Figure 6: Original controller optimal controller /Leading Fail Hard 
 
Figure 7: original optimal controller/Trailing Fail Hard 
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            Figure 8: Retune manually optimal controller/ Leading fail Hard 
 
 
Figure 9: Retune manually Optimal Controller/ Trailing Fail Hard 
Fail-Soft 
The second type of the actuator malfunction is known as fail-
soft, which is when one of the actuator is unconstraint from its 
control input. Control torque for the failed actuator in this 
scenario is zero and therefore not able to stabilize the 
kinematic mode of the wheelset. Figs.10a and 10b compares 
with the stability of the bogie with different active control 
schemes when one of the actuators fail-soft [3]. In Figs.10a 
and 10b, the critical speed is reduced to approximately 10m/s 
for all three active control schemes in the event of an actuator 
fault. Clearly, in the event of fail-soft condition the active 
controller would not able to stabilize the system and the 
operation speed of the system will have to be reduced very 
quickly to a very low level to avoid potentially dangerous 
situation if no other corrective actions are taken [3].        
Therefore, in this scenario, the priority of fault tolerance 
for the active control systems is to preserve stability control in 
the presence of actuator fail-soft, with the curving 
performance a secondary design issue. 
 
 
Figure 10: Stability of the different controller with leading/trailing actuator     
    In the event of fail-soft, the bogie stability is guaranteed if 
the number of control input is reduced from two actuators to 
one, and therefore more feedbacks are available for more 
sophisticated control design to provide desired control torque 
through the remaining actuator [3].  Fig.11 clearly reveals the 
bogie stability across a wide range of speed through re-
designing of the optimal controller with one control input.  It 
is also necessary to assess performance of redesign controller 
around the curve. Fig.12 gives the lateral and longitudinal 
contact forces at the wheel-rail contact points for the leading 
and trailing wheelset in the event of fail soft at the trailing 
actuator. The simulation result indicates clearly when the 
controller is re-designed with one control input (representing 
the remaining actuator), the perfect steering condition is 
achieved on the curved track, where the longitudinal contact 
forces at both leading and trailing wheelset are zero and the 
lateral contact forces of the two wheelsets are equal [13]. 
 
Figure 11:  Stability of original / re-design optimal controller with 
leading/trailing fail soft in actuator 
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Figure 12: Curving performance of re-design optimal controller with    
                  trailing fail-soft 
 
CONCLUTION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper has studied the fundamental fault tolerant 
control issues for actively controlled railway vehicles through 
analytical redundancy to guarantee controllability of the 
system in the event of actuator fault. A reconfiguration based 
strategy for managing both soft and hard faults has been 
investigated, focusing on solving instability and curving 
performance issues respectively. The design reconfiguration 
controller has been evaluated by their performance capability 
as evidenced in simulation results.  
Research is ongoing to develop optimization technique to 
search for the best control gain and control structure in the 
event of fail-hard in such a way that ensure both stability and 
curving performance.  However, there is clearly scope for 
extending the work other failure modes with different actuator 
configurations. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  C. Esveld, Modern Railway Track, Delf University of Technology: BV 
Amesterdam, 2001.  
[2]  R. Goodall and H. Li, “Modelling and analysis of a railway wheelset for 
active control,” in UK Control, Swansea, 1998,September.  
[3]  T.X. Mei, “A Study of Fault Tolerance For Active Wheelset Control,” in  
22 nd IAVSD, Manchester,UK, 2011.  
[4]  Q. Zhao and J. Jin, “Realiable Tracking Control System Design Against 
Actuator Failures,” in SICE 97, Tokushima,Japan, 1997.  
[5]  H. G. Guo, Automative Informaticand communicative system, London, 
UK: IGI Global, 2009.  
[6]  J. Pearson, R. Goodall, T.X. Mei and G. Himmelstein, “Active Stability 
Control Stategies For A High Speed Bogie,” Science Direct, vol. 12, no. 
Control Engineering Practice, pp. 1381-1391, 2004.  
[7]  T.X. Mei and H. Li, “Control Design for the Active Stabilization of Rail 
Wheelset,” Dynamic, System, Measurement and Control, vol. 130, no. 1, 
pp. 011002 - 011011, Jan 2008.  
[8]  T.X. Mei and R. Goodall, “Wheelset control strategies for a 2-axle 
railway vehicle,” Vehicle System Dynamics, vol. 33, pp. 653-664, 2000.  
[9]  S. Bruni, R. Goodall and T.X. Mei, “Control and monitoring for railway 
vehicle dynamics,” International Journal of Vehicle Mechanics and, vol. 
45, p. 743–779, 2007.  
[10]  P. Aknin, J. Ayasse and A. Devallez, “Active Steering of Railway 
Wheelsets,” in 12th IAVSD Conference, Lyon, France., 1991.  
[11]  R. Iserman, “Model_Based Fault Detection and And Diagnosis Satus and 
Applications,” in 16th IFAC Symposium on Automatic Control in 
Aerospace, Osaka, Japan, 2004.  
[12]  R. Goodall and T.X. Mei, “LQG and GA solutions for Active Steering of 
Railway Vehicles,” IEE Proceedings-Control Theory and Applications, 
vol. 147, no. 1, pp. 111-116, 2000.  
[13]  S. Shen, T. Mei, R. Goodall, J. Pearson and G. Himmelstein, “A syudy 
of active steering strategies for a railway bogie,” in IAVSD, Kanagawa, 
Japan, 2003. 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Vehicle symbol and parameter in the simulation  
Symbols Parameters 
 Lateral diplacement of leading, trailing wheelset,   
bogie frame and vehicle body                  
 
yaw diplacemet of leading, trailing  and bogie 
fram 
 
 
Vehicle forward speed (50m/s) 
 
 
wheelset mass (1250 kg) and yaw inertia (700   
kgm2),   respectively 
 
 
Half guage of wheelset(0.7 m), half spacing of        
axle(1.225 m) 
 
 
wheel radius(0.45 m), and conicity (0.2) 
 
 
Bogie frame mass(6945 kg), and Yaw inertia     
(3153 kgm2) respectively. 
 
 
Secondary Lateral and longitudinal  stiffness (511  
kNm-1), and  damping(37 kNsm-1) respectively. 
 
 
primary Lateral  stiffness (4750 kNm-1), and  
damping  (7705 N sm-1 ) respectively. 
 
 
Half vehicle mass (15000kg) 
 
 
Longitudinal and lateral creepage coefficient   
(10MN). 
 
 
Radius of the curved track at the leading and 
trailing  Wheeslet(1250 m). 
 
 cant angle of the curved track at the leading 
and    trailing  wheelset (6°) 
 Track lateral diplacement for leading and trailing 
wheelsets, respectively 
 
 Controlled torque for leading and trailing weelset   
respectively. 
 
 Gravity (9.8 m/s2)    
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Abstract 
Active control for railway wheelsets in the primary suspension has been shown to offer 
a number of performance gains, and especially it can be used to stabilise the wheelsets 
without compromising the vehicle’s performance on curves. However, the use of 
actuators, sensors and data processors to replace the traditional passive suspension 
raises the issue of system safety in the event of a failure of the active control, which 
could result in the loss of stability (i.e., wheelset hunting), and in more severe cases, 
derailment. This paper studies the key issue of condition monitoring for an actively 
controlled railway system, with a focus on actuator failures to detect and isolate failure 
modes in such a system. It seeks to establish the necessary basis for fault detection to 
ensure system reliability in the event of malfunction in one of the two actuators.  
Computer simulations are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method.   
Keywords: railway; active control; condition monitoring; fault tolerance; actuators; 
sensors 
1. Introduction 
Active control for railway wheelsets in primary suspensions has been shown to offer a 
number of performance gains, especially that it can be used to stabilise the wheelsets without 
compromising the vehicle’s performance on curves, to reduce the wear of the wheels and 
track, and to minimise the track shifting forces [1]. Recently, a number of different wheelset 
configurations and active control methodologies have been proposed [2], including Actuated 
solid-axle wheelset (ASW), Actuated independently rotating wheelset (AIRW), Driven 
independently rotating wheelset (DIRW), Directly steered wheel (DSW) and Secondary yaw 
control (SYC). Although the control requirements as well as control possibilities are largely 
reliant on the vehicle and wheelset configurations that have been outlined, the most important 
challenge relates to strategies for the safety and reliability of the active control [3]. 
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In the active approach, the use of actuators, sensors and data processors to replace 
traditional passive suspensions raises the issue of system safety in the event of a failure of the 
active control, which could result in the loss of stability (i.e., wheelset hunting) and in more 
severe cases, derailment.  Traditionally, mechanical components are used for the wheelset 
stabilisation and are generally accepted as “safe” which is largely achieved through 
mechanical overdesign [4]. However, the practical implementation for active (electronic) 
control systems can only be made possible if the safety and reliability requirements can be 
met [5].  
Effective condition monitoring of safety-critical control systems through fault 
detection and isolation (FDI) is essential to ensure that the overall safety of such systems is 
not compromised [6], and such condition monitoring must be able to estimate or detect 
incipient faults in real time and in a reliable manner [3] and it should not be affected by other 
parameter changes and/or uncertainties in the system [7].  
A research project at Salford University (UK) is being carried out to study an 
analytical redundancy-based fault tolerance approach for the active wheelset control, where 
the issue of fault detection and isolation for the active control system is one of the key 
research objectives. The focus of the research is on actuator failures, although the issue of 
sensor faults would also be considered. Some initial studies by the authors to establish a 
critical understanding of instability problems and re-configuration possibilities/feasibilities in 
the event of actuator fault(s) were reported in [4] and [8]. This study, however, is concerned 
with the development of a fault detection and isolation method to detect actuator failure(s), in 
order to enable the controller in the system to be re-configured to cope with the identified 
fault in the proposed fault tolerant system. The actuators (as well as the active control as a 
whole) are an integral part of the vehicle dynamics, and therefore cannot be treated in 
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isolation in the development of an effective Fault detection and Isolation (FDI) method. 
Previous studies [4] [8]have suggested that the dynamic properties of a railway vehicle/bogie 
can be severely affected by an actuator failure in the system, and that the changes also occur 
in different ways depending on the failure modes (e.g., fail-hard or soft) and location (e.g., at 
the leading or trailing wheelset) of the failed actuator. In order to identify abnormal changes a 
model-based approach is studied in this paper to exploit the dynamic changes in a railway 
vehicle (caused by an actuator fault) for fault detection and isolation in the event of hard and 
soft failures, respectively.  
The paper is organised as follows. The mathematical dynamic model and control 
design of the railway vehicle is presented in the next section. Section 3 deals with the 
approach to developing a model-based estimator to provide the controllers with the required 
feedback variables, where also the estimated data from the proposed estimator will be used to 
diagnose the faulty actuator. Section 4 demonstrates the performances of the railway vehicle 
with the actuator faults, while Section 5 addresses the key issues of fault detection and 
isolation in the event of actuator malfunction. Finally, a conclusion will be offered and future 
work will be discussed. 
 
2. Modelling of railway dynamics and control design 
The first step is to develop the appropriate models for describing the dynamic behaviour of a 
railway vehicle system. This study uses a conventional two-axle bogie with a half body frame 
[9]. Because the active steering action only affects the lateral and yaw motions of the vehicle, 
only the plan view dynamic of a half vehicle needs to be considered [10]. Figure 1 gives a 
simplified plan view diagram of the half vehicle [9], where the wheelsets are connected to the 
bogie frame via springs and dampers in the lateral direction. In practice, some form of 
longitudinal connection is needed to transmit traction and braking forces from the wheelsets 
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to the vehicle body frame, but this is not a concern of the current study [11]. There are also 
actuators placed between the wheelsets and the bogie frame in the yaw direction for the 
implementation of active controls [7]. The equations of motion for a railway vehicle when 
travelling along a track are principally determined by the creep forces that are generated 
between the wheel and rail contact patches [12]. In this paper, a linear model has been 
considered, which is justified as the active control tends to reduce the effect of non-linearity 
in the wheelsets [11]. 
 
 
                 
 
          
                    Figure1: Actuated solid-axle wheelset (ASW) 
The linear model of the motion contains seven degrees of freedom, i.e., the lateral and 
yaw motions for each wheelset and for the bogie frame, and a lateral displacement for the 
vehicle body defined by equations (1) to(7). The model is therefore the 14
th
 order in total [6]. 
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(7) 
 
The control input at the either wheelset ),(
21 ww
  represents the torque in the yaw 
direction produced by the corresponding actuator, where a model of electric-mechanical 
actuator is also developed for the study. The lateral track displacement is a random input, 
which represents track irregularities along the path track; whereas the track curvature and 
cant are the deterministic inputs [13]- more details of the vehicle parameters in the equations 
are provided in Appendix A.  Conventional solid axle wheelset can be stabilised by using 
either passive suspension or through the use of active control. For active approaches, it is 
possible to achieve this by applying either a yaw torque or lateral force between the bogie and 
the wheelset, but the yaw control is preferred as it also tends to improve the ride quality 
experienced by passengers [10].  
A number of control strategies are possible [2] [14], but in this study, optimal control 
approach is used for designing active control as the full state feedback required for the 
controller can be provided by the state observer used also for the fault detection and isolation 
scheme.  The design of the optimal controller is fairly standard and for the wheelset control it 
has been found that the minimisation of the lateral wheel-rail deflection and control of the 
angle of attack for the provision of curving force results in a controller that provides the 
desired degree of stability and performance [14]. Equations (8) and (9) define a state-space 
representation of the vehicle model suitable for optimal control design, where x is a vector of 
state variables, u is the control input vector, w is a vector of track inputs, and y is a vector of 
outputs or measurements [9].  
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The cost function is given in Equation (10), where the first term reflects the expected 
performance of the controller and the second term reflects the control effort requirement [13]. 
By tuning the weighting matrices Q and R to ensure a good design of the optimal controller 
[9], a control gain matrix K is obtained and the control input vector consisting of the two 
actuator torque signals is defined by Equation (11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Estimator design  
The optimal controllers for the two inputs (actuators) are designed with the use of full state 
variables, and a majority of the feedback such as wheel-rail deflection and wheelset angle of 
attack is not readily measureable [15]. Therefore, some form of state estimation is required to 
;wuxx  μBA        (8) 
Where; 
  ;yyψψyyψψyyψψyy Tvvgggg2w2w2w2w1w1w1w1w x  
 
  ;ττ T
2w1w
u  
 
;uxy  DC  
Where; 
  ;yy T
2w2w1w1w
y  
       (9) 
  ;dt....J   uuyy TT RQ
 Where; 
;)10,10();01.0,5.3,01.0,5.45( 1212  diagdiag RQ  
       (10) 
;.xu K         (11) 
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provide state estimates to the controller in order for the controller to calculate the torque 
demands.  
The approach adopted in this research study is to use a Kalman-Bucy Filter (KF) to 
provide the required feedback variables. More importantly, this KF can also be used for the 
purpose of fault diagnosis and condition monitoring tasks, where the fault detection and 
isolation scheme for actuators can be developed [13]. In addition, the use of the KF can also 
guarantee that the correct feedback information is available to ensure the system integrity in 
the case of sensor failure(s) [14]. The Kalman filter is designed based on Equation (12), 
where the estimated signals would be used to detect fault(s) in the actuators [12]. 
,kkkk wuxx  kkk μBA  
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(12) 
 
     In the equation, the lateral displacements of the wheelsets, bogie and vehicle body 
are replaced by their lateral displacements relative to the track in order to control the vehicle 
to follow the track; the derivatives of the track irregularities are considered as the input white 
noise for the design [10]. 
The vehicle is equipped with eight sensors (six accelerometers and two 
displacements). The accelerometers are used to measure the lateral and yaw acceleration of 
the leading and trailing wheelsets and the bogie frame, while the two displacement sensors 
are used to measure the yaw motion of each wheelset relative to the bogie – the latter is used 
to provide information of the wheelset, but to avoid the need for axle mounted sensors which 
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would be problematic in practice due to the hostile working environment. The output 
equation for the measurements is given in Equation (13). 
kkkk vuxy  .. kk DC ; 
Where;  
 
g2w2w
g1w1w
T
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(13) 

vk represents the measurement noise vector, and the measurement matrix Ck is 
obtained readily from the system matrix Ak. In this study, all measurement noises are set to 
2% of their maximum value at the vehicle speed of 50 (m.sec
-1
).  The covariance matrix Q 
for the process noise (track) is given in Equation (14), while tuning Qis important to 
minimise the estimation error. 











6
6
1010
0101
Q  
(14) 
 
4. Control analysis in fault conditions 
In active control, good performance during curve negotiation can be achieved if both 
actuators remain fully functional. In order to be able to develop a fault detection and isolation 
scheme, it is first necessary to define different failure modes that are likely to occur for the 
actuator and to understand the consequence of those hardware failures. Two of the most 
regular actuator failures are considered in this research – one is a fail-hard and the other fail 
soft [8]. 
4.1 Fail-hard 
In the case of electro-mechanical actuators as used in this study, a fail-hard is a failure 
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condition when an actuator becomes stuck or immovable [18]; this might be caused by a 
mechanical jam, due to lack of lubrication. Figure 2 and 3 show the relative yaw angle 
between the bogie frame and the wheelset, where the actuator at the leading or trailing 
wheelset fails in hard mode at the time of 5(sec). The relative yaw angle for the wheelset with 
the hard failure is severely restricted as expected – the small movements are due to the 
flexibility included in the study for the connection of the actuators to the bogie frame.  
                         
                                      Figure 2: Measured relative yaw deflection of leading wheelset  
                           
                          Figure 3: Measured relative yaw deflection of trailing wheelset 
Figure 4 compares the minimum damping ratio of the wheelset modes between 
normal condition, and when one of the actuator fail-hard [8]. In the normal condition with 
both actuators functioning, the bogie is designed to be stable. An actuator hard failure would 
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reduce the stability margins, but does not present a major concern for stability - even in the 
case of trailing actuator failure, the critical speed is still around 85 (m.sec
-1
) or 306 (km.h
-1
). 
However, the fail-hard condition poses a more problem for the curving performance of the 
bogie.  
                             
                                       Figure 4: Minimum damping ratio 
 
The simulation results in Figure 5 and 6 indicate clearly that when fail hard occurs in 
the leading and trailing control input respectively, the original controller will not be able to 
provide the ‘right’ control effort as the contact creep forces at the both leading and trailing 
wheelset increase significantly on the curved track, delivering a poor steering condition. 
Therefore, the objective of the fault tolerance in the fail-hard scenario is to minimize the 
adverse impact of the actuator failure on the curving performance. It can be seen that the 
curving performance is more under risk when fail-hard occurs for the leading actuator.  
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                                                               Figure 5: Longitudinal contact forces  
                                   
                                                                      Figure 6: Lateral contact forces  
4.2 Fail-soft 
A fail-soft is a failure condition whereby the control surface moves freely without providing 
any moment to the vehicle, which may be caused by a failure of the electric motor to deliver 
any output torque [18]. The control torque for the failed actuator in this scenario is zero and 
therefore not able to stabilise the kinematic mode of the wheelset. Figure7 and 8 show the 
lateral deflections of both the leading and trailing wheelsets in the event of fail-soft for front 
and rear actuators, respectively, at the time of 5 (sec). This wheelset lateral deflection is 
larger enough to cause flange contact and possible derailment, if timely detection and 
corrective measures are not taken. 
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                                                Figure 7: Leading yaw deflection  
                               
                                                     Figure 8: Trailing yaw deflection  
Clearly, in the event of fail-soft condition, the active controller would not able to 
stabilize   the system and therefore the priority of fault tolerance for the active control 
systems is to preserve stability control in the presence of actuator fail-soft, with the curving 
performance a secondary design issue. 
5. Fault detection and isolation 
In the event of actuator malfunction, the fault detection is possible using the model-based 
fault detection method, by the mean of the evaluation of the residuals. In this study, the 
Kalman filter based method is preferred for fault detection because it is already implemented 
in the control scheme to estimate the full-states’ feedback for the controller. Therefore, the 
0 1 2 3 4 5
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Time(sec)
M
e
a
s
u
re
d
 o
f 
le
a
d
in
g
 y
a
w
 d
e
fl
e
c
ti
o
n
(r
a
d
)
 
 
Normal Condition
Leading Actuator Fail Soft 
       at time of 5(sec)
0 1 2 3 4 5
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Time(sec)
M
e
a
s
u
re
d
 o
f 
tr
a
ili
n
g
 y
a
w
 d
e
fl
e
c
ti
o
n
(r
a
d
)
 
 
Normal Condition
Trailing Actuator fail Soft 
      at time of 5 (sec)
 206 
 
residuals can be generated capture between the estimated data kyˆ  and measured data ky
indicated by the sensors. 
5.1 Fail-hard detection 
Figure 9 (a) and 9(b) compare the generated residuals of relative yaw angle for both 
wheelsets between normal condition, and when the leading actuator is locked-up (i.e. fail-to 
hard mode) at the time of zero. They clearly show that the level of the error signals is 
significantly increased, as the wheelset will be locked by the faulty actuator.  In the scenario 
of trailing actuator fail-hard, the generated residuals of the yaw deflection for both wheelsets 
are increased compared to the normal condition, as shown in Figure 10 (a) and 10(b) 
respectively.  
                                 
                         Figure 9(a). Generated residual of leading yaw deflection when leading fail-hard  
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                              Figure 9(b).  Generated residual of trailing yaw deflection when leading fail-hard
 
                              Figure 10(a). Generated residual of leading yaw deflection when trailing fail-hard  
                                       
                 Figure 10(b). Generated residual of trailing yaw deflection when trailing fail-hard  
In order to extract features for fault detection and isolation, the root mean square or standard 
deviation can be considered, but in this study the latter is used as in the fail-hard mode as an 
actuator may lock-up at different positions rather than just at zero position.   Therefore, the 
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standard deviation moving window has been used to analyse the data. Figure 11 and 12 
compare the standard deviation moving window with the size of 1 (sec) of the residuals of the 
relative yaw angle for both wheelsets when one of the actuators is fail-hard and in the normal 
condition. 
                                 
                                             Figure 11: STD of residual from leading yaw deflection 
                                
                                            Figure 12: STD of residual from trailing yaw deflection 
It can clearly be seen that the actuator fail-hard can be detected and isolated if the 
residuals of the yaw deflections are above a certain threshold. The leading actuator with the 
hard failure can be detected when the standard deviation of the generated residual from the 
leading yaw deflection exceeds a certain point (Figure 11), while the standard deviation 
moving window of the generated residual from the trailing yaw deflection does not show a 
significant change (Figure 12). The event of trailing hard failure can be identified when the 
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standard deviation running window of generated residual from the relative yaw displacement 
at the trailing wheelset exceeds a certain point (Figure 12). 
Further analysis shows that the generated residuals from the yaw accelerometers of 
the two wheelsets do not show significant changes in fail-hard conditions compared to the 
normal condition. For example, Figure 13 reveals that the standard deviation moving window 
of generated residual from the leading yaw accelerometer is always below a certain point. 
The latter pattern can be considered to separate the hard failure from the soft mode. 
                                  
                                                      Figure 13:  STD of residual from leading yaw accelerometer  
5.2 Fail-soft detection 
The  actuator in the event of fail-soft can lead to system instability, and therefore the 
residuals generated by the observer will be expected to show an oscillation (or a limit cycle if 
the non-linearity of the wheel-rail profiles is considered) as demonstrated in Figure 14  where 
one of the actuators fails in the soft mode at the time of zero. 
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                                            Figure 14: residual of trailing yaw deflection  
However, it seems that the use of residuals alone is not sufficient to identify whether 
the fail-soft occurs at either front or rear actuators as all generated residuals from sensors are 
largely increased. Therefore, it is necessary to include extra patterns in order to isolate the 
location of the soft failure.  
Study shows that the standard deviation ratio of measurement of the lateral 
accelerometer of the front and rear wheelsets to its residual can be used to determine the 
location of the soft mode respectively. Figure 15 and 16 show the standard deviation running 
window with the size of 1 (sec) of the ratio of the front and rear lateral acceleration to their 
residuals when one of the actuator fail-soft at the time of zero respectively. It clearly indicates 
that the ratios for the wheelsets with the faulty actuator are higher.   
This is due to the fact that when the actuator fail-soft occurs either in the leading or 
trailing wheelset, the faulty actuator is not able to deliver any torque to the wheelset and 
therefore the lateral oscillation of that wheelset without actuator torque significantly increase.  
Based on the simulation results, the ratio of the leading accelerometer to its residual for the 
leading wheelset in the event of leading actuator fail-soft is above 8 and in the event of 
trailing actuator fail-soft is below 2 (Figure 15), whereas, the ratio of the trailing 
accelerometer to its residual for the trailing wheelset in the event of the trailing actuator fail-
soft is above 3 and in the event of leading actuator fail-soft is below 3 (Figure 16).    
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It can be seen that the standard deviation of the measurement of the lateral 
accelerometers of the wheelset to their residuals can provide a proper threshold to identify the 
actuator fail-soft. Therefore, the location of the actuator fail-soft can be diagnosed if the 
ratios exceed a certain point.   
                                  
                                  Figure 15:  STD ratio of leading lateral accelerometer to residual  
                                      
                                           Figure 16: STD ratio of trailing lateral accelerometer to residual 
 
In order to detect the actuator in the hard failure from the soft failure, the generated 
residual from the wheelset yaw accelerometer can be considered due to the fact that the 
magnitude of those generated residuals does not show significant changes in the fail hard 
condition compared to the normal condition (Figure 13). Table-1 summarises the change of 
the residuals in the event of actuator failure(s), where R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7 and R8 
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represent the generated residuals from leading lateral accelerometer, leading yaw 
accelerometer, trailing lateral accelerometer, trailing yaw accelerometer, bogie lateral 
accelerometer, bogie yaw accelerometer, leading and trailing yaw deflection respectively. 
Table 1: The generated residuals from measured signals; ++ large increase; +ε relatively small increase; 0 no significant 
change;    + increase.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
                 Figure 17.   Generated residual from leading yaw deflection at conicity of 0.2 and 0.4 
One of the critical design challenges is that the features for fault detection must be 
robust against uncertainties, such as parameter variations at the wheel-rail interface. For 
example, Figure 17 indicates that the generated residual from leading yaw deflection in the 
Fault location                                        Residuals 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
Soft Leading 
wheelset 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Trailing 
wheelset 
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
Hard Leading 
wheelset 
  +   0   0   0   +ε    0   +   0 
Trailing 
wheelset 
  +   0   +ε   0   +    +   +   + 
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event of leading actuator fail-hard at the conicity of 0.2 can give similar output as that in the 
normal condition at constant conicity of 0.4. This is because the effect of the parameters such 
as conicity on the dynamic properties of a rail vehicle can be significant, and deviations from 
the nominal values used in the model changes could lead to estimation inaccuracies in the 
similar way as the fault conditions. Research is on-going to ensure the FDI scheme will meet 
the robust requirements of diagnosing the actuator failure, e.g. by considering the use of 
additional measurements to improve the robustness and/or extended Kalman filter where the 
conicity can be included as an extra estimation parameter.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This report presents a novel fault detection and isolation strategy for actively controlled 
railway vehicles in the event of actuator failure, in order to ensure the system safety and 
maximise the vehicle performance under the fault conditions.  
In this methodology, a model-based approach using the Kalman-Bucy Filter has been 
used to detect and identify the actuator failures by residuals’ evaluation in the time domain. It 
is suggested that the actuator in a hard mode can be readily isolated through evaluating the 
generated residuals from the yaw deflection sensors. The actuator with the soft failure can be 
isolated by computing the standard deviation ratio of measurement of the lateral 
accelerometer of the front wheelset to its residual.  
One of the critical design aspects is that the features for fault detection depend on the 
reliability of the sensors, and also must be robust against structured uncertainties, such as the 
parameter variations at the wheel-rail interface and nonlinearities of the vehicle dynamics.  
Therefore, the robustness of the proposed FDI will need to be considered in the further work 
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in order to ensure the reliability of the proposed new technology against uncertainties in the 
system and in the event of other faults in the control system.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vehicle symbol and parameter in the simulation  
Symbols Parameters 
vgww yyyy ,,, 21
 
Lateral diplacement of leading, trailing wheelset,   bogie frame and vehicle 
body                  
gww  ,, 21  yaw diplacemet of leading, trailing  and bogie fram. 
sV  Vehicle forward speed (50m/s) 
ww Im ,  wheelset mass (1250 kg) and yaw inertia (700   kgm2),   respectively 
vg II ,  
Half guage of wheelset(0.7 m), half spacing of        axle(1.225 m) 
 
,0r  wheel radius(0.45 m), and conicity (0.2) 
gg Im ,  Bogie frame mass(6945 kg), and Yaw inertia     (3153 kgm2) respectively. 
scsc CK ,  
Secondary Lateral and longitudinal  stiffness (511  kNm
-1
), and  damping(37 
kNsm
-1
) respectively. 
ss CK ,  
primary Lateral  stiffness (4750 kNm
-1
), and  damping  (7705 N sm
-1
 ) 
respectively. 
vm  Half vehicle mass (15000kg) 
2211, ff  
Longitudinal and lateral creepage coefficient   (10MN). 
 
21, RR  Radius of the curved track at the leading and trailing  Wheeslet(1250 m). 
21
, cc   cant angle of the curved track at the leading and    trailing  wheelset (6°) 
21
, tt yy  Track lateral diplacement for leading and trailing wheelsets, respectively 
21
, ww    Controlled torque for leading and trailing weelset   respectively. 
g  Gravity (9.8 m/s2)    
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Abstract—This paper studies a model-based approach for the 
condition monitoring of an actively controlled railway system, 
with a focus on actuator failures to detect and isolate failure 
modes in such a system. It seeks to establish the necessary basis 
for fault detection to ensure system reliability in the event of an 
abnormal change in one of the two actuators. Computer 
simulation is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the method. 
 
Keywords—active control; railway system; condition 
monitoring; fault tolerance; fault detection and isolation 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A conventional railway wheelset for the railway vehicle is 
composed of two coned (or profiled) wheels rigidly fixed to a 
common axle. Although this arrangement has the advantages 
of natural curving, it exhibits a sustained oscillation when the 
wheelset is unconstrained. Traditionally, the wheelset is 
stabilized by using passive suspensions on conventional rail 
vehicles, but such additional stiffness affects the pure rolling 
action of the wheelset during curve negotiation. Therefore, if 
passive components are to be used then a compromise has to 
be made between steering and stability [1]. However, recent 
studies have demonstrated that this design conflict can be 
solved by applying active control for railway wheelsets in 
primary suspensions to stabilize the wheelset without 
compromising the vehicle’s performance during curve 
negotiation, leading to a significant reduction in the wear of 
the wheelset and track and minimized track-shifting forces [2]. 
In this new approach, the improved dynamic performance is 
achieved through the use of actuators, sensors, and the 
software that implements the control algorithm to provide a 
link between the controller and vehicle system to be 
controlled. However, the use of actuators, sensors to replace 
the traditional passive suspensions raises the issue of system 
safety in the event of a failure of the active control, which 
could result in the loss of stability and in more severe cases, 
derailment [3]. Therefore, active systems for safety-critical 
applications have to achieve a high level of integrity through 
fault tolerance approaches that ensure the basic functionality 
of the overall system whilst allowing component fault(s) [2]. 
Although hardware redundancies may be used in the system to 
ensure the necessary functionality and safety of such a system, 
and sometimes it may be acceptable to use redundant sensors 
due to their relatively low costs, it is difficult to justify the 
likely high cost of using multiple actuators for redundancy 
and/or to accommodate these within the limited space of a 
railway bogie. On the other hand, an analytical redundancy 
method can help to minimize the use of the hardware 
redundancies in order to keep the overall cost down [4].  
For the main components used in an active control system, the 
actuators tend to be cost intensive and require more space to 
be embedded than sensors and electronic control units; hence, 
developing an analytical redundancy-based fault tolerance 
approach for active wheelset control that does not increase the 
number of actuators is essential [5]. In order to develop a fault 
tolerant control (FTC) scheme for actively controlled 
wheelsets in the event of actuator failure, fault detection and 
isolation (FDI) performs a substantial task by providing 
information about actuator faults in the system that enables the 
controller in the system to be re-configured in order to cope 
with identified faults [6]. 
Fault detection and isolation techniques have been widely 
studied, some of which are concerned with the detection of 
actuator failures in different industrial applications. For 
example, a neural network has been used to detect and 
diagnose the malfunction of a pneumatic actuator of a train 
door [7]; Wolfram and Isermann [8] demonstrated the use of 
parameter estimation for detecting the electro-mechanical 
actuator of a textile machine when the electrical part of an ac 
motor breaks down; and study in [9] used the Extend Kalman 
Filter (EKF) to detect pump pressure faults in an electro-
hydraulic actuation system. However, a literature review 
of the railway vehicle suggests that the majority of condition 
monitoring tasks are comprehensively considered as the fault 
identification in dynamic systems [10] such as conicity 
estimation [11], suspension failure [12], creep force [13] and 
creep coefficients [14]. The subject of the FDI of the actuator 
failure(s) with the use of active control within primary 
suspension has not been addressed for the railway vehicles.  
In this paper, the objective of the study is to focus on the 
development of an FDI method with a model-based technique 
for the electromechanical actuators to identify actuator failure 
in order to enable the appropriate reconfiguration to take place 
to facilitate the development of a fault tolerant control scheme. 
Modelling techniques and specified models for railway vehicle 
dynamic systems are well developed, and therefore a model-
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based approach is considered in this paper to exploit the 
dynamic changes (caused by an actuator fault) of a vehicle for 
FDI in different failure modes (e.g. hard and soft failures). In 
this study, a Kalman-Bucy Filter (KF) based method is used to 
develop a fault detection scheme where the residuals will be 
generated to capture differences between the output of the 
dynamic model and the measurements from sensors. Two 
different sensing options will be discussed in relation to 
condition monitoring tasks, and a thorough assessment of the 
FDI of the actuator faults with the two sensing options will 
then be carried out. 
II. VEHICLE DYNAMIC AND CONTROL SCHEME 
This study uses a conventional two-axle bogie with a half 
body frame, which is a standard practice in the study of rail 
vehicle dynamics. Figure 1 presents a simplified plan view 
diagram of the vehicle scheme which consists of two 
wheelsets, a bogie frame and a half vehicle body. The 
wheelsets are connected to the bogie via springs and dampers 
in the lateral direction. In practice, some form of longitudinal 
connection is needed to transmit traction and braking forces 
from the wheelsets to the vehicle body frame, but this is not a 
concern of the current study and hence not included [1]. On 
each wheelset, an actuator is also placed between the wheelset 
and the bogie in the yaw direction for implementation of the 
active control [15]. The equations of motion for a railway 
vehicle when travelling along a track are principally 
determined by the creep forces that are generated between the 
wheel and rail contact patches [16]. 
 
                       Figure 1: Simplified plan view diagram 
The linear model of the motion contains seven degrees of 
freedom representing the lateral and yaw motion of the two 
wheelsets, lateral and yaw motion of the bogie frame and 
lateral motion of the half vehicle body [1]. The use of the 
linear model is justified as the active control tends to reduce 
the effect of non-linearity in the wheelsets [17] and it can be 
demonstrated by the equations given in [18]. The variable and 
parameters of the vehicle scheme are defined in the Appendix. 
Figure 2 shows the overall fault tolerant control (FTC) scheme 
for the railway vehicle used in this study. The FTC scheme 
consists of two parts: the first part is a re-configuration active 
controller, and the other an FDI scheme for detecting and 
isolating potential component failure(s). The FDI will also be 
concerned with sensor faults [2], but this paper will deal with 
the issue of actuator failure(s) only. When the vehicle starts to 
run along a track, the output measurements from the vehicle 
model to the Kalman-Bucy Filter (KF) provide state estimates 
to the controller, while the controller calculates the torque 
demands which are sent to the actuators, and which then apply 
the required control torque to the vehicle’s wheelsets. At the 
same time, the output measurements from each actuator to the 
a local Kalman filter generate its own residuals which are then 
analyzed in order to provide information for identification of 
the actuator’s status. If an abnormal change is diagnosed based 
on information provided by the FDI filter, the controller re-
configuration unit will adjust the structure and the tuning of 
the controller in order to maintain the desired performance. 
 
 
Figure 2: Fault tolerant control scheme 
III. ACTUATOR DYNAMICS 
Different technologies can be considered in order to realize the 
actuation system in active suspension, such as pneumatic 
actuation, electro-hydraulic actuation, electro-mechanical 
actuation and electro-magnetic actuation [19]. However, in 
this study, electro-mechanical actuation is selected to meet the 
main requirement for the active control: to stabilize the 
kinematic modes and curving performance. The actuator 
model consists of two sections: the first models the electrical 
dynamics of a dc motor, while the second models the 
mechanical parts of the motor inertia and gearbox ratio.  The 
linear model for the actuator is given in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), 
respectively. 
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The nomenclatures for symbols used in the above equations 
are provided in the Appendix—together with the parameter 
values assumed for all calculations presented in this section. 
The use of a Proportional-integral (PI) controller for the 
actuator is found to satisfy the requirements for the control of 
torque output, as given in Eq. (3). 
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Where e represents an error value as the difference between 
the measured current (ia) of the dc motor and the desired 
current set-point (iset); this can be determined readily from the 
demand torque (τw) discussed in section 2, as the current is 
proportional to the gear ratio and motor constant as shown in 
Eq. (4). 
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If both actuators remain fully functional, vehicle stability and 
good curving performance on a curved track can be achieved. 
However, if one of the actuators fails, the vehicle, its stability 
and performance can be significantly affected [18]. This 
research considers the two most common actuator failures: 
fail-hard and fail-soft. The fail-hard is a failure condition 
when the motor shaft of an actuator becomes immovable (i.e. 
blocked); this could be caused by a mechanical jam due to a 
lack of lubrication [20]. The study in [18] demonstrated that 
an actuator with hard-failure does not have a major problem 
with stability, but the vehicle performance on curves can be 
significantly affected and hence the priority for the control 
reconfiguration will be to provide an improved steering action. 
A fail-soft condition is a failure whereby the control surface 
moves freely without providing any moment to the vehicle, 
which may result due to a failure of the electric motor to 
deliver any output torque [20]. In this scenario, the motor 
current for the failed actuator is zero, and as a result, the 
control torque for the failure actuator becomes zero; therefore, 
the actuator is unable to stabilize the kinematic mode of the 
wheelset and therefore the control reconfiguration will need to 
focus on the provision of stability control [5]. It is clear that 
the effective detection and isolation for potential actuator 
failures (as presented in the section below) will play a critical 
part in the overall fault tolerance scheme for the active control 
of railway vehicles.  
IV. DESIGN OF THE FDI SCHEME 
In this study, a KF-based method is used to monitor the 
actuator conditions. Therefore, the residuals can be generated 
to capture between the estimated data cyˆ  and measured data
cy indicated by the sensors. The KF filter is implemented here 
to monitor the actuator status instead of estimating the 
actuator’s states. Equation (5) defines a state-space 
representation of the actuator model for the KF design. 
  
In the equation, the derivative of the torque ( g ) between the 
wheelset and gearbox is considered as a noise source in the 
design; the inclusion of ( g ) in the design will show that the 
resulting KF provides adequate information for the FDI 
function. In the design, a small value of 0.001 is used for the 
torque variable ( g ) to have a full rank of matrix Ac. In this 
study, two sensing options will be discussed.  In option 1, each 
actuator is equipped with two sensors–one to measure the 
actuator speed and the other to measure the motor current [21]. 
The output equation for the measurements is given in Eq. (6).  
                     ccccc
vHxCy   
Where; 
                    
  ;Tamc iy   
     (6) 
 
In option 2, an additional sensor is included, a strain gauge 
measuring the torque applied to the wheelset from the actuator 
gearbox. The output equation for the measurement is given in 
Eq. (7). 
                  ccccc vHxCy   
Where; 
                   ;Tgamc iy   
   (7) 
Where Cc can be obtained readily from the system matrix Ac, 
and vc represents the measurement noise vector. In this study, 
all measurement noises are set to 2% of their absolute 
maximum values at the vehicle speed of 50(m.sec
-1
). By 
tuning the covariance matrix for the process noise Qc, the 
tracking performance and robustness of the KF can be 
thoroughly studied. The process noise is set to the covariance 
value of the derivative of the torque between the wheelset and 
gearbox, while the generated residuals of the KF will be used 
to provide information for the condition monitoring tasks. 
A. Fail-hard detection and isolation 
When an actuator fails in hard mode the actuator is 
immovable, i.e. the movement of the faulty actuator would be 
severely limited (due to elasticity in the connections). For 
example, Figure 3 indicates that the motor rotational velocity 
for the leading wheelset when the front actuator was locked 
significantly reduced. The study reveals that the generated 
residuals with the sensor option 1 alone are not sufficient to 
provide adequate information for fault identification in the 
event of actuator fail-hard, as all generated residual residuals 
are almost identical to the normal condition. This is due to the 
fact that the measurement signals used for the sensor option 1 
do not provide information about the effect of the dynamic 
conditions of the wheelset (i.e. the load) on the actuator.  
Although the measured signal of the motor rotational velocity 
is reduced, it cannot be used alone for FDI as a benchmark is 
required to identify an abnormal change. The FDI may 
however be possible with some extra data processing. 
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                        Figure 3: Measured motor rotational velocity 
This study uses the standard deviation ratio of measurement of 
the rotational velocity of the motor to its residual to detect and 
isolate the actuator with the hard failure. This is because when 
the actuator fail-hard occurs either in the leading or trailing 
wheelset, the motor rotational velocity of the faulty actuator is 
potentially reduced, whereas the generated residuals remain 
unchanged; therefore, the amount ratio can provide a reliable 
indication of when the fault occurred. The standard deviation 
(STD) was preferred here as the actuator can be locked in 
different positions. Figure 4 shows the standard deviation 
running window with a size of 200(m.sec) of the ratio of the 
front motor rotational velocity to its residual, when the leading 
actuator fails hard. It clearly indicates that the ratios for the 
wheelsets with the faulty actuator are significantly lower. 
Similar results will be found when the trailing actuator fails 
hard.   
 
Figure 4: STD ratio of motor rotational velocity to residual – front actuator 
 
In the sensor option 2, the fault detection can be possible 
simply by the evaluation of the residuals in the event of fail-
hard, because the inclusion of an additional measurement 
provides extra information about the torque between the 
gearbox and the wheelset. Figures 5, 6 and 7 compare the 
generated residuals for the leading actuator between the 
normal condition, and when the leading actuator is in fail-to-
hard mode. They clearly show that the level of the error 
signals is significantly increased for the faulty actuator, 
whereas the generated residuals for the healthy actuator do not 
show significant changes. In the scenario of trailing actuator 
fail-hard, the generated residuals for the leading actuator are 
approximately equal to the normal condition, while the faulty 
actuator for the trailing wheelset generates higher residuals 
compared to the normal condition.   
 
        Figure 5: Residuals from motor rotational velocity – front actuator    
 
           Figure 6: Residuals from motor current – front actuator     
 
               Figure 7: Residuals from gearbox torque – front actuator           
In order to extract features for the FDI, the root mean square 
or standard deviation of the residuals can be considered; 
however in this study, the latter is preferred as an actuator may 
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lock-up at different positions rather than just at the zero 
position. 
B.  Fail-soft detection and isolation 
The actuator in the event of fail-soft can lead to system 
instability, and therefore the residuals generated by the 
observer in either sensor option 1 or option 2 will be expected 
to show an oscillation—or a limit cycle if the non-linearity of 
the wheel-rail profiles is considered. Figures 8, 9 and 10 
compare the generated residuals of the front actuator when 
options 1 and 2 are used for fault detection. They show the 
generated residuals of motor rotational speed, motor current 
and torque between the gearbox and wheelset in the normal 
condition, and when the leading actuator fails in soft mode. 
They noticeably indicate that the generated residual signals of 
the leading actuator are radically magnified, as the faulty 
actuator is not able to deliver any torque to the wheelset. 
Although the generated residuals of the rear actuator which 
functions properly increase, this gain is slow, and an abnormal 
change in actuator can be identified within 200(m.sec), as seen 
in Figure 11. Therefore, it is necessary to enable the controller 
to be re-scheduled to cope with the identified fault, before 
causing any further damage to the healthy actuator and to 
maintain vehicle safety. Similar results can be achieved when 
the trailing actuator fails soft. It seems that the use of residuals 
is sufficient to detect the actuator fail-soft and to identify 
whether the fail-soft occurs at either the front or rear actuator. 
In order to detect the difference(s) between the actuator in the 
hard failure and the soft failure when option 2 is used, and as 
all the generated residuals of the faulty actuator increase, the 
generated residual from the motor rotational velocity can be 
considered due to the fact that the magnitude of those 
generated residuals does not exceed 4(rad.sec
-1
) in the fail-
hard condition (Figure 5), whereas it will increase drastically 
in the event of fail-soft (Figure 8). 
 
        Figure 8: Residuals from motor rotational velocity – front actuator   
 
             Figure 9: Residuals from motor current – front actuator 
 
Figure 10: Residuals from torque – front actuator 
  
 
  Figure 11: Residuals from motor rotational velocity – rear actuator   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a novel FDI strategy for actively 
controlled railway vehicles in the event of actuator failure, in 
order to ensure system safety and reliability under fault 
conditions. Two different options with different combinations 
of sensors have been suggested for developing fault detection 
in order to monitor the condition of the actuators. In the first 
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option, the actuator in the hard mode can be isolated by 
computing the standard deviation ratio of the measurements of 
the motor rotational velocity to its residual. In the scenario of 
the fail-soft, FDI can be achieved through the residuals’ 
evaluation. In the second option, the type and location of the 
actuator failure can be identified readily through the residual 
evaluation.  
Research is ongoing to integrate the rescheduling technique 
into the developed methods of FDI in order to implement a 
fault-tolerance technique for actively controlled wheelsets that 
will justify the safety and reliability of this new technology for 
use in the railway industry.   
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APPENDIX 
Vehicle symbol and parameter in the simulation  
Symbols Parameters 
vgww yyyy ,,, 21
 
Lateral diplacement of leading, trailing wheelset,   
bogie frame and vehicle body                  
gww  ,, 21  
Yaw displacement of leading, trailing wheelset and 
bogi frame  
gVs ,  
Vehicle forward speed (50m/s), Gravity (9.8 m.s-2)  
   
ww Im ,  
wheelset mass (1250 kg) and yaw inertia (700   kgm2) 
 
vg l,l  
Half guage of wheelset(0.75 m), half spacing of        
axle(1.225 m) 
 
,0r  
wheel radius(0.45 m), and conicity (0.2) 
 
gg Im ,  
Bogie mass(6945 kg), and Yaw inertia   (3153 kgm2)  
 
scsc CK ,  
Secondary Lateral and longitudinal  stiffness (511  
kNm-1), and  damping(37 kNsm-1)  
 
ss CK ,  
primary Lateral  stiffness (4750 kNm-1), and  
damping  (7705 N sm-1 )  
 
vm  
Half vehicle mass (15000kg) 
 
2211, ff  
Longitudinal/ lateral creepage coefficient   (10MN). 
 
21,RR  
Radius of the curved track at the leading and trailing  
Wheeslet(1250 m). 
21
, cc   
cant angle of the curved track at the leading 
and    trailing  wheelset (6°) 
 
21
, tt yy  
Track lateral diplacement for leading and trailing 
wheelsets 
 
21
, ww   
 Controlled torque for leading and trailing weelset  
   
mI  
Motor moment of inertia (0.00115 kg.m2) 
 
aR  
Motor armature resistance (0.112Ω) 
 
aL  
Motor armature inductance (9.04e-4 H) 
 
tK  
Motor torque constants (1.611 N.m.A-1) 
 
bK  
Motor back e.m.f constant (1.305) 
 
n  Gear ratio (1/87) 
 
gK  Gearbox drive stiffness(1.131102e6 N.m.rad
-1) 
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